ALCANÇA QUEM NÃO CANSA

HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE

2011-11-01T15:42:00.002+02:00

DIREITOS HUMANOS EM AFRICA: UMA PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA

Por Constâncio Nguja
Especialista em Política Africana

Introdução
Escrevo este artigo uma semana após a morte de Muhammar Qadafi, ex-líder da Líbia. Segundo o mundo ocidental, trata-se de um tirano, ditador e grande violador dos direitos humanos. E como é que este mesmo homem era visto pelo seu povo? Como era ele visto pelo povo africano em geral? E como outros políticos como Robert Mugabe são vistos?
Como podemos avaliar e encarar a questão dos direitos humanos em África? É em torno destas questões que o presente artigo visa reflectir. O artigo surge da necessidade de reflectir sobre a passagem dos 30 anos após a adopção da Carta Africana dos Direitos do Homem e dos Povos (a 21 de Outubro). O mesmo será baseado na revisão bibliográfica, seguida da experiência passada em canais de informação.

O Conceito de Direitos Humanos

Desde a adopção da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos, em 1948, tem havido uma preocupação constante para a proteção de certos direitos básicos, que um homem tem de desfrutar pelo mero facto da sua condição de ser humano. O conceito de direito humano é tão antigo quanto a sociedade humana. Este conceito evoluiu e foi, em grande medida, um instrumento de revolta contra os governos tiranos.
Hoje, o conceito de direitos humanos está intimamente ligado ao "Estado" ou uma sociedade organizada com um governo, e refere-se à relação entre o indivíduo e o Estado ou seu governo, seus direitos de participação política, as liberdades de que o indivíduo deve desfrutar e suas reivindicações sobre o Estado no que tange à satisfação das necessidades básicas da vida, sejam elas ligadas à saúde, educação, entre outras. Em outras palavras, os Estados e Governos têm uma responsabilidade primordial de proteger, reconhecer, observar e expandir as fronteiras dos direitos fundamentais dos cidadãos e dos outros seres humanos sob seu território e jurisdição. Se qualquer Estado ou Governo não cumpre com essa responsabilidade, ele pode ser obrigado a perder a sua legitimidade e o direito de comandar a obediência e lealdade dos cidadãos.

Hoje em dia contamos com ideias internacionalmente aceites sobre os direitos – sejam de natureza civil, política, social ou económico-ambientais. Os Estados são obrigados a aderir a esses regimes de direitos, convertidos nos seus deveres de respeitar, proteger, promover e satisfazê-los em relação aos seus povos.

Breve histórico da protecção dos direitos humanos em África
A) Os direitos humanos e dos povos nos períodos pré-colonial e colonial (Por José H. Fischel de Andrade, in http://www.dhnet.org.br/direitos/sip/africa/sistemaafricano.htm)
A África durante seu período pré-colonial era composta de cidades independentes e principados, reinos e impérios, sendo suas relações baseadas na soberania, independência e cooperação. Apesar de não ser homogêneos, nem cultural nem politicamente, havia uma série de características comuns que, ainda hoje, se diferenciam de forma destacada dos padrões ocidentais.
Essas características podem ser resumidas, grosso modo, no conceito de ideal comunitário. Este se distingue do mundo ocidental em função de três pontos cruciais: a) as pessoas não se vêem como indivíduos, nem se preocupam com seus direitos individuais, sendo a cidadania atingida em razão do papel da pessoa na comunidade, estando todas preocupadas com o grupo, com os direitos étnico-culturais; b) as decisões políticas são tomadas através de consenso comunitário, devendo o chefe consultar os mais velhos, que representam o povo – destaca-se a possibilidade de “oposição leal”, isto é, os leais fazem parte do grupo e os oponentes, por definição, não são leais; c) a riqueza é automaticamente redistribuída, não havendo conceito de propriedade privada – o que faz com que o homem rico seja respeitado somente se ele divide seus pertences com seus familiares e príncipes de seu grupo étnico-social. Nota-se, portanto, que o senso comunitário tinha como contrapeso dos direitos e privilégios certos deveres, que poderiam ou não se reflectir na violação de outros direitos.
Outros factores de extrema importância em qualquer organização sócio-política pré-colonial africana eram a família e a vila, ou a tribo. A terra contava pouco e por essa razão, para os Estados africanos, fronteiras eram algo móvel, flexível, indefinido (...)
A dominação e influência estrangeiras – consolidadas através da colonização – tiveram impacto imensurável no continente africano. Um ex-Ministro da Educação dos Camarões, e conceituado jurista, define bem algumas das consequências do período colonial: a participação do continente na vida internacional foi reduzida abruptamente, extinguindo-se praticamente o desenvolvimento de ideias, conceitos e princípios políticos; o conceito tradicional de que a vida humana era sagrada foi ridicularizado; o novo sistema social mostrou uma face diferente, distante do indivíduo e do espírito familiar; o respeito pela dignidade humana passou a significar respeito pelo homem branco, posto que os valores dominantes passaram a ser ocidentais; foi, por fim, o término da crença nos valores humanos.
O período colonial significou a diminuição, senão a extinção por completo, do exercício dos direitos humanos. Não havia respeito nem aos direitos civis e políticos, nem tão pouco aos económicos, sociais e culturais. Não houve, no geral, preocupação por parte dos Estados Colonizadores quanto ao desenvolvimento econômico de suas colónias – pelo menos até o início da segunda Guerra, quando as exigências de estado de beligerância forçaram uma consideração mais racional de seus recursos.
Não obstante, apesar de as potências colonizadoras não estarem preocupadas em conceder aos cidadãos das terras colonizadas os mesmos direitos facilitados aos de seus territórios, e até mesmo levando-se em consideração todas as atrocidades cometidas, não se pode negar certos aspectos positivos que tiveram lugar durante a época da colonização. Dentre eles, pode-se mencionar a eliminação de diversos conflitos inter-étnicos; a abolição, onde existia, da escravidão doméstica africana.
Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a situação política no continente africano mudou consideravelmente, haja vista a aquisição da independência de seus Estados – processo ocorrido, principalmente, durante as décadas de 60 e 70. A influência destes Estados deu oportunidade ao estabelecimento de uma organização regional nos moldes já existentes em outros continentes; e que, como suas análogas, teve papel fundamental no desenvolvimento da protecção dos direitos humanos – apesar da diversidade, muitas vezes, de objectivos e métodos utilizados.
B) Os Direitos Humanos e dos Povos face à independência dos Estados africanos e o papel da Organização da Unidade Africana na sua promoção e protecção até meados dos anos 70.
Quando a Carta das Nações Unidas foi adoptada e aberta à assinatura, em 1945, somente quatro Estados africanos eram independentes: o Egipto, a Libéria, a Etiópia e a África do Sul. À medida que os novos Estados africanos adquiriam sua independência, era natural que fossem manifestando sua adesão a todos os instrumentos globais – não só para afirmarem sua posição de Estados soberanos, como também para se inserirem no cenário mundial. Entretanto, existia uma certa artificialidade quanto ao real grau de comprometimento destes novos Estados com certos instrumentos concertados no plano global. Exemplo pertinente é a Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos, de 1948, à qual os Estados Africanos sempre manifestaram sua adesão, tendo-a respeitado raramente.
Os motivos que ensejam este comportamento são de fundamentação ora histórico-política, ora económica. A alegação sempre feita é a de que os Estados africanos não estavam presentes quando da redação destes documentos. Consequentemente, faz com que estes não tenham sua legitimidade global que têm como resultado a não observância destes instrumentos, como o desmantelamento dos sistemas políticos multipartidários herdados da época colonial e a sua substituição por sistemas monopartidários ou regidos por ditaduras militares; a impossibilidade, em função dos sistemas políticos mencionados, do respeito aos direitos civis e políticos, tais como liberdade de associação, de imprensa, eleições regulares, direito à vida, propriedade, etc.; violações massivas de direitos em razão de golpes de estado e de situações de emergência; não reconhecimento de realidades étnicas e religiosas distintas da adoptada oficialmente, só para mencionar alguns.
Depararam, pois, os Estados africanos, no período pós-guerra, com duas realidade difíceis de serem conciliadas; a mundial, de (re)construção, de (re)estruturação de esforços com vistas, inter alia, à protecção, nos mais diversos aspectos, dos direitos humanos; e a continental, de paulatina libertação das metrópoles, que comportava uma construção, uma estruturação completa, iniciada quase do nada, tanto política, quanto económica e jurídica (se comparadas com padrões ocidentais).
Foi tendo como pano de fundo esse contexto conturbado, de emancipação e afirmação políticas, que tomou força, principalmente por volta de 1958, o movimento pan-africano. Este culminou com a adesão da Carta da Organização da Unidade Africana em 1963, quando 32 Estados africanos já eram membros da Organização das Nações Unidas. Hoje em dia são 54 os Estados membros da UA (sucessora da OUA), com a adesão do Sul do Sudão.
A Carta da OUA foi defendida como “uma Carta para a Libertação”, visto que verdadeiras preocupações dos Estados africanos, nela contidas, serem relativas à unidade africana, à não-interferência nos assuntos internos dos países – tomados individualmente -, e à libertação, não só do sistema colonial como também do neocolonial. Esta perspectiva fez com que a Carta da OUA fosse constantemente criticada como sendo nada mais que uma formulação de direitos dos Chefes de Estado, uma institucionalização de um sindicato de Presidentes africanos, cuja tarefa principal seria a normalização das relações de seus “membros feudais”.
A falta de afinidade entre a OUA e os direitos humanos deve ser analisado tanto histórica quanto politicamente. A expressão “Direitos Humanos” não figurava no projecto etíope, de 17 de Maio de 1963, que serviu como base de discussão, e que é preferido em relação ao projecto apresentado por Ghana. O máximo que se conseguiu inserir na Carta da OUA a seguinte cláusula preambular:
“Persuadidos de que a Carta das Nações Unidas e a Declaração Universal dos Direitos do Homem, a cujos princípios reafirmamos nossa adesão, oferecem uma base sólida para uma cooperação pacífica e frutuosa entre nossos Estados”.
A referência feita à Carta das Nações Unidas e à Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos, em disposição preambular, teve como escopo não comprometer os Estados membros quanto à observância daqueles direitos, haja vista quedarem-se sob a rubrica de “desejos”, não havendo, pois, obrigação jurídica de os efectivar. Não obstante, a menção feita na Carta constitutiva da OUA aos princípios de instrumentos concentrados em fórum global, na qual não houve participação de grande maioria dos estados africanos, impossibilita todo e qualquer rechaço, por parte dos membros da OUA, dos direitos lá enunciados, sob o argumento de que estes mesmos Estados africanos não participaram na sua elaboração (supra); o que, consequentemente, solidifica o princípio da universidade dos direitos humanos.
As esperanças de respeito aos direitos humanos, baseado na disposição preambular mencionada, não encontraram respaldo na realidade, principalmente em razão dos princípios enunciados do Artigo III da Carta da OUA, que destacam inter alia a não ingerência nos assuntos internos dos Estados e o respeito pela soberania.
Foram precisamente estes dois princípios que fizeram com que os direitos humanos não fossem objecto de discussão por quase duas décadas nos órgãos da OUA. Dessa forma, a OUA manteve-se indiferente frente a constantes e massivas violações de direitos humanos, enfatizando sempre que se tratava de assuntos internos dos Estados em questão, que o princípio da não-interferência era um óbice para qualquer acção por parte da Organização, e que a OUA não era um tribunal que pudesse julgar seus membros por suas políticas internas.
A importância dada aos princípios da soberania e da não interferência revela que na prática da OUA houve constante ausência de interesse por parte da maioria dos governos africanos em seu conjunto ou individualidade com vistas a assegurar o efectivo respeito aos direitos humanos e às liberdades fundamentais. Na verdade, ao se abrigarem sob o princípio da não-interferência nos assuntos domésticos dos outros Estados, os governos africanos não observavam o princípio básico de responsabilidade colectiva que existe no campo da protecção dos direitos humanos.
Este tipo de atitude por parte dos Estados africanos começou a entrar em contradição com os próprios objetivos da OUA. Isto porque os direitos humanos, que eram utilizados como o ponto de reivindicação para a luta contra o colonialismo e o apartheid, quando violados pelos Estados membros da OUA não encontraram protecção – podendo-se considerar como única excepção a tutela do direito à autodeterminação.
A frequência com que estas contradições ocorriam era preocupante. Os líderes africanos usavam o slogan “Respeito pela dignidade humana” para fortalecer a luta pela independência, mas esqueciam-se desse dado logo que assumiam o poder.
A década de setenta testemunhou violações condenadas por governos de países de distintos continentes, como a expulsão do Uganda, pelo General Idi Amim Dada, de britânicos de origem asiática, ou então a expulsão do Gabão, pelo Presidente Omar Bongo, de cidadãos de Benin. Apesar da reprovação da comunidade internacional, a OUA não se manifestou em nenhum destes episódios – o que, naturalmente, teve como resultado uma gradual neutralização de qualquer simpatia que existisse com relação a causas como o anti-racismo e anti-colonialismo -, tendo sempre como motivo para este procedimento o respeito pelo princípio da não-interferência.
Apesar do extremado sentimento de ciúmes por parte dos governos africanos com relação à sua soberania – então recém-adquirida – alguns acontecimentos, tanto de ordem interna quanto externa, ensejaram uma séria reflexão e avaliação do seu papel – assim como do princípio da não-interferência – no contexto político africano. Internamente, afora as próprias violações cometidas pelos Estados, que por si só já chamavam a atenção mundial, teve fundamental importância a queda, em 1978, de três ditaduras; quais sejam, a do Imperador Jean Bokassa, da República Centro-Africana, a do Presidente Nguéma Macias, da Guiné Equatorial, e a do General Idi Amin Dada, do Uganda. Como factor externo deveras importante, teve-se a “cruzada pelos direitos humanos” iniciada, em 1979, pelo então Presidente Jimmy Carter, como parte da política externa norte-americana. Os Estados Unidos, assim como diversos países ocidentais, começaram a condicionar seus programas de assistência ao efectivo respeito dos direitos humanos nos países beneficiários. Ainda em nível externo, as Nações Unidas tiveram papel sobremaneira importante, principalmente através da promoção de eventos que chamaram a atenção para a necessidade de se concertar um sistema regional próprio para a protecção dos direitos humanos em África.
Estes acontecimentos levaram os Estados africanos à ponderada conclusão de que somente com a erosão (pelo menos parcial) do princípio da não-interferência e soberania é que se tornaria viável falar-se de um eficaz sistema de promoção e protecção de direitos humanos.
Foram estas as principais barreiras superadas, no contexto da OUA, para o surgimento da Carta Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos.
C) A Organização da Unidade Africana e a Exegese da Carta Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos
Evento de suma importância na história da OUA, e igualmente na da protecção dos direitos humanos, a Conferência de Lagos, Nigéria, de 1961, deve ser destacada principalmente pelo carácter precursor. Desta Conferência, na qual participaram 194 países, advogados e professores de Direito de 23 países africanos, assim como de 9 países de fora do continente, uma das declarações de maior importância é a que afirma:
“b) que, com o objectivo de dar total efeito à Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos de 1948, esta Conferência convida os governos africanos a estudarem a possibilidade de se adoptar uma Convenção Africana de Direitos Humanos, de tal sorte que as Conclusões desta conferência sejam salvaguardadas pela criação de uma Corte de jurisdição apropriada, à qual todas as pessoas sob a jurisdição dos países signatários terão recursos”.
Só após duas décadas é que se implementou, apesar de parcialmente, este dispositivo.
Em Maio de 1963, na Conferência dos Chefes de Estado e de Governo Africanos, quando trinta Estados Africanos assinavam a Carta constitutiva da OUA, a proposta de uma Convenção Africana de Direitos Humanos foi novamente discutida. Entretanto, os governos africanos preferiram desviar seus esforços para outros assuntos, considerados prioritários”.
Da institucionalização da OUA até a segunda metade de década de setenta, todas as moções dirigidas com vistas à protecção dos direitos humanos ficaram restritas a seminários, conferências, simpósios, haja vista os princípios da não-interferência e da soberania obstaculizarem toda e qualquer tentativa de operalização protectora. O pensamento de vários intelectuais era o de que mesmo estes eventos de cunho académico não geravam os resultados positivos esperados, tornando-se pouco provável uma mudança de perspectivas – prevalecia, pois, o pessimismo.
Não obstante, em 1978, uma Revolução movida pela Nigéria foi adoptada na Sessão da Comissão de Direitos Humanos da ONU, cujo escopo era precisamente requerer às Nações Unidas assistência para o estabelecimento de instituições regionais de direitos humanos.
Após quase um ano, durante a 16ª Conferência dos Chefes de Estado e de Governo Africanos, realizada em Monrávia, Libéria, de 17 a 20 de julho de 1979, o Presidente Leopold Sedar Senghor, do Senegal, propôs uma Resolução que levou à Decisão 115/XVI (1979). Esta versava sobre a preposição de um esboço preliminar, por um grupo de peritos, de uma Carta Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos, a qual vislumbraria, inter alia, o estabelecimento de órgãos para a promoção e protecção destes direitos.
Logo em seguida, entre 10 e 21 de Setembro de 1979, a pedido da Assembleia Geral e da Comissão de Direitos Humanos da ONU, e a convite do governo da Libéria, o Secretário-Geral das Nações Unidas organizou em Monróvia um seminário sobre o estabelecimento de comissões de direitos humanos, com especial referência à África. Uma de suas mais importantes conclusões sustenta que o princípio da não-interferência nos assuntos internos de um Estado soberano não deveria excluir a acção internacional quando da violação dos direitos humanos. Não obstante, considerou-se que a função principal da Comissão Africana de Direitos Humanos deveria ser primariamente promocional, posto que se constituiria na informação à população dos seus direitos.
Foi em Dakar, de 28 de Novembro a 8 de Dezembro de 1979, que o grupo de peritos, mencionados na Decisão 115/XVI (1979), se reuniu com o objectivo de preparar um esboço preliminar da Carta Africana. Eles se surpreenderam ao se deparar com um esboço preliminar da Carta Africana pelo Secretariado da OUA, o qual era bastante semelhante com os dispositivos das Convenções Europeias e Americana de Direitos Humanos. Ao rever a situação, a Consultoria Jurídica da OUA e o grupo de peritos chegaram à conclusão que a OUA necessita de um instrumento de direitos humanos diferente e especial, o qual lidasse especificamente com problemas africanos: devendo então ser dada ênfase aos direitos dos povos, aos deveres dos indivíduos, ao órgão que promoveria e protegeria os direitos constantes na Carta, à criação de obrigações pertinentes à segurança do Estado, e aos métodos de aplicação dos dispositivos da Carta. Outros factores que influenciam na relação da Carta foram inter alia a necessidade de se dar importância ao princípio da não-discriminação, de se enfatizar os princípios e objetivos da OUA, de se mostrar que a moral e os valores africanos ainda têm significância na sociedade africana, assim como de se dar o merecido destaque aos direitos económicos, sociais e culturais.
Uma vez concluído o esboço preliminar da Carta Africana, o Secretário-Geral da OUA convocou uma reunião ministerial para aprová-la. Esta realizou-se em Banjul, Gâmbia, de 9 a 15 de Junho de 1980. Neste período apenas 11 artigos foram revistos e adoptados. Isto se deu, como bem explica Emmanuel G. Bello, em função de dificuldades mormente psicológicas, podendo-se mencionar a falta de consenso, entre as delegações, no que tangia à conceituação política de direitos humanos; a atmosfera de suspeita entre as delegações; e a postura cautelosa, que preferia manter o status quo e não avançar progressivamente.
Frente ao relativo fracasso desta primeira reunião ministerial, outra foi convocada para se realizar entre 7 e 19 de Janeiro de 1981, também em Banjul. Quarenta dos então 50 Estados membros da OUA participaram nesta segunda reunião, quando todos os artigos remanescentes foram revistos e aprovados.
A 18ª Conferência dos Chefes de Estado e Governo da OUA, realizada de 17 a 26 de Junho de 1981 em Nairobi, Quénia, procedeu à aprovação da Carta Africana, que a partir de então ficou aberta à assinatura, adesão e ratificação dos Estados membros da OUA.

Os instrumentos e instituições de protecção dos direitos humanos em Africa
Segundo MARIA JOSÉ MORAIS PIRES, in CARTA AFRICANA DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS E DOS POVOS (disponivel em http://www.dhnet.org.br/direitos/sip/africa/ua_pires_carta_africana_direitos_povos.pdf),

A Carta Africana constitui naturalmente um contributo importante para o desenvolvimento do direito regional africano e preenche uma lacuna em matéria de protecção dos direitos do homem. Trata-se de um progresso significativo, resultante de um compromisso entre as concepções políticas e jurídicas opostas, que veio trazer ao direito internacional dos direitos do homem a consagração de uma relação dialéctica entre direitos e deveres, por um lado, e a enunciação tanto de direitos do homem como de direitos dos povos, por outro. As tradições históricas e os valores da civilização africana influenciaram os Estados autores da Carta, a qual traduz, pelo menos no plano dos princípios, uma especificidade africana do significado dos direitos do homem. Uma outra inovação que merece relevo, consubstancia-se na ausência de distinção entre direitos civis e políticos, por um lado, e direitos sociais e económicos por outro, o que constitui aliás a consagração da mais recente doutrina do direito internacional dos direitos do homem. A Carta não distingue a natureza dos direitos, atribui-lhes igual força jurídica e submete-os todos à “jurisdição”, ou melhor, ao controlo da Comissão Africana dos Direitos do Homem. Assim, em teoria, a Comissão poderá ser chamada a apreciar a actividade dos Estados em matéria de acções destinadas a assegurar o exercício dos direitos económicos e sociais.
A enunciação dos deveres revela-se também uma das originalidades da Carta de Banjul. A referência aos deveres tinha já surgido num instrumento jurídico não vinculativo – a Declaração Americana dos Direitos e Deveres do Homem de 1948 – mas a Carta Africana revela-se o único tratado relativo a direitos do homem que consagra, de forma desenvolvida, a noção de deveres individuais não só em relação ao próximo, mas também em função da comunidade, na linha da tradição africana. Este entendimento constitui uma “ruptura” com a concepção ocidental dos direitos do homem, que considera à luz da doutrina positivista, a dialéctica direito-dever essencialmente baseada no direito como um conjunto de prerrogativas, que originam por reciprocidade um feixe de deveres ou obrigações. A “autonomização” dos deveres altera a natureza deste conceito, embora não seja possível afirmar que a Carta estabelece uma relação hierárquica entre direitos e deveres, nem tão-pouco uma precedência dos direitos sobre os deveres. Determina apenas – com alguma imprecisão – o conteúdo dos deveres, bem como os seus beneficiários. Com efeito, a Carta impõe várias obrigações ao indivíduo em relação à comunidade, as quais não decorrem de um “direito subjectivo”, no sentido kelseniano, pois constituem verdadeiras obrigações autónomas, sem paralelo em outros instrumentos de direito internacional de direitos do homem.
Para além das inovações trazidas pela Carta Africana, importa ainda assinalar algumas lacunas de natureza técnico-jurídica, do seu articulado.
Assim, a definição imprecisa dos direitos e a sua enunciação de forma ambígua e insuficiente, bem como a ausência de limitações específicas, ou melhor, a formulação de limitações que protegem o Estado, em detrimento do indivíduo, reduzem o conteúdo dos direitos, por vezes abaixo do nível mínimo exigido pelo direito internacional dos direitos do homem 6. É certo, que no artigo 27.º, n.º 2, surge, incluída no capítulo dos deveres, o que se poderá designar de “cláusula geral de limitação” 7, aplicável genericamente a todos os direitos. Assim, os direitos e liberdades exercem-se no “respeito dos direitos de outrem, da segurança colectiva, da moral e do interesse comum”. Para além de uma objecção de natureza sistemática – a sua inclusão no capítulo dos deveres – a imprecisão dos conceitos, deixa ao Estado uma larga margem de apreciação, dado que será sempre possível encontrar um fim legítimo para justificar uma ingerência nos direitos e liberdades dos indivíduos. Caberá naturalmente à Comissão delimitar com rigor a aplicação desta norma, de forma a evitar interpretações distorcidas daquele preceito.

Que direitos estão protegidos na Carta Africana dos Direitos do Homem e dos Povos?
Ao longo do catálogo dos direitos inscritos na Carta Africana transparece a influência da Declaração Universal dos Direitos do Homem. Sem entrar aqui no debate da sua obrigatoriedade, cabe notar que a técnica jurídica usada, ou seja uma enunciação declarativa, sem excessivas preocupações de limitações e garantias, afigura-se análoga ao texto de 1948. Por outro lado, como é conhecido, o sistema dos Pactos das Nações Unidas, prevê dois regimes diferenciados consoante a natureza dos direitos, designadamente nos meios de garantia, sendo que o Pacto relativo aos Direitos Económicos, Sociais e Culturais apenas exige uma execução progressiva das acções necessárias ao exercício dos direitos e o Pacto dos Direitos Civis e Políticos está submetido ao controlo de um órgão para-jurisdicional, o Comité dos Direitos do Homem.
Neste contexto, na Carta de Banjul, a indistinção entre os direitos civis e políticos de natureza perceptiva e os direitos económicos e sociais de natureza programática 16, tanto no que se refere à sistemática, como no respeitante à sujeição à competência da Comissão, revela-se assim muito inovadora. Esta identidade de regimes parece implicar que os Estados partes pretendem assegurar de imediato o exercício de todos os direitos previstos na Carta e, em última análise, sujeitam os Estados à respectiva apreciação pela Comissão.
A concepção individualista dos direitos do homem está naturalmente presente na letra e no espírito das normas da Carta de Banjul, em parte por influência da Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem, apesar da tradição social africana incluir o indivíduo no grupo, num conjunto de relações familiares e étnicas. Por outro lado, a própria ideia de abstenção do Estado inerente aos chamados direitos da “primeira geração” está hoje completamente ultrapassada, tanto pela doutrina como pela jurisprudência. A exigência de acções do Estado, tanto se verifica nos chamados direitos da “primeira” como da “segunda geração”, o que aliás decorre do espírito da Carta Africana. Os seus autores quiseram claramente ultrapassar a dialéctica marxista, que rejeita os direitos da “primeira geração”, para impor uma relação de interdependência e igualdade entre todos os direitos.
Uma observação que pode desde já ser feita à generalidade dos direitos refere-se às cláusulas de limitações, as quais se revelam imprecisas, remetendo em alguns casos os limites dos direitos para a “lei”, sem que se defina o que se entende por lei. Ora, em regimes de partido único, afigura-se-nos que a lei não tende a proteger os direitos e liberdades dos cidadãos, mas sim o poder do Estado e das autoridades públicas. A ausência de cláusulas limitativas do tipo europeu, como sejam as limitações necessárias a uma “sociedade democrática” não se encontram nas disposições da Carta de Banjul. Cabe ainda referir brevemente, os princípios gerais de igualdade e não discriminação que se encontram inscritos nos artigos 2.º e 3.º da Carta Africana, os quais, à semelhança dos Pactos e da Convenção Europeia, não são disposições autónomas, só podendo ser invocadas em conjunto com a aplicação de um direito protegido no texto.

A situação dos direitos humanos em África
A situação dos direitos humanos na África é, em geral considerada preocupante, de acordo com observadores da ONU, do mundo ocidental e de organizações não-governamentais. Governos democráticos parecem estar a aumentar em África, embora ainda não sejam a maioria A National Geographic declara que 13 das nações africanas podem ser consideradas verdadeiramente democráticas. Muitas nações reconheceram direitos humanos básicos nominalmente para todos os cidadãos, embora na prática esses nem sempre sejam reconhecidos, uma vez que não foram criados poderes judiciários razoavelmente independentes.
Ao se analisar a questão dos direitos humanos, deve-se ter em conta os interesses das grandes potências, e o choque das civilizações. No que concerne aos interesses das grandes potências, basta nos recordarmos que, durante a Guerra Fria, as duas grandes potências (Estados Unidos da América e União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas) apresentavam retóricas diferentes sobre esse conceito. Por um lado tínhamos os EUA e os seus aliados a defenderem acerradamente os direitos civis e políticos (que caracterizam a democracia liberal), e por outro, a URSS e seus aliados a defenderem os direitos económicos e a justiça social (factos que caracterizam o Socialismo e Marxismo). Se bem que a democracia liberal (comandada) afirma-se ter vencido a Guerra Fria, hoje assiste-se uma corrida desenfreada em se introduzirem itens relativos ao Socialismo ou Marxismo. A título de exemplo, Barack Obama já foi acusado de ter caída pelo Socialismo pela sua luta em introduzir reformas no sistema sanitário dos EUA (confira em http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/19/nation/na-campaign19, ou http://prospect.org/article/what-right-wingers-mean-when-they-call-obama-socialist, dentre vários). Ademais, na famosa “Primavera Árabe” reivindicam-se direitos sociais (típicos do socialismo).
No que tange ao choque das civilizações, o politólogo americano Samuel Huntington afirmara que, após a Guerra Fria, a relativa vitória democrático-liberal e a vontade de expansionismo encontraria obstáculos ou conluios com algumas culturas como a chinesa, a latina, a budista, a hindu, a muçulmana e a africana.
Esse facto é visível na interpretação dos direitos humanos na contemporaneidade. Os direitos humanos definidos na óptica ocidental não são convergentes à óptica muçulmana, chinesa, budista, muito menos aos moldes patrimonialistas africanos.
A título de exemplo, o sistema internacional convivia com o Prémio Internacional Al-Gaddafi de Direitos Humanos (confira-se em http://www.gaddafiprize.org/English.htm ), para além dos seus nóbeis, entre outros. Entretanto, Qadafi era, aos olhos do ocidente, um vilão e violador dos direitos humanos.

CONCLUSÕES
O artigo trouxe uma resenha sobre o conceito de direitos humanos, assumpções e interpretações a este relacionados. Mas na essência este reflectiu sobre os 25 anos após a entrada em vigor da Carta Africana sobre os Direitos do Homem e dos Povos e os frutos que dela advêm ao nível do continente Africano.
Há melhorias no que tange à abertura democrática no continente Africano. Entrementes, existe desafios no que concerne às ideologias, crenças e culturas locais em relação aos ideais importados ou vigentes no mundo ocidental – é o chamado choque das civilizações. O problema se agrava se se tiver em conta que África em si não é monolítica, ou seja, os seus países não convergem em termos culturais, políticos, ideológicos, entre outros. Esse devia ser o primeiro passo – que se encontrasse um meio termo de uniformizar, pelo menos os modelos políticos, económicos – para que a interpretação do conceito de direitos humanos não fosse ambígua. E como dizem os nossos provérbios, “sempre há certeza de amanha será um outro dia!”

BIBLIOGRAFIA
Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Protocol to the African Charter on the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998) in Botha N 2 International Human Rights Law Study Guide (UNISA, 2005)
SERAC & Anor V. FRN (2002) 2 CHR 537 - African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Banjul Gambia, 30th Ordinary Session 13th - 27th October 2001.
Tiawan S. Gongloe - "Politics and Good Governance with Emphasis on Democracy, Human Rights and Ethics and National Integration in Africa." - The Perspective, Atlanta Georgia, November 5, 2002.
Wahiu W in The African Human Rights System: Towards the Co-Existence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006).

AFRICAºS POLITICAL MIRROR IN 2011

2011-10-13T17:20:00.002+02:00

E assim vai a Africa em 2011

Por Constâncio Nguja

Introdução
África é o terceiro continente mais extenso (atrás da Ásia e da América) com cerca de 30 milhões de quilômetros quadrados, cobrindo 20,3 % da área total da terra firme do planeta. É o segundo continente mais populoso da Terra (atrás da Ásia) com cerca de 900 milhões de pessoas, representando cerca de um sétimo da população do mundo, e 54 países independentes; apesar de existirem colônias pertencentes a países de outros continentes, tais como as Ilhas Canárias e os enclaves de Ceuta e Melilla, que pertencem à Espanha, o território ultramarino das ilhas de Santa Helena, Ascensão e Tristão da Cunha, que pertence ao Reino Unido, e as ilhas de Reunião e Mayotte, que pertencem à França.
Apresenta grande diversidade étnica, cultural, social e política. Nesse continente são visíveis as condições de pobreza, sendo o continente africano o mais pobre de todos; dos trinta países mais pobres do mundo (com mais problemas de subnutrição, analfabetismo, baixa expectativa de vida, etc.), pelo menos 21 são africanos. Apesar disso existem alguns poucos países com um padrão de vida razoável, ainda assim não existe nenhum país realmente desenvolvido na África.[3] O subdesenvolvimento, os conflitos entre povos e as enormes desigualdades sociais internas, são o resultado das grandes modificações introduzidas pelos colonizadores europeus. Atualmente os países africanos mais desenvolvidos são Líbia, Maurícias e Seicheles, com qualidades de vida superiores a de muitos países da Europa. Ainda há outros países africanos com qualidades de vida e indíces de desenvolvimento razoáveis, podendo destacar a maior economia africana, a África do Sul e outros países como Marrocos, Argélia, Tunísia, Cabo Verde e São Tomé e Príncipe.
A África costuma ser regionalizada de duas formas, a primeira forma, que valoriza a localização dos países e os dividem em cinco grupos, que são a África setentrional ou do Norte, a África Ocidental, a África central, a África Oriental e a África meridional. A segunda regionalização desse continente, que vem sendo muito utilizada, usa critérios étnicos e culturais (religião e etnias predominantes em cada região), é dividida em dois grandes grupos, a África Branca ou setentrional formado pelos oito países da África do norte, mais a Mauritânia e o Saara Ocidental, e a África Negra ou subsaariana formada pelos outros 44 países do continente.
O presente artigo pretende trazer uma resenha dos acontecimentos políticos que marcaram o continente negro em 2011.

As dinâmicas da política Africana
Em Janeiro de 2011 publiquei um artigo onde prognosticava a política externa e internacional .
No que tangia à África, o artigo referia que verificar-se-ia que:
• O debate sobre a Costa do Marfim tenderia a durar, caso a comunidade internacional não usasse a força para retirar o candidato perdedor, Laurent Gbagbo do poder. Que era necessário ressalvar que tal acção deveria tomar lugar a curto prazo, visto que depois, podia ser tarde, porque o inimigo já teria manipulado as populações a seu favor, para uma situação igual a que aconteceu com os Estados Unidos da América na Somália, entre 1992 e 1994;
• O pós-referendo traria muito que se discutir entre os opinion-makers sobre a política internacional, sobretudo de África. O resultado do referendo, a divergência entre os movimentos do Sul, o petróleo, o acesso ao mar, a região de Abiey, possível irredentismo para Darfur, a anunciada Sharia para o Norte, a caça a Bashir pelo Tribunal de Haia, entre outros, seriam os assuntos a serem debatidos nas próximas manchetes. (...)
Hoje, volvidos 10 meses de 2011, os dois assuntos já tiveram o seu desfecho.
Na Costa do Marfim, A eleição presidencial de 2010 levou à Segunda Guerra Civil naquele país. Depois de meses de negociações infrutíferas e violência esporádica, a crise entrou numa fase crítica quando forças de Alassane Ouattara tomaram o controlo da maior parte do país, com Laurent Gbagbo entrincheirado em Abidjan, maior cidade do país. Organizações internacionais relataram inúmeros casos de violações dos direitos humanos por ambos os lados. Na cidade de Duékoué, estima-se que centenas de pessoas tenham morrido como resultado da retirada das forças Liberianas que vieram em auxílio de Gbagbo. As forças da ONU e francesas tomaram uma acção militar contra Gbagbo. Gbagbo foi capturado depois de uma invasão em sua residência a 11 de Abril. Este facto culminou com a assumpção do poder presidencial por Alassane Ouatara, a 6 de Maio de 2011.
Este foi o primeiro desfecho para o caso da Costa do Marfim.
No que concerne ao Sul do Sudão, o referendo realizado entre os dias 9 e 15 de Janeiro, como consequência do Acordo de Naivasha assinado em 2005 , entre o governo central de Cartum e o Movimento Popular de Libertação do Sudão (SPLA / M), culminou com a proclamação daquele território como a mais nova nação do continente Africano.

Entretanto, mais acontecimentos políticos emergiram durante o ano:
1. A Resolução 1973 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas , que culminou com a intervenção para a retirada do regime de Muhammar Qadafi na Líbia, no poder há 42 anos;

2. Eleições presidenciais no Benin (que legitimaram a re-eleição do presidente Thomas Yayi Boni, no poder desde 2006), Cabo Verde (que culminaram com a vitória de Jorge Carlos Fonseca), Republica Centro Africana (legitimando a re-eleição do presidente François Bozizé), Chade (legitimando a re-eleição de Idriss Déby, no poder desde 1990), Níger (que elgeu pela primeira vez Mahamadou Issoufou), Nigéria (legitmando o presidente Goodluck Jonathan), São Tome (trazendo de volta Manuel Pinto da Costa, que fora presidente entre 1975 e 1991), Seychelles (conferindo James Michel ao segundo mandato), Uganda (legitimando a re-eleição de Yoweri Museveni, no poder desde 1986), e Zâmbia (trazendo, pela primeira vez ao poder, Michael Sata). Dois outros países (Camarões e Libéria) estão em pleitos eleitorais, e outros tê-los-ão brevemente (a República Democrática do Congo e, provavelmente o Madagáscar e o Zimbábwe);

3. O regresso dos atentados do Grupo Extremista Al Shabab na Somália. O marco foi a 4 de Outubro com o atentado a Mogadíscio;

4. Os mandatos de detenção ou auscultação do Tribunal Penal Internacional para os políticos africanos tais como os Líbios Muhammar Qadafi (ex-líder líbio) Saif al Islam (filho de Qadafi), e Abdullah Senussi (ex-chefe dos serviços secretos), os Quenianos William Samoei Ruto (Ministro da Ciência e Tecnologia, actualmente suspenso), Henry Kiprono Kosgey (Ministro da Industrialização), Joshua Arap Sang (Funcionário Sénior de uma estação de rádio local), Francis Kirimi Muthaura (Membro dos Serviços de Segurança), Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (filho do paid a nação Queniana Jomo Kenyatta e actual Minsitro das Finanças), Mohamed Hussein Ali (Chefe dos Correios e antigo Comissário da Polícia) por terem agitado ou contribuido para a agitação que culminou com a violência pós eleitoral no Quénia;

5. As revoltas populares em Angola, Swazilândia e Senegal.

Conclusão
A dinâmica da política africana varia de Estado para Estado, região para região, tendo em conta outros contextos como o tempo, os factores étnico-sociais, a economia, a mão externa e a conjuntura internacional.
Este artigo trouxe o espelho político dos acontecimentos que têm estado a marcar o continente negro, em 2011. O mesmo não fez relação dos factos políticos com nenhuns outros factores de outra natureza. Retratam-se aqui, somente dos acontecimentos políticos e qualquer julgamento deve ser feito nesses parâmetros. Quo vadis Africa?
Se considerarmos que África faz-se de pedaços que cada um de nós constituímos, então há que concordar com o provérbio africano do povo wolof (senegalês), segundo o qual, “é melhor caminhar do que amaldiçoar a estrada” . África caminha para onde cada um de nós caminha!

Somalia: Failed State and Failing Responses

2011-07-20T11:43:00.001+02:00

Sandra Adong Oder, Senior Researcher, Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

That Somalia is a place of anarchy and disarray is one of the few statements on which consensus exists. For years, Somalia has been categorised in terms of its ‘statelessness’, and this in turn has defined how we respond to the situation in that country.

Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the Republic of Somalia in 1991, many have taken it upon themselves to find a ‘state-building’ solution to the country’s woes. Somalia’s anarchy has assumed importance in international peace and security studies for good reason. Weak and failed states pose a challenge and have serious repercussions for their peoples, but they can also hurt neighbouring countries and cause regional instability. The underlying assumption here is that social, economic and political problems are not being dealt with by legitimate and representative state institutions. The prevention of state failure has thus become a pressing and legitimate security concern.

In a report released last month, the Failed States Index placed Somalia at the top of its list, and the country is in no danger of losing this position anytime soon. Broadly, the term ‘failed state’ is used to describe a state that has lost control of its territory or its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. This definition suggests that the state has been rendered ineffective and has lost its ability to enforce its authority throughout the whole of its territory, for a variety of reasons.

Produced by the Fund for Peace, the Failed States Index aims at explaining what ‘normal’ states experience and what constitutes a ‘failed’ state. Seeing Somalia in these terms leads to a whole series of assumptions about the situation in that country and how to ‘fix’ it, all based on these pre-defined, highly conventional notions of what a properly functioning state is. However, in effect, two diverging realities exist within the area classified as the legal entity of Somalia. In the north, two state-like entities have evolved, Somaliland and Puntland, while southern and central Somalia is marred by violence and anarchy. There is thus a sharp contrast between functioning de facto states in the north and a non-functioning de jure state in the south.

In our minds, an enduring conviction is that if anything is failing or has failed, it needs to be fixed. By naming the whole of Somalia a ‘failed state’, we then automatically assume the stance of problem solving in conventional, formulaic terms, rather than considering more pragmatic, if alternative, solutions to the anarchy that pervades Somali society. We thus start from a ‘failed’ state perspective and short-sightedly strive to create a modern, sovereign Weberian state, which is seen as a necessary prerequisite for peace, stability and security, with a view of reversing failures. As such, a large number of external efforts have been made to rebuild and reconstruct Somalia, where the international community and regional actors have invested in returning the country to statehood as we know it.

But over the years, a variety of local and smaller governance structures have emerged in that country – as opposed to large-scale actors – which are often to a considerable extent effective in governing smaller parts of the country. In recent times, what has emerged along the coast could be likened to a loose bunch of city-states, where, for example, in Mogadishu, business interests are a key factor in interactions. Regional and community-level initiatives exist, but have one thing in common: a resistance to the creation of a unitary state. One clear example is Somaliland, which remains committed to its own statehood and is opposed to any resurrection of the Republic of Somalia. But we are not reading into this focus and are still advocating for increasing conventional state-building assistance.

A second and more critical perspective is the lingering conviction that ‘state building’ and ‘peacemaking’ are the same thing. A consequence of this is that responses conflate these concepts and do not take into account the interplay, tensions and trade-offs between them. However, if these concepts are interrogated critically, one could conclude that state-building efforts, particularly by external actors, have the tendency to undermine peacebuilding and may actually increase violence.

A third perspective is to critically understand who the actors are, the nature of their motives and interests, and why they are dead set on prolonging the lawlessness and stateless conditions in Somalia. In 2003, Menkhaus listed three such actors, mainly of an internal nature. The first are those who profit from a protracted conflict; the second are criminal elements; and the third are risk-averse actors, including political and business communities, who stand to lose more from the establishment of a state than from its absence. According to Menkhaus, rather than face uncertainty and loss, they choose the safer option of maintaining the status quo.

An interesting addition to this list is the category of external actors with vested interests, which they will pursue irrespective of their effects on peacemaking or state building. During the Cold War, Somalia was a valuable ally to the West and as a result, security concerns overrode humanitarian operations in the 1980s. While the Cold War is now over, Somalia’s current ‘statelessness’ allows regional actors to freely play their power games in the country, and one can argue that some of the security dynamics in Somalia are actually functions of the wider security concerns in the Horn of Africa. In this regard, Somalia’s ‘statelessness’ may even arguably be a driver of inter-state conflicts in the region.

So instead of imposing a ‘failed state’ category on contemporary Somalia that may merely drive further instability, perhaps we should encourage existing trends and try to shape them in terms of realistic expectations and not engage in ‘state building’, but rather in ‘system building’, and then expect the dividends of ‘peacebuilding’. This may include arguing for the further formation of smaller ‘state-like’ entities like Somaliland and Puntland. Adopting such a mind shift would have consequences for any intervening party, particularly external actors, who will be required to adopt different strategies to achieve political ends.

In conclusion, the Failed State Index’s analysis relies on the assumption that the ‘state’ is the best tool for preserving peace, and in the absence of peace, it is the best response. This may prove to be a tragic misconception that will continue to haunt the continent if we continue to misread its political history. We should rather focus at the level of the capacity of leaders to address their ‘failed state’ projects in alternative ways. Another important consideration is for the leadership, including external actors, to understand that maintaining the status quo is not an option for a weary and overburdened Somali citizenry.

Succession debate threatens stability in Senegal

2011-07-20T11:38:00.001+02:00

David Zounmenou, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

With recent political developments in Burkina Faso and Senegal and governments’ reactions toward social discontent, one could not help but ask whether leaders are capable of deciphering the signs of popular rejection and anticipate an exit that spares their countries unnecessary pain. In Senegal people are now deeply divided about whether the President Abdoulaye Wade should stand for a third term and whether his son is entitled to rule the country.

On June 16 Wade decided to initiate a constitutional amendment ahead of the 2012 presidential polls. The amendment, intended to create what was called a “presidential ticket”, would make provision for the creation of a vice-president. It was also intended to lower the requested 50 percent to 25 percent of the national votes for a candidate to be declared a winner of the polls without a run-off. The vice-president is to be elected along with the president in the upcoming electoral contest.

Senegal has never had a vice-president before and the current regime has amended the constitution a number of times. In addition, there was no term limit in the Senegalese constitution when Wade came to power in 2000 and the president could serve as many terms as Wade’s seven years in office. In 2001, the Wade regime amended the constitution to reduce the seven-year tenure to five and set the two terms limits with an implicit understanding that the president himself might not serve more than two terms.

The regime has now developed a legal argument that the new law is not retroactive and therefore Wade is entitled to stand for the 2012 Elections, since it is interpreted as his second term under the 2001 constitution. Wade alleges that nothing in the constitution opposes his candidacy and that his son, as any Senegalese citizen, also has the right to take part in electoral contest if he so desires. But for the opposition his argument at best needs to be understood within the context that African leaders have creative ways of circumventing their constitutions and electoral laws in the pursuit of maintaining their power.

Beyond the controversy around the proposed amendment, the issue of Wade’ succession and the possibility of his son Karim Wade taking over the presidency continues to polarise Senegal. Under the 2001 constitution, in case of Wade’s inability to complete his term, power is transferred to the Speaker of the National Assembly, Pape Diop. But the latter has been weakened and lack a strong political base to stand the challenge. Even though Wade insisted that the new law was to consolidate democracy in Senegal, he failed to mobilise support beyond his cabinet.

The move to amend the constitution in order to introduce the controversial candidacy drew massive street protests. Leaders of the opposition and civil society organisations accused Wade of attempting to plan a “dynastic succession” and went on rampage against what they called an opportunistic constitutional amendment.

Indeed, security forces endured nearly a week monitoring violent demonstrators in the country’s capital, Dakar, and several major towns and cities across what has been one of Africa’s most stable nations. According to media reports, Karim Wade would have tried to seek help from France to put the riots down. It is also reported that more than 100 people were injured in the clashes.

If these protests are something to go by, they signify once again the growing unpopularity of Wade’s presidency, especially over the past few years in which he is perceived as presiding over the deteriorating performance of government, inability to address social-economic challenges of the county whilst attempting to hang onto power. Forced by the scope of reaction of ordinary people and the level of violence, Wade has decided to withdraw his proposal but promised to still stand for 2012 polls. For the opposition, this could be seen as a political defeat for Wade and the pressure should be sustained to force him out power at the end on his current term.

The increasing deterioration in the living conditions of the citizens also tends to cloud Wade’s political legacy. The current polarisation of the political environment is worsened by frequent protests through which citizens voice their frustrations over a continuously tense political climate, chronic power shortages, floods, and abusive amendments to the constitution.

While the North Africa protests continue to inspire opposition against long-standing rulers in the continent, it must be kept in mind that Senegalese have, in the last couple of years, frequently undertaken large-scale protests to defend their democracy. The 23 June Movement, a coalition of opposition parties and civil society activists, has vowed to sustain the fight for genuine democratic succession in Senegal. Failure to plan orderly political successions in Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea has planted the seeds for instability.

The weakest link in all this is the Senegalese opposition movement that is far from being united and coherent; though in the past a common front had helped them win the March 2009 municipal elections. This included Dakar - thwarting the political ambition of Karim Wade to become the mayor of the capital city and use it as a platform to launch his presidential bid.

Without unity, a change in favour of the opposition is highly unlikely in 2012 and risks of violent contestation are high. President Wade, aged 85, was one of the longest serving opposition politicians in Africa. His electoral triumph in 2000 was seen as an opportunity for change and a step towards consolidating Senegalese democratic experience. But as the African wisdom holds it, one needs to live longer to see something and its opposite at the same time.

It is clear that Wade has neither given up in his intention to retain power beyond 2012 nor propping up his son - currently the minister of energy, infrastructure, transport and international cooperation - to the presidential helm. A committee set to engage various political actors to find solutions to the crisis has yet to convince Senegalese of its authority and impartiality. For the time being, opposition leaders doubt its ability to reach a political consensus acceptable to all citizens. The only option remaining might be a free and fair electoral process in which people will decide whether to keep or end the rule of one of the most controversial political figures in Senegalese political history.

Since the 2007 presidential elections, the Senegalese political landscape has become highly fragmented while Wade faces serious concerns over his age and health. The question is whether Wade will adjust his political trajectory so as to leavean acceptable political legacy. How Wade manages the current national crisis will have a lasting impact on the Senegalese democratic system and his own political legacy. The euphoria that followed the electoral victory of opposition leaders, perceived as a triumph of democracy, will have to be revisited.

In the prevailing circumstances, there is a need for dialogue on and understanding of the future of Senegal’s socio-economic and political dispensation. Although an electoral victory will provide the winner with the means to manipulate state institutions, it also holds out the likelihood of increased conflict and instability. Consolidating democracy is a long-term process built on a commitment by various political forces to reach a national consensus that reinforces dialogue, respect for national institutions, transparency, and above all, on the willingness to put national interest before their own.

A ANALISE DE UM CHINES SOBRE A EUROPA E O FUTURO

2011-06-12T15:31:00.002+02:00

Um olhar chinês sobre a Europa
Quase tudo o que se consome, com excepção da alimentação e bebidas, é hoje 'made in China'
A China é hoje a fábrica do mundo. Quase tudo o que se consome, com excepção da alimentação e bebidas, é hoje 'made in China'.
Pensou-se, em tempos, que a Europa e o mundo ocidental teriam uma saída sólida face à progressão chinesa nos mercados mundiais. Essa saída consistiria em produzir cada vez mais produtos de maior valor acrescentado e maior sofisticação tecnológica. A China apropriar-se-ia dos têxteis, do calçado, dos brinquedos, dos plásticos… A Europa continuaria a exportar electrónica, tecnologias de informação e comunicação, aeronáutica espacial, serviços avançados...
Esse era o modelo dos economistas da minha geração. Hoje sabemos que pensámos de forma excessivamente linear e simplificada. A China avançou para todos os sectores sem excepção e concorre com o mundo ocidental. Os desequilíbrios instalaram-se e são preocupantes... para não dizer intransponíveis.
Insucesso para o paradigma em que pensaram os economistas e políticos ocidentais. Sucesso para a China.
Face às dificuldades estruturais desta globalização desequilibrada, vale a pena transcrever aqui excertos de uma entrevista de um professor chinês de economia (que corre no You Tube). Sobre a Europa, o Prof. Kuing Yaman - que viveu em França - faz as seguintes asserções:
1. A sociedade europeia está em vias de se auto-destruir. O seu modelo social é muito exigente em meios financeiros. Mas, ao mesmo tempo, os europeus não querem trabalhar. Só três coisas lhes interessam: lazer/entretenimento, ecologia e futebol na TV! Vivem, portanto, bem acima dos seus meios. Porque é preciso pagar estes sonhos de miúdos...
2. Os seus industriais deslocalizam-se porque não estão disponíveis para suportar o custo de trabalho na Europa, os seus impostos e taxas para financiar a sua assistência generalizada.
3. Portanto endividam-se, vivem a crédito. Mas os seus filhos não poderão pagar 'a conta'.
4. Os europeus destruíram, assim, a sua qualidade de vida empobrecendo. Votam orçamentos sempre deficitários. Estão asfixiados pela dívida e não poderão honrá-la.
5. Mas, para além de se endividar, têm outro vício: os seus governos 'sangram' os contribuintes. A Europa detém o recorde mundial da pressão fiscal. É um verdadeiro 'inferno fiscal' para aqueles que criam riqueza.
6. Não compreenderam que não se produz riqueza dividindo e partilhando mas sim trabalhando. Porque quanto mais se reparte esta riqueza limitada menos há para cada um. Aqueles que produzem e criam empregos são punidos por impostos e taxas e aqueles que não trabalham são encorajados por ajudas. É uma inversão de valores.
7. Portanto o seu sistema é perverso e vai implodir por esgotamento e sufocação. A deslocalização da sua capacidade produtiva provoca o abaixamento do seu nível de vida e o aumento do... da China!
8. Dentro de uma ou duas gerações 'nós' (os chineses) iremos ultrapassá-los. Eles tornar-se-ão os nossos pobres. Dar-lhes-emos sacas de arroz...
9. Existe um outro cancro na Europa: existem funcionários a mais, um emprego em cada cinco. Estes funcionários são sedentos de dinheiro público, são de uma grande ineficácia, querem trabalhar o menos possível e apesar das inúmeras vantagens e direitos sociais, estão muitas vezes em greve. Mas os decisores acham que vale mais um funcionário ineficaz do que um desempregado...
10. Vão (os europeus) direitos a um muro e a alta velocidade...
É um ponto de vista. Controverso. Provocador. E pouco importa se subscrevo ou não, integral ou parcialmente, as teses expostas. O leitor que tire as suas próprias conclusões. E valide ou não o que pensa "o venerável professor chinês".
http://www.dnoticias.pt/impressa/diario/opiniao/218085-um-olhar-chines-sobre-a-europa

A INTERVENCAO NA LIBIA NA VOZ DO PRESIDENTE DO RUANDA

2011-06-02T14:04:00.002+02:00

Presidente Ruandês responsabiliza governantes africanos por
intervenções estrangeiras

O Presidente ruandês, Paul Kagamé, considerou que a intervenção
militar das potências internacionais nos países em crise em África,
baseando-se nos casos da Côte d’Ivoire e da Líbia, é a "consequência
dum fracasso colectivo e individual dos dirigentes africanos".

« Quando alguns Estados africanos criam eles próprios as condições
duma ingerência externa nos seus próprios assuntos, a sua
responsabilidade é inteira. Se a nossa própria fraqueza e a nossa má
governação nos expõem à manipulação, é inútil queixar-se», declarou
Paul Kagamé em entrevista à revista « Jeune Afrique » a publicar
segunda-feira.

Na Côte d’Ivoire, afirmou Kagamé, as imagens da detenção de Laurent
Gbagbo « inspiraram-me uma espécie de tristeza quanto à maneira como
se faz e concebe a política em África ».

« Quanto mais olho mais vejo, detrás , a sombra do cenarista
estrangeiro. O facto de que 50 anos após as independências, o destino
do povo ivoiriense, da sua economia, da sua moeda, da sua vida
política estejam ainda controlados pela antiga potência colonial põe
problema. É isto que estas imagens mostram antes de tudo”, afirmou o
Presidente rwandês.
Paul Kagamé indicou que se França interveio na Côte d’Ivoire foi
devido à incapacidade da União Africana e da Comunidade Económica dos
Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO) a resolver a crise neste país,
acrescentando que é a consequência dum « fracasso colectivo e
individual » dos Africanos.

« Qual é, enquanto Africanos , a nossa parte de responsabilidade?",
interrogou-se o chefe do Estado rwandês. “Que imagem a própria África
dá ao resto do mundo? Pensamos que o espectáculo dum Exército
estrangeiro, mesmo sob cobertura onusina, intervindo nas ruas duma
capital africana é uma boa coisa? Por que nós, Africanos, deixamo-nos
que se nos criem este tipo de situações? Temos a coragem de nos
olharmos num espelho? », questionou-se.

O que há por trás da invasão da Líbia??

Em recente reunião do Conselho Parlamentar da Europa (CPE), Svetlana
Goriatcheva, da delegação russa, não conseguiu segurar sua indignação
e soltou o verbo. Em tradução livre, disse: "Senhoras e senhores
parlamentares, há três dias estamos aqui falando do sexo dos anjos.
Enquanto isto, bombas caem às dezenas nas cabeças dos líbios,
misturando sangue e areia. Sinceramente, não entendo a reacção passiva
e indiferente dos senhores".

Goriatcheva afirmou que as potências centrais protegem os ditadores
amigos dos EUA e da União Europeia que estão massacrando, com a ajuda
da Arábia Saudita, manifestantes que nas ruas exigem mais democracia e
melhores condições de vida. 'Não vejo aqui ninguém exigindo a cabeça
desses ditadores'.

Disse mais: 1. Querem a cabeça de Kadafi porque "ele se negou a
prorrogar os contratos de fornecimento de petróleo" nas mesmas
condições de antes, como exigiam a França, Inglaterra, Itália e
Espanha. 2. A Resolução 1973 do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, que
estabeleceu a zona de exclusão aérea na Líbia, 'além de não prever a
participação da OTAN nas operações, está sendo interpretada com uma
amplitude absolutamente fora de propósito'.

Os senhores membros do CPE engoliram em seco. Mas, há outra causa,
além do petróleo, sobre a qual a jornalista Ellen Brown chama a
atenção no Asia Times Online. Em síntese, como diria Hamlet, há muito
mais coisas entre o céu e a terra do que possa imaginar nossa vã
filosofia.

Alertas da jornalista: 1. Contradição – enquanto o Conselho de
Segurança da ONU trabalhava "febrilmente" para condenar os ataques de
Kadafi contra 'manifestantes', o Conselho de Direitos Humanos
elaborava "um relatório carregado de elogios à Líbia, no quesito de
direitos humanos".
2. O general (da reserva) Wesley Clark disse que "10 dias após o 11 de
setembro de 2001, os EUA tinham planos de invadir 7 países em 5 anos:
Iraque, [Afeganistão], Síria, Líbia, Somália, Sudão e Irão".

Pois é, "os líbios têm tratamento médico gratuito; a educação é
universal e gratuita; ao casar, cada casal líbio recebe um empréstimo
sem juros de US$ 50 mil; agricultores são isentos de impostos;
gasolina e pão são subsidiados; etc, etc."

Já afirmei que a revolta na Líbia não é do povo, mas sim de um grupo
de oposição organizada e armada principalmente pelos EUA para derrubar
Kadafi e tomar o poder. A importante revelação sintetizada por Ellen
Brown: "Robert Wenzel, do Economic Policy Journal, afirmou que nunca
antes ouvira falar de rebeldes que, com alguns dias de rebelião, já
criaram um banco central!".

Qual o mistério do banco central 'dos rebeldes'? É que Kadafi, como
Saddan, se negou a aceitar o dólar como moeda internacional e passou a
exigir euros. Pior, conclamou os países africanos a criar uma nova
moeda: o dinar-ouro. EUA e UE quase enfartaram. Sarkozy declarou que
"a Líbia se transformou numa ameaça à segurança financeira
internacional".

O xis da questão, é que nestas condições as potências centrais
perderiam os meios de manipular os preços internacionais. Cortar o
pescoço de Kadafi (como o de Saddan) e fundar um banco central
subalterno na Líbia é a forma de 'cortar o mal pela raiz'. E tome
tomahawk na cabeça do povo líbio.

Petróleo? Que nada! Imperialismo quer o Banco Central da Líbia Caso o
governo Kadafi caia, será interessante observar se o recém-criado
banco central líbio associar-se-á ao Banco de Compensações
Internacionais, se a indústria líbia do petróleo será imediatamente
privatizada e vendida a investidores globais e se continuará a haver
água, educação e assistência médica universais e gratuitas na Líbia.

Vários comentaristas e analistas de economia já observaram o estranho
fato de os rebeldes líbios terem tido tempo, em plena rebelião, para
criar, em Março, seu próprio banco central ‘rebelde’ – antes até de
haver governo ou Estado. Robert Wenzel escreveu no Economic Policy
Journal: “Mais um recorde, para o livro Guiness. Nunca antes ouvi
falar de rebeldes que, com alguns dias de rebelião, já criaram um
banco central. O movimento sugere que haja algo mais, naqueles
rebeldes, além do exército de voluntários, e que podem estar em acção,
ali, projectos muito mais sofisticados” (em
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2011/03/libyan-rebels-form-central-bank.html).

Alex Newman escreveu, no New American: “Em declaração distribuída
semana passada, os rebeldes líbios relataram resultados de reunião
realizada dia 19/3. Dentre outros informes, os supostos rebeldes
esfarrapados anunciaram “a designação do Banco Central de Benghazi
como autoridade monetária competente para definir as políticas
monetárias da Líbia, o qual terá sede provisória em Benghazi” (em
http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-mainmenu-26/africa-mainmenu-27/6915-libyan-rebels-create-central-bank-oil-company).

Newman citou o editor-chefe da rede CNBC John Carney, que comentou:
“Parece-me que seja a primeira vez no mundo, que grupo revolucionário
cria banco central ainda durante os combates pelo poder político.
Sinal de o quanto são poderosos os banqueiros centrais que estão
surgindo nesses tempos extraordinários”.

Outra anomalia também chama a atenção, na justificativa para que os
EUA alinhem-se oficialmente ao lado dos rebeldes. Fala-se das
violações dos direitos humanos, mas há contradições. Segundo artigo
publicado na página internet da rede Fox News, dia 28/2:

“Enquanto a ONU trabalha febrilmente para condenar o ataque de Muamar
Kadafi contra manifestantes, o Conselho de Direitos Humanos
preparava-se para divulgar relatório carregado de elogios à Líbia, no
quesito direitos humanos.

O relatório regista aumento de oportunidades educacionais e louva a
posição oficial de fazer dos direitos humanos ‘uma prioridade’ para
aprimorar ‘o quadro constitucional’. Vários países, entre os quais o
Irão, Venezuela, Coreia do Norte, Arábia Saudita e Canadá, deram notas
positivas à Líbia no quesito protecção legal aos cidadãos – os mesmos
que agora se estariam levantando contra o governo e sendo cruelmente
atacados pelo mesmo governo” (em
http://nation.foxnews.com/united-nations/2011/03/01/un-poised-praise-libyas-human-rights-record).

Sejam quais forem os crimes pessoais de Kadafi, o povo líbio parecia
viver muito bem. Uma delegação de médicos russos, ucranianos e
bielorrussos escreveu carta aberta ao presidente Dmitry Medvedev e ao
primeiro-ministro Vladimir Putin da Rússia, em que dizem que, depois
de habituados à vida na Líbia, são de opinião que poucos países vivem
em condições tão favoráveis quanto os líbios: “[Os líbios] têm
tratamento médico gratuito e seus hospitais oferecem o que há de
melhor, no mundo, em tratamentos e equipamentos médicos. A educação é
universal e gratuita, muitos jovens recebem bolsas de estudo no
exterior, pagas pelo Estado. Ao casar, cada casal líbio recebe
empréstimo sem juros de 60 mil dinares líbios (cerca de US$ 50 mil),
como auxílio do Estado para constituir família. Há empréstimos
oficiais sem juros e, pelo que vimos, sem prazo. Dados os subsídios
que o Estado paga, o preço de carros é muito inferior ao que se vê na
Europa e praticamente todas as famílias têm carro. Gasolina e pão são
subsidiados e baratíssimos, e os agricultores são isentos de impostos.
O povo líbio é pacífico e calmo, não é dado a beber e os líbios são
muito religiosos (em
http://alexandravaliente.wordpress.com/2011/03/26/nato-u-s-war-crimes-open-letter-from-citizens-of-ukraine-belarus-and-russia-working-and-living-in-libya/)”.

Os médicos insistem que falta informação à comunidade internacional
sobre a luta contra o regime. “Quem, afinal, se rebelaria contra o
governo que vemos aqui?” – perguntam.

Ainda que muito disso não passe de propaganda, não há como negar pelo
menos uma grande realização do governo de Kadafi: há água farta para a
população, e gratuita. O Estado construiu um grande aqueduto que traz
água ao deserto e implantou na Líbia o maior e mais caro projecto de
irrigação que há no mundo (o Projecto “Grande rio feito pelo homem”
[ing. GMMR, Great Man-Made River] custou US$ 33 bilhões). Na Líbia, a
água é muito mais crucialmente importante para os cidadãos, que o
petróleo.

O GMMR abastece 70% da população com água potável e para irrigação,
bombeada do imenso Sistema Aquífero de Arenito Níbio, do sul até as
áreas urbanizadas no litoral, localizadas ao norte, a 4 mil
quilómetros de distância da fonte. Isso, pelo menos, não há dúvidas de
que o governo de Kadafi fez bem feito.

Outro argumento que se tem usado para explicar o ataque à Líbia é que
se trataria “do petróleo”, ideia que também apresenta inúmeras
contradições. Como observou o National Journal, a Líbia produz apenas
2% do petróleo mundial. Só a Arábia Saudita, só ela, tem capacidade
para aumentar a oferta de petróleo e suprir qualquer demanda que se
criasse pela falta do petróleo líbio, e mesmo que a Líbia fosse
varrida do mapa. Além do mais, se trata de petróleo, por que tanta
pressa para criar um novo banco central?

Outros dados intrigantes voltam a circular na Internet, mostrando
entrevista realizada em 2007, pela página Democracy Now, com o general
da reserva Wesley Clark. Naquela entrevista, o general Clark diz que
10 dias depois do 11 de Setembro de 2001, um general lhe disse que já
estava tomada a decisão de invadir o Iraque. Clark conta que a notícia
o surpreendeu e que perguntou por quê. “Não sei”, foi a resposta, “acho
que é porque ninguém sabe o que fazer!”. Mais tarde, o mesmo
informante contou ao general Clark que havia planos para invadir sete
países em cinco anos: Iraque, Síria, Líbano, Somália, Sudão, Líbia e
Irão.

O que há de comum entre esses sete países? Os que estudamos o sistema
bancário e os bancos centrais em todo o mundo sabemos que nenhum
desses países aparece na lista dos 56 países filiados ao Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) [Banco de Compensações Internacionais;
é o ‘banco central’ dos bancos centrais; organização internacional
responsável pela supervisão bancária, que visa “promover a cooperação
entre os bancos centrais e outras agências na busca de estabilidade
monetária e financeira” mundial, com sede na Basileia, Suíça (NTs, com
informações de http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banco_de_Compensa%C3%A7%C3%B5es_Internacionais)].
Se não fazem parte do BIS, esses países estão fora do campo
regula tório dos banqueiros centrais reunidos no BIS, na Suíça.

Os renegados mais resistentes são precisamente a Líbia e o Iraque –
dois países que já foram directamente atacados. Kenneth Schortgen Jr,
escrevendo em Examiner.com, observou que “seis meses antes de os EUA
atacarem o Iraque, o Iraque passou a exigir euros, em vez de dólares,
nas vendas de petróleo – o que converteu o Iraque em ameaça mortal,
porque ameaçava o domínio do dólar como moeda internacional de
reserva, na modalidade de petrodólar” (em
http://wn.com/pre_market_movers_february_4th,_2011?orderby=relevance&upload_time=today)

Segundo matéria publicada em jornal russo dia 28/3/2011, “Bombing of
Líbia - Punishment for Ghaddafi for His Attempt to Refuse US Dollar”
(em http://kir-t34.livejournal.com/14869.html), Kadafi fez movimento
semelhante ao dos iraquianos: começou a recusar dólares e a exigir
euros, e conclamou os países árabes e africanos a usar uma nova moeda,
o dinar de ouro. Kadafi planejava conseguir que toda a África, seus
200 milhões de habitantes, passassem a viver com essa nova moeda
única.

Ao longo do ano passado, vários países árabes e muitos países
africanos aprovaram a nova moeda. Restaram contra só a África do Sul e
alguns países da cúpula da Liga Árabe. A iniciativa não foi vista com
bons olhos pelos EUA e pela União Europeia; o presidente Nicolas
Sarkozy declarou que a Líbia seria ameaça à segurança financeira da
humanidade. Kadafi não se impressionou e prosseguiu na sua campanha
para criar uma moeda da África.

Com o que, afinal, podemos voltar ao mistério do novo banco central
‘rebelde’ na Líbia. Em artigo publicado em Market Oracle, Eric Encina
escreve:

“Fato raramente mencionado pelos ‘especialistas’, ‘comentaristas’
‘analistas’ ou políticos ocidentais é que o Banco Central da Líbia é
100% banco público. Hoje, o governo da Líbia cria a própria moeda, o
dinar líbio, graças ao uso que dá ao seu banco central público
nacional. Ninguém pode dizer que a Líbia não seja nação soberana, rica
em recursos naturais e capaz de comandar o próprio destino económico.
O principal problema dos cartéis dos bancos globais é que, para
negociar com a Líbia, têm de negociar através do Banco Central líbio e
em moeda nacional líbia. Nessas condições não têm controle sobre a
negociação nem meios para manipular os preços e condições de
negociação.

O objectivo de derrubar o Banco Central Líbio (CBL) não aparece nos
discursos de Obama, Cameron e Sarkozy, mas não há dúvidas de que é
objectivo prioritário na agenda da grande finança globalista: incluir a
Líbia na lista de países financeiramente obedientes” (em
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article27208.html).

A Líbia não tem só petróleo e água. Segundo o Fundo Monetário
Internacional, o banco central líbio mantém lastro de cerca de 144
toneladas de ouro. Com esse tipo de moeda-lastro, quem precisa de BIS,
FMI e seus ‘aconselhamentos’?

Dadas essas evidências, é preciso agora considerar mais de perto as
regras do Banco de Compensações Internacionais e o efeito que têm nas
economias locais. Artigo que se lê na página do BIS na internet
(http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm) declara que os bancos centrais
reunidos na Rede de Governança dos Bancos Centrais devem manter, como
seu objectivo único ou básico, “preservar a estabilidade de preços”.

Devem ser independentes dos governos nacionais, para garantir que
nenhuma consideração política interfira no funcionamento.
“Estabilidade de preços” significa manter suprimento estável de moeda,
mesmo que isso implique castigar a população com pesadíssimas dívidas
externas. Os bancos centrais ‘coligados’ são encorajados a não
aumentar o suprimento de moeda mediante emissão de dinheiro e devem
usar o dinheiro em benefício do Estado, directamente ou mediante
empréstimos.

Em artigo de 2002 em Asia Times Online, intitulado “The BIS vs
national Banks” (14/5/2002), Henry Liu dizia:

“As regulações do BIS têm o único objectivo de fortalecer o sistema
bancário internacional privado, mesmo que à custa das economias
nacionais. O BIS faz para os sistemas bancários nacionais o mesmo que
o FMI fez aos regimes monetários nacionais. Economias nacionais que
sirvam aos interesses da finança globalizada deixam de servir a
interesses nacionais.

... o FDI [ing. foreign direct investment, investimento estrangeiro
directo] com valor nominal em moedas estrangeiras, quase sempre o
dólar, condenou muitas economias nacionais a um desenvolvimento sem
equilíbrio, voltado para exportar, sobretudo para gerar pagamentos em
dólar aos investidores estrangeiros directos, com mínimo benefício às
economias nacionais”
(http://www.atimes.com/global-econ/DE14Dj01.html).

E acrescentava: “Se se aplica a “Teoria do Dinheiro do Estado” de
Knapp, qualquer governo pode pagar com a própria moeda todas as
necessidades do seu próprio desenvolvimento, para manter o pleno
emprego sem inflação”. A “Teoria do Dinheiro do Estado” refere-se a
dinheiro criado por governos, não por bancos privados.

A pressuposição da lei que manda não tomar empréstimos do próprio
banco central do governo é que esses empréstimos seriam
inflacionários, e que tomar empréstimos do dinheiro que haja em bancos
estrangeiros ou do FMI não seria inflacionário. Mas, hoje, todos os
bancos criam de fato o dinheiro que emprestam, seja dinheiro público
ou privado. A maior parte do dinheiro novo, hoje, vem de empréstimos
bancários. Tomar empréstimos do próprio banco central governamental
tem a vantagem de que o empréstimo é praticamente sem juros. Já se
sabe que se se eliminam os juros, o custo dos projectos públicos cai em
média 50%.

Tudo faz crer que o sistema líbio funciona desse modo. Segundo a
Wikipedia, entre as funções do Banco Central da Líbia está incluída a
de “emitir e regulamentar os créditos e moedas circulantes na Líbia” e
“gerir e emitir todos os empréstimos estatais”. O banco central da
Líbia, público, pode administrar e administra a moeda nacional e faz
empréstimos com vistas a atender, em primeiro lugar, os interesses do
Estado líbio.

Só assim se entende que a Líbia tenha recursos para oferecer educação
e atendimento médico universal e gratuito, e para dar a cada novo
casal, como presente de núpcias, US$ 50 mil em empréstimo que o Estado
faz, sem juros. Só assim se entende que o país tenha tido meios para
pagar os US$ 33 bilhões que lhe custaram o projecto do GMMR. Hoje, os
líbios temem que os ataques aéreos da Otan cheguem aos aquedutos desse
projecto, o que, sim, geraria mais um desastre humanitário.

Difícil crer, nesse quadro, que os ataques à Líbia tenham a ver
exclusivamente com o petróleo. Quase certamente têm a ver, também, com
a independência radical do banco central líbio. Com energia, água e
crédito abundante para desenvolver a infra-estrutura para que energia e
petróleo sejam postos a serviço do bem estar dos líbios, a Líbia pode
sobreviver à distância das garras dos financiadores/credores
estrangeiros. E aí, afinal, está a real ameaça que a Líbia traz: a
Líbia pode provar ao mundo que é possível fazer o que a Líbia faz.

Inúmeros países não têm petróleo, mas estão em desenvolvimento novas
tecnologias que podem tornam nações não produtoras de petróleo
independentes, em termos energéticos, sobretudo se os custos para
construir a infra-estrutura são reduzidos à metade, porque os
empréstimos saem do próprio banco central nacional e público, gerido
em nome de interesses públicos. A independência no campo da energia
libertará os governos da rede dos banqueiros internacionais, e da
necessidade de direccionar a produção doméstica para os mercados
estrangeiros, para pagar o serviço das dívidas.

Caso o governo Kadafi caia, será interessante observar se o
recém-criado banco central líbio associar-se-á ao Banco de
Compensações Internacionais, se a indústria líbia do petróleo será
imediatamente privatizada e vendida a investidores globais e se
continuará a haver água, educação e assistência médica universais e
gratuitas na Líbia.

SOUTH AFRICA AND BRICS

2011-05-28T12:21:00.000+02:00

From BRIC to BRICS and South Africa’s Military

Anton Kruger, Consultant, Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

At the end of 2010 South Africa’s was finally invited to join the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economic community. BRIC came into existence in 2001 and quickly grew to become one of the main economic players globally. With increased economic power comes increasing military power as well, and the question that needs to be raised is why South Africa was invited to join BRIC in the first place and will this place any extra military responsibilities on South Africa?

When South Africa was envited to join the BRIC countries, it was unclear to many commentators why it would allow South Africa in, rather than countries like South Korea, Mexico or Turkey with much bigger economies. However, even though the main objectives of the BRIC’s were initially economic development and cooperation, these have changed into a more geopolitical role.

Looking beyond the size of South Africa’s economy, it becomes clear why South Africa, from a geopolitical viewpoint, was invited to join the BRICs.

South Africa’s geostrategic port locations and resources would allow BRIC to better compete with the G7 in global issues. South Africa is an extremely resource rich country and has a strategic location on the 3 essential shipping routes from West to East, which includes to countries such as India, China, Japan and Russia’s far eastern regions. The other routes are through the Suez Canal or around Russia’s northern coast. The route around Cape Agulhas becomes extremely important to the BRIC countries if one considers the vulnerability of the Suez Canal to political and military instability, as well as the danger that ice flows presents around Russia - a route that is closed for nearly half of the year.

The four BRIC countries do not only have their growing economies in common, but they are all undergoing an extensive military modernization effort, aimed at preserving their strategic interests. While European nations like Britain, France, and Germany have been drastically cutting their defence budgets over the last years and the US defence budget is set to flatline in the coming years, the four BRIC countries have been willing to invest in improving their overall military capabilities.

Since 2005, Brazil’s defence budget has grown by nearly 5 percent per annum and the government approved a new defence policy in 2008 that set aside 70 billion USD for reequipping the army. It is also expected that the country’s defence expenditure will rise from the current 1.5 percent of GDP to nearly 2.2 percent of GDP by 2030.

The Russian Federation, meanwhile, also approved plans to boost its arms purchasing budget to 436 Billion USD from 2011 to 2020. Russia has introduced a comprehensive plan to restructure its military from its current over-sized force to a more rapid deployable and professional force.

India is also increasing its defence budget with nearly 11 percent this year. This follows a 34 percent increase during the 2009/2010 financial year. China’s defence budget will officially climb by 12.7 percent this year following a 7.5 percent increase last year. Many experts believe that China is in actual terms spending a lot more on its defence budget than what it is willing to admit.

In comparison, South Africa’s is spending on defence can be considered trivial. South Africa is currently spending only 1.2 percent of GDP on defence which is the lowest of all five of the BRICS countries. In late 2010 a commission of enquiry appointed by the South African government after soldiers took part in an labour action the previous year, found that the South African government should raise defence spending to 2 percent of GDP. This was after evaluating living conditions within the South African military and investigating whether the military is able to conduct its mission as outlined by the government’s own defence policies. Combat readiness is also suffering because of a high operational tempo, while having a very low budget to conduct operations.

While South Africa is not perceived to be a global military force, it can be considered as a regional military power in the context of southern Africa. It has major international commitments to Africa in the form of peace support operations most notably in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and has also recently began military operations to support Mozambique in fighting piracy off its coast. Internally, the South African Army and Air Force has redeployed back to country’s borders after a long time of neglect. The South African military is however too poorly equipped and funded to execute their tasks to the level that they would desire and welcome accelerated investment in the military.

Also, considering South Africa’s unique maritime position within the BRICS group, The South African government would have to expand the military’s naval and air capabilities to improve its maritime security - something it has been largely overseeing up to now.

True, South Africa does have a much smaller economy than the rest of the BRICS countries and it cannot be expected to spend as much on defence as the rest. It is however, a well known fact that South Africa has been underspending on defence and the South African Government should insure the country’s military is adequately funded to conduct the tasks given to it. South Africa will also have to step up to the plate if it wants to remain on par with the military capabilities that are expected of it as a member of BRICS.

EGYPT IN CASE

2011-05-28T11:49:00.000+02:00

The Disbanding of the Egyptian Ruling Party Raises Questions About National Reconciliation

Phakamani S. Lisa, Intern, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

The popular uprising that began in Egypt on 25 January 2011 led to the downfall of long term Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak after three decades in power. Since then, many Egyptians have been calling for the ‘purification’ of the country’s political system of those associated with the former leader - particularly for them to be tried for various alleged crimes, including corruption and the murder of more than 800 protesters during the revolution, while in power. In addition, they requested the disbandment of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). As a result, in late March, the Supreme Administrative Court called for the dissolution of the party as well as the nationalisation of its assets. The allegations against the party vary from corruption and rigging of elections to violating party values as well as inciting social disorder, restricting freedom of expression and curbing political freedom.

The Tunisians had done the same with their former ruling party soon after the fall of President Zine el Abedine Ben Ali in early January this year.

The call for the NDP’s dissolution was supported by members of the coalition that championed Egypt’s revolution. They strongly believed that without this, the former ruling party could have still been used as a tool by ousted President Mubarak or members of his defunct regime to launch a counter- revolution and recover power. Some of the major political parties also believed that the NDP was still in a position to undermine the transition towards a democratic Egypt.

Over the decades that NDP was in charge of Egyptian affairs, there was little separation between the party and the government. In view of the party’s use of violence to disturb social order and blatantly infringe the rights and freedoms of citizens, its dissolution may be justified. This could also satisfy many people. But would measures to eliminate it (such as disbandment) lead to free and fair elections, and prevent its members from influencing political events in the country? Or should Egypt look for less radical measures to facilitate the transition?

Perhaps the Egyptians (as well as Tunisians) should have considered a few things before calling for the disbandment of the former ruling party. Disbanding the party and banning some former dignitaries does not prevent others from recycling themselves in other parties or political movements. In late April the NDP renamed itself the New National Party (NNP). Unless anyone associated with the party is also banned from standing in elections, some members could stand as independent candidates. It is important that the latter measure should be taken, and that criteria should be devised to identify and justify those that should be prevented from holding any public office. The difficulty of this lies in the fact that some may have been beneficiaries of the party by default and not by any design on their part.

A better course of action may have been to leave the party in tact so that people can identify its members. After all, as journalists Michael Slackman and Mona El-Naggar recently wrote in the New York Times, the NDP’s image is tainted and its leaders now ‘make docile inmates’ whilst ‘still stunned to find themselves behind bars’. For example, the Egyptian fact-finding committee has confirmed that about 846 people were killed over the18 days of revolution and that the former Interior Minister, Habib Al-Adely, and other top officials of the defunct regime ordered police to use live ammunition against peaceful protestors. The committee also confirmed that there were snipers shooting from rooftops. Mubarak made no attempts to stop the violence and might have fuelled it by announcing that he would only retire in September. As all these facts are in the public domain, the party does not stand any realistic chance of winning in elections - specifically when its members can clearly be identified. Some of its prominent members cannot hide themselves, but others could.

What the issue of disbanding NDP represents goes beyond a single political party. It also touches on the crucial issue of reconciliation in the country. Egyptians are very resentful about what they have experienced at the hands of the former regime. But as in the case of members of the former ruling regime, perhaps on an even bigger scale, some people benefited from the regime not necessarily because they approved of its actions, but because they were compelled to connive with some of them. Some may have even joined the party because that was the order of the day, or perhaps their jobs and livelihood depended on a certain course of action.

This is not in any way to suggest that there should be impunity. Public funds and assets that have been identified to have been stolen by Mubarak, his family members and associates, must continue to be recovered and handed over to the State. Those charged with serious crimes must also be fairly tried and if found guilty, face the consequences. Most importantly is the need not to focus on retribution. Perhaps Egyptians should start with their current military rulers who inevitably also benefited from the defunct regime. After all, the head of the military council was the Defence Minister of Mubarak for about two decades.

MOCAMBIQUE, AFRICA E O MUNDO EM 2011

2011-05-19T15:26:00.002+02:00

A POLITICA EXTERNA E INTERNACIONAL: DESAFIOS PARA 2011

Constâncio Nguja

2010 foi um ano de muitos desafios tanto para a política externa de Moçambique, como para a política internacional em geral. No que concerne à política externa, Moçambique teve que se deparar com:
• novas exigências e morosidade dos Parceiros do Apoio Programático (PAP) no desembolso de fundos para o apoio ao Orçamento do Estado (OE);
• as acusações do Departamento do Tesouro Norte-Americano sobre o envolvimento do empresário Momade Bashir Sulemane no tráfico de drogas;
• a intensa pressão do Malawi para a navegabilidade dos Rios Zambeze e Chire;
• a subida do preço do trigo no sistema internacional, que culminou com o anúncio do agravamento do preço do pão e um posterior subsidiamento pelo governo;
• as divulgações da wikileaks sobre um possível cumplicidade de políticos Moçambicanos eminentes (incluindo o actual Presidente da República, Armando Guebuza, e o ex, Joaquim Chissano) no tráfico de droga;
• e por fim, a subida do preço do barril do petróleo no sistema internacional.

No tocante aos acontecimentos marcantes, no sistema internacional em geral, talvez seja necessário separar o continente Africano e o resto do Mundo. África teve que se deparar com:
• A copa Mundial 2010, que pela primeira vez teve lugar em solo Africano (concretamente na África do Sul);
• Eleições na Guiné Conackry, depois de muitos anos de regimes militares, tendo passado o poder para às mãos dos civis;
• O “golpe de Estado” na Costa do Marfim perpetrado por Laurent Gbagbo contra o candidato vencedor das eleições presidenciais naquele país, Alassane Ouattara. O mais importante acontecimento foi o “consenso” entre os demais líderes Africanos sobre a derrota de Gbagbo, o que denota que tais líderes começam a convergir na ideia sobre os conceitos de democracia e de eleições.

E no resto do mundo:
• O sismo no Haiti que ceifou a vida de pelo menos 200 mil pessoas. O sismo de Haiti vem mais uma vez provar que a natureza e o meio ambiente deve constar na agenda da planificação dos Estados;
• As polémicas divulgações do wikileaks. Apesar de terem trazido muito pouca novidade, estas tem estado a agitar o mundo enquanto duram;
• A vitoria dos Republicanos no Congresso Americano;
• A crise económico-financeira na Europa e o questionamento da viabilidade da Zona Euro;
• A abertura do governo cubano às reformas, o que pode simbolizar a queda do penúltimo dominó do comunismo (se considerarmos que a Coreia do Norte está sob regime comunista);
• A saída de Lula da Silva e o seu legado de ascensão do Brasil como uma potência regional, bem como a luta para a imposição daquele país como potência emergente no sistema internacional como um todo;
Perante este remarques, que cenários podem se esperar para 2011?
Ao nível da Politica Externa de Moçambique:
• O Estado Moçambicano deve se preparar para mais um ciclo de pressões por parte do Malawi, em relação à navegabilidade do Zambeze e Chire, visto que o governo malawiano já inaugurou o seu porto em Nsanje. Ademais, o cenário agrava-se com a expulsão da Vice-Presidente Joyce Banda do partido no poder, que era acusada de manter “relações privilegiadas com Moçambique”;

• Quanto às relações com os Estados Unidos da América, dado que as análises tendem a concluir que os desaires foram agravados pelo então Chefe da Missão Diplomática, Todd Chapman, espera-se que a nova Embaixadora, a Senhora Leslie Rowe, traga um novo capítulo mais amigável entre os dois Estados. Ademais, isso não depende somente de uma das partes, mas do esforço de ambas!;

• No que concerne à subida do preço internacional do trigo e sua farinha, quero acreditar que o governo tem estado a envidar esforços no sentido de atiçar as políticas agrárias, visando o fomento da produção agrícola. A curto prazo, nada se pode esperar! Há que admitir que o governo negligenciou o sector agrícola por muito tempo. Por ora, resta louvar e encorajá-lo pelas novas decisões tomadas até à data, e esperar que haja seriedade na implementação das mesmas;

• Por último, mas não menos importante, Moçambique deve se preparar para fazer face à tendente subida do preço do barril de petróleo no mercado internacional. A demanda da China e a pressão Americana, mais o futuro do Sudão (que está a passar por um referendo que pode levar à sua divisão em dois Estados), implicará uma nova estratégia na partilha desse recurso, que pode ter implicações nos demais países Africanos não produtores;

E, para a África:
• O debate sobre a Costa do Marfim tenderá a durar, caso a comunidade internacional não use a força para retirar o candidato perdedor, Laurent Gbagbo do poder. É necessário ressalvar que tal acção devia tomar lugar a curto prazo, visto que depois, pode ser tarde porque o inimigo já terá manipulado as populações a seu favor, para uma situação igual a que aconteceu com os Estados Unidos da América na Somália, entre 1992 e 1994;

• O pós-referendo trará muito que se discutir entre os opinion-makers sobre a política internacional, sobretudo de África. O resultado do referendo, a divergência entre os movimentos do Sul, o petróleo, o acesso ao mar, a região de Abiey, possível irredentismo para Darfur, a anunciada Sharia para o Norte, a caça a Bashir pelo Tribunal de Haia, entre outros, serão os assuntos a serem debatidos nas próximas manchetes.

A terminar, para o Mundo:
• Ajustes na política externa Americana devidos à maioria Republicana no Congresso;
• A tendente subida do preço do petróleo;
• A crescente ascensão da China face à queda do Ocidente (e principalmente na Europa) devido às crises económico-financeiras;
• Um possível ataque do Israel ao Irão (prenunciado no ano passado) para que este não termine o seu programa nuclear (o que constitui uma séria ameaça à existência sobrevivência do Estado semita). Essa possibilidade agrava-se com a denúncia da desunião entre os árabes pela wikileaks;
• Dilma Roussef como Presidente e novos estilos na condução da política externa do Brasil;
• A queda do penúltimo dominó comunista – Cuba – face à crise económica com que se depara;
• Novos contornos da crise na península coreana, com tendência à guerra, face ao apoio dos EUA à Coreia do Sul, os ataques da Coreia do Norte, e o incómodo da presença Americana na região para a China;
• Status quo no conflito Israelo-Palestiniano, face a um plano de paz mal confeccionado pela Administração Obama (que não envolve o quarteto, o Hamas, a convergência entre os Israelitas, entre outros erros);
• Etc.

Conclusão
O artigo visa servir de guia para os Moçambicanos na leitura dos fenómenos internacionais que, directa ou indirectamente poderão afectar as suas vidas, em 2011. É mais uma daquelas vezes em que se pretende se usar a ciência ao serviço do povo.

OS RECURSOS NATURAIS EM MOCAMBIQUE NA VISAO DE PAULO MUXANGA

2011-05-19T15:25:00.001+02:00

“A pergunta que persiste em não se calar - recursos naturais: maldição ou benção para Moçambique?”

Paulo Muxanga

Sei que ao lerem estas linhas ficarão mais confusos do que esclarecidos sobre a ideia que se pretende transmitir, a começar pelo título escolhido, que não contém, de todo, qualquer novidade. Mas, tenho que vos confessar que isso é o reflexo da contradição interior que me tem assolado toda vez que me deparo com informações sobre a rica dotação de Moçambique em recursos naturais (desde marinhos, passando pelos florestais, indo até os minerais), a relação que se estabelece entre tal condição e o desenvolvimento económico, político e social dos países e, ainda as experiências nada exemplares vividas por muitos países também ricamente dotados em recursos naturais, sobretudo no espaço africano. Contudo, há pelo menos uma coisa que fica bastante clara aqui, é que não se pretende reinventar a roda, simplesmente procura-se juntar mais alguma lenha a volta do debate sobre o significado dos recursos naturais para Moçambique e seu povo, de modo particular, numa altura em que se torna frequente o anúncio de descoberta e/ou existência de variedades destes recursos naturais no país.

Mas afinal, porquê tanta preocupação com isto? É que os dados disponíveis demonstram inequivocamente, coincidência ou não, que grande parte dos países, ricamente dotados em recursos naturais, estão associados a baixos níveis de desempenho económico, político e social, comparativamente a outros, menos dotados. De acordo com Aurélio Bucuane e Peter Mulder (2007) , países como Nigéria, Angola, Serra Leoa, sudão, Libéria e República Democrática do Congo, com considerável riqueza em recursos naturais (petróleo, diamantes, coltan, cobre, borracha, entre outros), em longos anos de exploração destes recursos, não conseguiram sair do baixo ranking em que se encontram no índice de desenvolvimento humano, ao mesmo tempo que se tornaram focos de permanente instabilidade e conflitos. Entretanto, existem excepções, como é o caso do Botsuana, que, conforme André Standing e Van Vuuren (2006) , embora dependente de recursos, tem gerido um crescimento económico relativamente bom e uma política de despesa social progressiva. E porque é que se chama maldição de recursos? Mohammed Ali Alayli (2005), argumenta que a maldição dos recursos naturais refere-se a situação em que, em vez de desencadear o crescimento e o desenvolvimento, a riqueza em recursos naturais se torna a causa da estagnação económica, da corrupção e da guerra. Mas onde Moçambique entra nisto tudo? Por causa da sua rica dotação em recursos naturais e o risco inerente de desenvolver os factores da maldição. Como assim? Segundo Aurélio Bucuane e Peter Mulder (2007), existem dois factores, interligados, cuja ocorrência potencia a maldição dos recursos, sendo, um de natureza económica (“doença holandesa”, incluindo a falta de políticas económicas e de planificação prudentes, redução do investimento e acumulação da dívida) e, outro de natureza institucional (falta de transparência, corrupção, nepotismo, disperdício de dinheiro e enfraquecimento da democracia) . Não me vou deter na apresentação detalhada de cada um destes elementos, visto ser um exercício que ultrapassa o âmbito e objectivo deste texto. Entretanto, interessa-me descorrer um pouco mais sobre a questão da natureza institucional, porque, de acordo com Aurélio Bucuane e Peter Mulder (2007), na literatura mais recente, sobressai o argumento de que a qualidade institucional é o mecanismo chave no estabelecimento da relação causal entre riqueza em recursos naturais e desenvolvimento económico. A tese é de que países ricos em recursos naturais, com instituições fracas (aqui é onde entra Moçambique, mesmo que em termos futuristas), muitas vezes não trazem prosperidade, porque os seus rendimentos são aplicados em actividades não produtivas, como pagamento de favores e compra de lealdades, enquanto que, países ricos em recursos, com instituições fortes, são mais prováveis de estimular o crescimento e desenvolvimento através de investimento produtivo em capital físico e humano. Esta fraqueza institucional, aliada ao acesso limitado aos recursos naturais, conforme os autores acima (ibid.), muitas vezes, faz com que a gestão destes recursos seja numa base não competitiva e transparente, propiciando a acumulação de muita riqueza, por parte de um grupo restrito de pessoas, sobretudo ligadas ao poder político, e práticas corruptas por parte dos oficiais governamentais seniores. Esta situação pode conduzir a cenários de quase captura do Estado, como ocorre com Angola, demonstrado por Rafael Marques, no seu relatório “A Presidência: o epicentro da corrupção”, mas também pode gerar sentimentos de injustiça e disputas entre vários segmentos na sociedade, ameaçando, dessa forma, conforme Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon , a transição democrática e estabilidade política.

Perante estes factos, importa referenciar factores que possam contribuir para a mitigação da maldição dos recursos em Países como Moçambique. Nuno Castel-Branco apresenta uma receita simples e prática, “partilhar as riquezas com responsabilidade e humildade; gerir as riquezas com transparência, idoneidade e inteligência; garantir a gestão e controlo sociais (incluindo das comunidades locais) dessas riquezas; garantir que as riquezas beneficiem amplamente o povo, em vez de apenas os escolhidos do poder politico e económico do capital…”. Entretanto, para que tal ocorra, entre outras acções, o país deverá, muito rapidamente alterar a imagem de ser um dos Países com o governo e instituições públicas mais fechados, ou menos transparentes, da região da Africa Austral, conforme ilustrado pelo relatório do MISA 2010 “A report on open and secretive public institutions in Southern Africa”. Nisto, e a bem da transparência e da inclusão, apela-se a Assembleia da República, cotada neste relatório, e de forma paradoxal, como a instituição mais fechada, para que pare de empurrar constantemente para a cáuda das suas prioridades legislativas a proposta de lei sobre o acesso à informação, agendando sua urgente discussão e aprovação.

A VIOLENCIA BASEADA NO GENERO NA VISAO DE PAULO MUXANGA

2011-05-19T15:23:00.001+02:00

A Violência Baseada no Género como Factor de Propagação do HIV/SIDA nas Mulheres

Paulo Muxanga

O debate, em torno da Violência Baseada no Género (VBG), tem estado a crescer nos últimos anos. Os esforços têm se multiplicado, quase que em todo o mundo, visando combater a prática deste tipo de violência. Há uma consciência mundial do impacto devastador, na sociedade, causado pela prática impune e reiterada da VBG. Defensores dos direitos das mulheres mobilizam-se, dentro e fora dos países e regiões, para conseguir mudanças significativas em padrões e políticas nacionais, regionais e internacionais, abordando a questão da VBG. Mergulhados nesta onda, aproveitando, ainda, o entusiasmo, gerado pela campanha mundial dos 16 dias de activismo pelo fim da violência contra as mulheres, na sua edição de 2010, pretendemos, com esta reflexão, discutir a relação que se estabelece, entre a VBG e o HIV/SIDA, e as consequências dai resultantes, destacando, de modo particular, a África Subsaariana.

A VBG refere-se, de acordo com Schmidt e Nice, à violência sofrida por causa de ideias sobre o que significa ser um homem ou uma mulher e, esta, inclui violência contra a mulher (VCM), mas também, a discriminação baseada na orientação sexual ou mudança da identidade do género. Os homens e rapazes homossexuais tambem sofrem VBG, entretanto, esta afecta, desproporcionadamente, as raparigas e a mulher.

Por seu turno, a Declaração de Beijing e respectiva Plataforma de Acção, definem a violência contra as mulheres como “qualquer acto de violência baseada em género que resulte ou que seja provável que resulte em prejuízos físicos, sexuais ou psicológicos às mulheres [e raparigas], incluindo a ameaça de tais actos, a coerção ou privação arbitrária da liberdade, quer ocorra em público quer na vida particular.”

A violência é, geralmente, dirigida, especificamente, contra as mulheres, por diversas razões, sendo de destacar as relações de poder desiguais, em prejuízo da mulher, dentro das famílias, comunidades e Estados. Esta situação tem contribuído para a restrição do direito das mulheres a manifestarem as suas vontades e desejos, a exporem os seus pontos de vista e posicionamentos, bem como, a decidirem sobre questões que lhes digam, directamente, respeito, como é o caso das questões sexuais e reprodutivas.

No fórum familiar, por exemplo, onde os homens são dominantes, sendo, por isso, detentores das prerrogativas de decisão sobre as condições em que as práticas sexuais e reprodutivas devem ocorrer, o poder de barganha da mulher é fraco, o que aumenta o risco de sua exposição à práticas sexuais inseguras, podendo resultar na contaminação pelo HIV/SIDA. Por outro lado, raparigas adolescentes, vivendo em meio familiar, estruturalmente violento, como sucede em muitas sociedades, estão sob risco ainda maior de exposição ao HIV/SIDA, uma vez que elas também podem ser vítimas de abuso sexual por membros mais velhos da família, parentes próximos e vizinhos.

Enquanto isso, ao nível da comunidade, para além de outros riscos, as mulheres também estão expostas ao risco de violência sexual, ao buscarem água, lenha e fazerem trabalho agrícola. As raparigas estudantes são pressionadas a sucumbir ao assédio sexual de homens mais velhos para pagar pelos livros escolares e pelas despesas pessoais, bem como, pelos próprios professores (como forma de facilitarem a sua passagem de classe) e colegas. Em algumas culturas, há uma crença de que a prática de sexo com virgens mantém os homens jovens e evita ou cura a infecção por HIV. Isso tem reforçado a tradição de encorajar o casamento na infância, o que também expõe as mulheres a riscos acrescidos de contaminação pelo HIV/SIDA.

Os dados disponíveis indicam que a proporção de mulheres infectadas pelo HIV/SIDA está crescendo em níveis mais altos do que a dos homens, sendo, as mulheres, de 2.5 a 8 vezes, mais susceptíveis de contraírem infecção que os homens. Em 2001 , estimou-se que, de 6 a 11% das mulheres africanas em idade, entre 15 e 24 anos, eram HIV positivo, comparado com o índice de 3 a 5% para homens jovens. Na África Subsaariana é tida como aquela que apresenta os mais elevados índices de seroprevalência. Em 2007 , por exemplo, a região apresentava uma taxa de 35 por cento de todas as pessoas que vivem com Sida no mundo e 32 por cento das novas infecções que ocorrem no planeta. Ainda nesta região, actualmente, estima-se que, 58% das pessoas infectadas com HIV/SIDA, são mulheres, tendo, na vasta maioria, a transmissão da infecção, sido através de seus maridos. Estes dados, tornam as desigualdades de género e seu impacto ainda mais visíveis.

Moçambique, País integrante da África Subsaariana, apresenta, segundo dados do INSIDA (2010), uma taxa de seroprevalência de 11.5 por cento, na faixa etária dos 15 aos 49 anos, sendo as mulheres as mais infectadas pelo HIV/SIDA, com uma taxa de 13.1%, contra 9.2% dos homens, em todas as províncias, excepto Niassa, onde a taxa de infecção, nos homens é mais alta - é de quatro por cento, contra três nas mulheres.

Algumas correntes defendem que a alta taxa de infecção pelo HIV/SIDA, em mulheres e raparigas, está ligada a questões fundamentais de poder e controle e à forma como a sociedade fecha os olhos para o comportamento dos homens, que exercem poder e controle sobre as mulheres, sendo que, a manutenção do aumento da taxa de infecção nas mulheres, resultará numa queda na força de trabalho das nações e no aumento da pobreza dentro das famílias. Isto atinge profundamente a produção de alimentos e as economias nacionais, uma vez que a maioria das mulheres africanas actua na produção agrícola. Também, tem se tornado cada vez mais visível a existência de uma forte ligação entre o HIV/SIDA e a pobreza. Por outro lado, a manutenção desta situação, compromete os esforços de promoção do desenvolvimento sustentável, bem com, o alcance das metas de desenvolvimento do Milénio, sobretudo, os números 3 e 6. Pelo que, se nada for feito para empoderar cada vez mais as mulheres, permitindo algum equilíbrio nas relações de poder, entre homens e mulheres, as mulheres e raparigas continuarão a sofrer as respectivas consequências negativas, cujos impactos se reflectem, como foi visto, na sociedade como um todo.

A CRISE NO ZIMBABWE NA VISAO DE PAULO MUXANGA

2011-05-19T15:22:00.000+02:00

Zimbabwe: dois anos do Acordo Político Global:
“Um parto doloroso para um nado morto”

Paulo Muxanga

Outra vez Zimbabwe. Desta vez o pretexto é relativo aos dois anos da implementação do Acordo Político Global (APG). Com este texto, pretendo lançar um olhar panorâmico aos contornos do mesmo e seu contributo na consolidação da democracia no Zimbabwe. Abraham Lincoln , num discurso, referiu-se à democracia como o “governo do povo, pelo povo, para o povo”. Com isto, pretendeu ele dizer que o poder de governar emana do povo, que se governa a si mesmo, buscando satisfazer seus próprios interesses. Entretanto, o APG reflecte justamente o oposto da tese de Lincoln, revelando-se uma verdadeira negação da vontade popular, expressa através do voto. Aliás, esta é uma tendência que parece ganhar forma em África, como o demonstram os exemplos do Quénia, Madagáscar e o próprio Zimbabwe.

As últimas eleições zimbabweanas, segundo variadas fontes, incluindo a Human Rights Watch, deixaram muito a desejar em termos de pacifismo, liberdade e transparência, com relatos de registo de graves indícios de fraude, também testemunhados por observadores africanos. Os dados de que dispomos, indicam um saldo que ronda os 200 mortos, em consequência da violência eleitoral de 2008, da qual nem o líder da maior força da oposição, Morgan Tsvangirai, presidente do Movimento para a Mudança Democrática (MDC), escapou. Este foi por várias vezes detido, espancado e privado de suas liberdades fundamentais, como a da movimentação, o que acabou por contribuir fortemente para a sua decisão de retirar-se da corrida à segunda volta das presidenciais, deixando o caminho livre para a vitória tranquila do presidente Robert Mugabe.

Os acontecimentos ocorridos ao longo do processo eleitoral zimbabweano de 2008 são reveladores de um desrespeito grave às normas democráticas internacionais, destacando-se, entre outras, a Carta Africana sobre Democracia, Eleições e Governação, no que se refere ao respeito dos direitos humanos e dos princípios democráticos, à realização regular de eleições, transparentes, livres e justas, à separação dos poderes, à participação efectiva dos cidadãos nos processos democráticos e de desenvolvimento, à transparência e justiça na gestão dos negócios públicos e, os Princípios e linhas gerais da SADC que regem eleições democráticas, no que tange a plena participação dos cidadãos no processo político; liberdade de associação; tolerância política; igualdade de oportunidades para todos os partidos políticos, em termos de acesso aos media estatais; igualdade de oportunidades para exercer o direito de voto e de ser votado; independência do sistema Judiciário e imparcialidade das instituições eleitorais; aceitação e respeito dos resultados das eleições pelos partidos políticos, proclamados pelas Autoridades Eleitorais Nacionais como tendo sido livres e justas, em conformidade com a lei do país.
Entretanto, perante estes factos, os líderes da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC), no lugar de fazerem cumprir os instrumentos por eles adoptados, condenando as irregularidades e não reconhecendo os resultados saídos desse processo, promoveram, apoiaram e, de certa forma, impuseram, como solução do problema, a adopção de um governo de partilha, no entanto, desequilibrada, materializado no Acordo Político Global (APG), em vigor há pouco mais de dois anos. Esta solução resultou de um longo processo, cujo desfecho não foi nada mais do que a legitimação de todo o processo eleitoral, que tinha sido contestado por quase todos os quadrantes, nacionais e internacionais, incluindo a própria SADC, embora o tivesse feito de forma muito tímida e sem convicção. Portanto, ao promover esta solução, a SADC, não só não resolveu o problema do Zimbabwe, como apadrinhou a amputação dos princípios do Estado de Direito Democrático, por si defendidos e plasmados em vários instrumentos africanos, alguns dos quais já mencionados.
Por outro lado, o APG, para além ser um documento ambíguo, em termos de mecanismos de garantia de sua implementação, o que o torna ineficaz, conferiu poderes excessivos à figura do Presidente da República, esvaziando, em larga medida, os poderes dos outros membros do governo, particularmente do Primeiro-Ministro e Vice-Primeiro-Ministro, tornando-os em meras figuras decorativas, conforme vem sendo demonstrado pelas sucessivas decisões unilaterais emanadas pelo Presidente da República, com destaque para as últimas nomeações de 10 governadores provinciais, os quais o Primeiro-Ministro diz não reconhecer por serem inconstitucionais, não tendo, no entanto, mecanismos legais a que possa recorrer para impugná-las. Mas também, a ineficácia deste acordo permite que uma das partes, no caso o Presidente da República, decida pelo fim do mesmo, e ainda convocar eleições, tudo feito a margem dos entendimentos obtidos entre as partes contratantes. Uma vez mais, a semelhança do que sucedeu anteriormente, a SADC, na voz do seu mandatário para a questão do Zimbabwe, o Presidente Sul Africano, Jacob Zuma, apoia e encoraja a ideia da realização de eleições em 2011, argumentando que esta seria uma das vias de acabar com os constantes impasses no governo inclusivo, saído do APG. Entretanto, se o Presidente Zimbabweano, Robert Mugabe, e o seu Primeiro-Ministro, Morgan Tsvangirai, se dizem prontos para o escrutínio, importa referir que há várias correntes no País que entendem que, em termos políticos, os pouco mais de dois anos do APG, não trouxeram grandes alterações, mantendo-se, em grande medida, os factores de violência e intimidação que conduziram o processo eleitoral de 2008 ao desfecho caótico em que se viu mergulhado. Enquanto uns argumentam que a realização de eleições, nas actuais condições, só beneficiará a ZANU-PF e seu presidente, Robert Mugabe, outros defendem que realizar eleições, num futuro imediato, poderia colocar riscos aos sinais evidentes de melhoria e estabilização da situação económica, que registou um crescimento de 5% o ano passado, algo que não sucedia desde 1998.
Posto isto, a conclusão que se pode tirar é de que a SADC precisa de, urgentemente, mudar a sua perspectiva em relação à questão zimbabweana, procurando corrigir os erros que conduziram àquilo que designamos de “nado morto”, o AGP, por todas as fragilidades acima apresentadas, e, simultaneamente, centrar as suas energias no fortalecimento do Estado de Direito Democrático e respeito pelos direitos fundamentais do povo zimbabweano, o que passa também por reavaliar o seu apoio à eventual realização de eleições gerais em 2011, no Zimbabwe.

AS RELACOES ENTRE MALAWI E MOCAMBIQUE NA VISAO DE SAITE JUNIOR

2011-05-19T15:21:00.000+02:00

Centro de Estudos Moçambicanos e Internacionais
Av. Patrice Lumumba, nº 1154, CP 1092, telefone nº + 258 21 301522, E-mail: cemode@teledata.mz, www.cemo-mozambique.org
Maputo-Moçambique

UM BREVE OLHAR AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE MOÇAMBIQUE E MALAWI

Saite Júnior
Analista da diplomacia africana
E-mail: saitejunior@gmail.com

A fase inicial das relações
As relações entre Moçambique e Malawi iniciaram na década 60 do século XX, altura em que o Malawi alcançou a sua independência da Grã-Bretalha e aprofundaram na década 70 com a independência de Moçambique. Desde dessa fase as relações foram puramente realistas, devido as ideologias politicas seguidas por cada Estado. A politica externa de Moçambique sub liderança de Samora Machel, era de orientação socialista, dando primazia a relação com países do leste europeu, a China e Cuba, sem contudo excluir a relação com demais Estados, sobretudo Estados jovens e empenhados no combate do colonialismo e na consolidação de independência nacional e na recuperação do uso e controlo dos recursos naturais a favor do seu povo (CRPM , 1975). Todavia em 1990 com adopção da ideologia capitalista e do regime multipartidário, Moçambique passa a estabelecer relações de amizade e cooperação na base do respeito mutuo pela soberania, integridade territorial, igualdade, não interferência nos assuntos internos e reciprocidade de benefícios ou seja Moçambique passa a priorizar a cooperação com todos os Estados, independentemente da sua ideologia política.

Por sua vez o Malawi, sob a liderança do presidente Hastings Kamuzu Banda, tinha uma politica externa orientada para os Estados capitalistas ocidentais. No entanto importa realçar que segundo Chirombo (2010) durante a guerra fria, o Malawi foi considerado aliado do regime do apartheid da África do Sul e regimes colónias com destaque para Portugal, e que “alimentou a guerra civil em Moçambique apoiado a RENAMO juntamente com o regime do apartheid” (O Autarca, 12/07/2009). Esta posição do Malawi obrigou aos Estado da Africa Austral a isolarem esse País e o Presidente Samora Machel chegou mesmo a ameaçar colocar mísseis na fronteira comum. Aqui estava-se claramente perante o realismo, que se verifica quando o interesse e o poder nacionais estão em causa e não mede o uso da força bruta (Rourke e Boyer, 2004; Kegley, 1995; Bennett, 1991; Rosenau, 1969; Morgenthau, 1965).

Em 1986 realizou-se em Luanda, entre os dias 21 e 22 de Agosto uma reunião dos membros da SADCC, que discutiu entre vários assuntos a necessidade de tomar uma posição mais dura em relação ao Malawi. Assim no “dia 11 de Setembro do mesmo ano o presidente moçambicano Samora Machel, presidente da Zâmbia Kenneth Kaunda e presidente o Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe, viajaram para Blantyre no Malawi para explicar ao presidente da Banda que os interesses fundamentais do povo do Malawi não eram diferentes dos de outros Estados SADCC, e que possíveis represálias advindas da posição leviana do Malawi afectaria gravemente a este Estados em todas vertentes, económica, politica e social. Nessa encontro pediram ainda ao Malawi para tomar uma posição diferente em relação a guerra em Moçambique”(Chirombo, 2010).

Como já foi observado, a diplomacia prossegue muitos objectivos e um dos quais é o político e o Estado deve garantir a paz e as boas relações com os países vizinhos. Contudo a visita de Mugabe, Machel e Kaunda mostra que o Malawi está aberto a discussões. Segundo o então vice-ministro do Malawi Dausi Nicholas, a necessidade de sobrevivência no sistema anárquico foi a razão que fez com que o Malawi estabelecesse relações com a África do Sul e Portugal. Com efeito Nicholas acrescentou que essa diplomacia malawina ajudou a desenvolver Moçambique, isto porque, o Malawi convenceu Portugal a levar em diante a construção da linha férrea da Beira apesar dos seus custos elevados. Com o fim da guerra-fria e o colapso da ideologia comunista, a política externa do Malawi entrou numa fase de acomodação.

Período pós guerra-fria
O apoio concedido pelo Malawi ao regime do apartheid e a RENAMO minou as relações entre esse Estado e Moçambique, mesmo depois da guerra-fria. Todavia pode-se argumentar que a politica externa regional de Banda visou superar os desafios da falta de litoral e apoiado a RENAMO, teria o acesso aos portos moçambicanos a custos baixos, estava em jogo a sobrevivência do Estado.

Todavia, terminada a guerra-fria e o apartheid ma África do Sul, o Malawi perdeu o seu aliado estratégico e devido a posição geostratégica e talassocrática favorável que Moçambique possui em relação ao Malawi, este ultimo sentiu-se obrigado limpar a sua imagem, para ter acesso os portos moçambicanos e aos corredores de desenvolvimento de Nacala e Beira. A titulo de exemplo, durante a fase final da guerra civil em Moçambique, o Malawi acolheu refugiados moçambicanos, uma posição meramente hipócrita e realista, isto é, uma posição baseada nos custos e benefícios de camaradagem. Assim a politica externa do Malawi funcionou como um instrumento que visa maximizar os benefícios reais e minimizar as percas, tal como Hans Morgenthau (1965:8) argumenta que na relação entre Estados a moral não tem espaço, uma vez que cada um procura acautelar os prejuízos e dinamizar os ganhos, ou seja, o Estado agem como um actor racional.

Com efeito durante a última década do século XX e principio do século XXI, as relações entre os dois países foram com base nos princípios preconizados pela Comunidade para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC) e não na amizade entre os dois povos.

O declínio das relações
As relações entre os dois países, voltaram a declinar em 2009, a quando do ataque e destruição por completo um quartel da Força de Guarda de Fronteira do distrito de Ngaúma, na província de Niassa, no norte de Moçambique. Está situação acabou ensombrando a visita do presidente do Malawi Bingo wa Mutharika, que esteve em Moçambique entre os dias 10 e 12 de Agosto de 2009. A quando a sua visita o Estado moçambicano esperava um pedido de desculpas por parte do Estado maliwiana o que não aconteceu, criando um clima sinuoso entre os dois chefes de Estado. Fase a isso, o presidente Bingo decidiu cancelar a sua visita a cidade da Beira que estava marcada para o dia 12 de Agosto de 2009, alegando queria colher mais informações junto de diversas entidades afins a partir de Lilongwe, a capital política do Malawi . Com efeito no mesmo dia, o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros de Moçambique, Oldemiro Baloi, afirmou que o Governo de Moçambique esperava que houvesse esclarecimento da situação, que as pessoas envolvidas fosse penalizadas e apresentadas as devidas desculpas se se apurarasse que a culpa estivera do lado malawiano.

Depois do incidente a Comissão Conjunta Permanente de Defesa e Segurança dos dois países, reuniu-se na ultima semana de Agosto, em Maputo para de entre outros assuntos discutir o incidente de Ngaúma. O encontro visou ainda o fortalecimento permanente das relações de cooperação entre os dois países, a promoção da paz, estabilidade e bem estar social para os dois povos. No diz respeito ao incidente de Ngaúma Filipe Nyussi, ministro da Defesa de Moçambique disse tratar-se de um exemplo de actos contrários ao princípio de respeito à soberania e integridade territorial dos Estados advogados pelos dois países e demais da região austral de África.

Outro acto que veio a declinar as relações entre os dois Estados foi a posição reticente por parte do Estado moçambicano, em torno da construção de um porto fluvial no rio Chire, um dos tributários do rio Zambeze. “A estratégia dos malawianos é de navegar o Zambeze para o transporte das suas mercadorias de Nsanje ao Chinde, na foz do rio Zambeze, e vice-versa, uma distância de apenas 240 quilómetros. Acreditam que isso poderá baixar significativamente os custos de transacção dos produtos, ou seja menos 25”(Valy, 2009)

Como retaliação a posição tomada por Moçambique em relação a porto fluvial de Nsanje, cerca de 750 moçambicanos residentes em Nsanje no extremo sul do Malawi foram proibidos de votar no dia 28 de Outubro de 2009 pela policia malawiana, alegando-se questões de segurança. Este acto representou uma autentica violação a Convenções de Viena sobre as Relações Diplomáticas e Consulares. Importa realçar que durante o mês de Setembro três membros da policia secreta malawiana interpelaram em Nsanje o Cônsul de Moçambique em Blantyre, Félix Mambule, exigindo-lhe as listas dos moçambicanos recenseados naquele ponto.

A situação voltou a agravar ainda, no mês de Maio deste ano quando seis moçambicanos foram condenados à pena de morte na cadeia de máxima segurança de Zomba, no Malawi, acusados de prática de crimes de assassinato. Contudo, depois de longas negociações as penas foram convertidas em prisão perpetua. No entanto, o número de moçambicanos condenados à pena de morte naquele país vizinho poderá ser superior, uma vez que existem outros encarcerados noutros estabelecimentos prisionais malawianos.

Bibliografia

VALY, Bayano (2009) Nsanje: choque de interesses entre Moçambique e Malawi?
Disponível em http://comunidademocambicana.blogspot.com/2009/08/nsanje-choque-deinteresses-entre.html

TVM, (2009) Mutharika promete explicações sobre incidente de Ngaúma. Disponível em
http://www.tvm.co.mz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2950&Itemid=77

ZAMBÉZIA Online (2009). 750 eleitores moçambicanos foram proíbidos de votar no

Malawi, Disponível em http://www.zambezia.co.mz/noticias/93/8469-750-eleitoresmocambicanos-
foram-proibidos-de-votar-no-malawi-20102009

O Aurarca (2009) Moçambique e Malawi em termos práticos desenvolvem uma relação hipócrita; Edição nº 1819 de 12 de Agosto de 2009: Quelimane

CHIROMBO, Richard (2010) Malawi-Mozambique relations from the 1960s to early 1990s: how malawi ended up as the key, rather than pariah, state. Disponível em http://zachimalawi.blogspot.com/2010/05/title-malawi-mozambique-relations-argue.html

HEDGES, D, (1989) Notes on Malawi-Mozambique Relations, 1961-1987; Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.15,No.4. Taylor&Francis Limited: Africa do Sul

ROBINSON, D (2009) Renamo, Malawi and the struggle to succeed Banda: Assessing theories of Malawian interventions in the Mozambican civil war; Eras Edition 11 disponível em http://www.arts.monash.edu.au./publications/eras

A opinião expressa pelo autor no artigo aqui publicado, não veicula necessariamente o posicionamento do Centro de Estudos Moçambicanos e Internacionais

OS CONFLITOS NOS GRANDES LAGOS NA VISAO DE PAULO MUXANGA

2011-05-19T15:18:00.002+02:00

A CRISE DOS GRANDES LAGOS E A PROBLEMÁTICA DOS REFUGIADOS EM MOÇAMBIQUE

Paulo F. C. Muxanga

Com este artigo pretendemos levantar alguns aspectos relativos ao fluxo de refugiados no território moçambicano e suas implicações na segurança e ordem públicas no País. Moçambique tem registado um influxo considerável de refugiados e outro tipo de imigrantes que se faz passar por refugiados, originários, sobretudo da zona dos grandes lagos (RDC, Burundi e Ruanda) e do corno de África (Somália). Um relatório da Comissão da União Africana revela que África possui 3 milhões de refugiados, dos quais 160 mil se encontram na África Austral e são provenientes da República Democrática do Congo (RDC), do Burundi, do Ruanda e da Somália. Segundo o Alto Comissário das Nações Unidas para os Refugiados, António Guterres, “(…) Moçambique é um exemplo de acolhimento e tratamento dos refugiados a nível do continente e por se tratar de um país em paz e em franco desenvolvimento constitui atracção”. Dados do Instituto moçambicano de Apoio aos Refugiados (INAR, 2010) apontam para a presença, em Moçambique, de um número acima de 8.500 refugiados e requerentes de asilo, dos quais, mais de 5.500 estão no centro de refugiados de Marratane, em Nampula, que é o maior do país, e os restantes, cerca de 3.000, encontram-se residindo fora do centro. Deste universo, grande parte provém da República Democrática do Congo, depois Ruanda, Burundi e Somália. Contudo, há também refugiados de outros países, em números menores.

O acolhimento de refugiados por si só não constitui factor de inquietação, até porque os Países Africanos adoptaram em 1969, a Convenção da OUA sobre aspectos específicos do problema dos refugiados em África, a qual, tal como a Convenção das Nações Unidas de 1951, exorta os Estados a concederem protecção e assistência às pessoas forçadas a abandonarem os seus países de origem por razões de insegurança interna e ameaça à sua integridade física.
Entretanto, quando o fluxo de imigração é crescente, torna-se complicado para países como Moçambique, com uma infra-estrutura económica e social fraca e com escassez de recursos, responder positivamente aos desafios impostos pela presença de estrangeiros necessitando de atenção especial por parte dos governos. A situação agrava-se quando a assistência internacional para estes casos é limitada, assumindo, os países acolhedores, grande parte da responsabilidade de manutenção e protecção dos refugiados, como está a suceder em Moçambique, onde o ACNUR e o PMA têm reduzido crescentemente a sua intervenção e os apoios concedidos ao governo. António Guterres disse, a propósito, numa visita efectuada à Moçambique, que o ACNUR estava a fazer reformas no sentido de minimizar os gastos na assistência aos refugiados, que se encontram em Moçambique ou noutros países.
Por seu turno, o INAR refere que o Estado moçambicano gasta anualmente de forma directa através do Orçamento Geral do Estado cerca de 10 milhões de meticais, para além de outros custos indirectos, com o acolhimento e manutenção dos refugiados.
Por outro lado, importa referir que, pelo facto de muitos dos refugiados serem provenientes de situações de conflitos armados (Guerra civil), por vezes, trazem consigo as suas armas. Estas são então usadas por alguns para praticar crimes, que incluem assalto à mão armada e furto. Estes influxos massivos de refugiados podem também contribuir para o aumento de ocorrência de outros ilícitos, como contrabando, branqueamento de capital e economia subterrânea.
Em Moçambique tem se assistido nos últimos anos a um crescimento acelerado do número de estrangeiros actuando na área comercial, sobretudo no comércio informal, destacando-se cidadãos de nacionalidade nigeriana e congolesa, com estes últimos a tomarem gradualmente o controlo desta área. A fragilidade do Estado em termos de capacidade de controlo (a nível das fronteiras e dentro do País) sobre os imigrantes (legais e ilegais) facilita de alguma forma a sua movimentação e potencia a prática de actividades ilícitas, tais como contrabando, tráfico de drogas e branqueamento de capital, com consequências negativas para a economia e o tecido social do País.
Mas também, esta entrada massiva de estrangeiros no território nacional pode ser, a semelhança daquilo que ocorreu na África do Sul, um foco potencial de xenofobia. A Liga dos Direitos Humanos e a Citizenship Rights da África do Sul, referem, por exemplo, no relatório que publicaram sobre as causas das acções xenófobas de 2008, que " é real" o risco de violência contra estrangeiros noutros países da África Austral que acolhem comunidades imigrantes significativas, como Moçambique, "porque há também um olhar de desconfiança da população local em relação aos de fora, principalmente em relação a algum desafogo financeiro que alguns estrangeiros ostentam". Muitos moçambicanos vivem de facto numa situação de pobreza aguda, em oposição à situação apresentada por alguns destes estrangeiros que, como foi já referido, têm estado a tomar o comércio informal nas cidades do País, ostentando em pouco tempo sinais de riqueza, para muitos moçambicanos, difíceis de perceber. Esta situação pode desenvolver, por parte dos nacionais, a ideia de que os estrangeiros são privilegiados e têm a vida facilitada, como sucedeu em parte com os sul-africanos, o que contribuiu para a situação explosiva que África do Sul viveu e continua a viver.
Já existem segmentos da sociedade civil em Moçambique, sobretudo na zona Norte (particularmente em Nampula, onde se situa a maior parte de estrangeiros na condição de refugiados), que começam a levantar vozes, associando os estrangeiros, entre outros crimes transnacionais, ao tráfico de seres humanos, para além de considerar que a sua entrada no País acontece sem respeito pelos valores tradicionais, sócio-¬culturais e económicos locais. Um responsável de uma Organização da Sociedade Civil (OSC) de Nampula dizia em jeito de desabafo “é um País de tudo e de todos”. Estes sinais podem parecer insuficientes, mas são reveladores de um potencial de conflito, cujo degenerar poderá acarretar consequências desastrosas para o País.
Portanto, como se pode perceber, a crise nos grandes lagos não é e nem deverá ser vista com uma questão apenas para os Países daquela região. Esta afecta e de forma significativa Países mais afastados, como Moçambique, África do Sul e outros, exigindo, por isso, um compromisso maior, por parte destes, na busca de soluções concretas e duradoiras para esta crise.
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SEGURANCA HUMANA NA SADC NA OPINIAO DE SAITE JUNIOR

2011-05-19T15:17:00.001+02:00

BREVE OLHAR À SEGURANÇA HUMANA NA SADC
Por: Saite Júnior

Escrevo este pequeno ensaio numa altura em que se verifica a violação dos direitos huamanos no Zimbabwe, uma crise politica em Madagáscar, o “monopartidarismo” em Angola, o conflito na República Democrática do Congo (RDC), manifestações na África do Sul, instabilidade política no Lesotho, na Suazilandia, subida do custo de vida em Moçambique e “ditadura” no Malawi, o que de certa forma contribui para a fraca observância da segurança humana na região boreal de África. Mas para entedermos o significado e conceito de segurança humana na Comunidade para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC) vamos voltar no tempo e no espaço.

Durante muito tempo, nos estudos de relações internacionais e de ciência política, o conceito de segurança esteve praticamente confinado à consideração da “unidade” do espaço nacional. Nesse contexto, o enfoque atribuído à ameaça externa esteve ligado a dois pressupostos: primeiro, que a maior parte das ameaças à segurança de um Estado têm origem externa; segundo, que essas ameaças são antes do mais de natureza militar e requerem uma resposta militar. E foi este último enfoque que caracterizou o sistema de segurança na SADC.

Com efeito, o conceito tradicional de segurança centrado no Estado, na sua soberania e integridade territorial, pressupõe que a segurança é conquistada na medida em que se fortalece a sua capacidade militar. Diante dessa concepção, na setima dezena do século XX, emergiram em vários círculos académicos, novas propostas e formulações alternativas que questionavam esse conceito tradicional de segurança, tais como: a segurança comum, abrangente, cooperativa, colectiva, global, etc. E todas essas concepções alternativas, abriram caminho para que na nova dezena no século tranzato se formulasse o conceito de Segurança Humana.

Assim o novo conceito de Segurança Humana tem o foco no indivíduo. A pessoa humana torna-se o referencial para a própria questão da segurança internacional. Temos, por exemplo, maior relevância no tratamento da segurança pessoal; na garantia de proteção do sujeito contra ações danosas perpetradas pelo Estado; garantia de proteção contra outros Estados que não o seu; garantia contra crimes cometidos por bandos de rua; protecção para a criança; além, é claro, da garantia de um ecossistema livre da degradação e o direito à segurança alimentar e à saúde.

Na SADC a situação política, económica, social e humanitária que se vive é bastante preocupante. É difícil aceitar que qualquer país passe incólume ao lado da instabilidade que se gera num país. O efeito de alastramento é evidente como várias situações já o atestam, tal como ja fiz referência no primeiro paragrafo desse ensaio. Isto significa que a dimensão interna e nacional da segurança influência positiva ou negativa a segurança regional.

Para uma melhor percepção dessa segurança humana na região vamos ilustrar alguns casos.
No Zimbabwe o índice de violações de direitos humanos subiu 5% no mês de Abril deste ano, segundo disse o Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), apontando, mais uma vez, que o Governo de unidade, do presidente Robert Mugabe, e do primeiro-ministro, Morgan Tsvangirai, não conseguiu acabar com os abusos e restaurar o Estado de Direito em todo o país. Enquanto o governo trouxe alguma estabilidade à economia, o ZPP disse que violações dos direitos humanos continuaram especialmente nas áreas rurais, apesar dos apelos dos líderes políticos aos seus apoiantes.

Em Madagáscar o então presidente Marc Ravalomanana, foi obrigado pelos militares em 2009, a abandonar o cargo e a dar lugar à “era Rajoelina”, na história de governação daquele país. Ravalomanana transferiu os poderes para às altas patentes militares, que, por seu turno, transferiram para Andry Rajoelina. Este facto revelou uma autentica violação da constituição da República e dos direitos fundamentais do povo malgaxe, devido a forma como este ascende ao poder, o que te causado até hoje uma insegurança no país.

No Malawi, o presidente da República Bingu wa Mutharika, ameaçou mandar fechar vários jornais, por terem publicado “mentiras” sobre a situação alimentar do país. Para além disso verifica-se naquele país, muita violação sistemática dos Direitos Humanos, de liberdade religiosa, com particular destaque para a descriminação das crença, dando primazia ao cristianismo relegando para o terceiro plano o Islão o que conduz para a insegurança humana.

Na Suazilândia, o regime vigente tem estado a bloquear todas as tentativas visando o estabelecimento de um regime democrático no País. Desde 1973 que os partidos políticos foram banidos, através de um decreto Real de Sobhuza II, para além de reportarem-se actos de intimidação e violações frequentes de direitos humanos contra os opositores do sistema, como são os casos das acusações contra o líder da Frente Democrática Unida da Suazilândia, de prática de actos terroristas.

No Lesotho, se instalou uma crise política depois das eleições parlamentares de Fevereiro de 2007 que se alastra até hoje. Os resultados das eleições parlamentares do Lesotho são contestados pela oposição que acusa o partido no poder de ter introduzido, de forma fraudulenta, um grupo de deputados para a Assembleia Nacional. Esta situação resulta do facto do processo eleitoral para este órgão ter dois momentos, sendo um da escolha de um determinado número de deputados nos círculos eleitorais e o outro de determinação de deputados através do Modelo Proporcional.

Em Moçambique, segundo a Chatham House (2010) embora a fraqueza democrática possa estar a atrasar a entrega de serviços e a redução contínua da pobreza, os factores sociais e económicos que formam a base do descontentamento popular talvez estejam a transformar o risco de conflitos numa agitação social imprevisível. Ao mesmo tempo, o sector de segurança é fraco e mostra-se cada vez mais incapaz de actuar contra as ameaças transnacionais à segurança regional e global que atravessam Moçambique, aumentando as pressões externas para uma acção que fica provavelmente para além da sua política ou da sua capacidade de implementação técnica.

Assim, há necessidade dos países da região encontrarem mecanismos viáveis e duradoiros que possa conduzir para a segurança humana e a principal ameaça a essa segurança é a pobreza.

A opinião expressa pelo autor no artigo aqui publicado, não veicula necessariamente o posicionamento do Centro de Estudos Moçambicanos e Internacionais.

REPUBLICA SAHARAUI NA VISAO DO SAITE JUNIOR

2011-05-19T15:10:00.003+02:00

O COMPORTAMENTO VERGONHOSO DOS LIDERES AFRICANOS PARA COM O POVO DO SAHARA OCIDENTAL

Por: Saite Júnior

Escrevo este pequeno ensaio numa altura é que o Partido Autenticidade e Modernidade (PAM) do Marrocos, o mais votado nas últimas eleições, sugeriu “maior Governo autónomo” para o Sahara Ocidental e admitiu que a Frente Polisário se converta num partido político regional. Contudo, importa antes referir que o Sahara Ocidental é o único território do continental africano que ainda não goza de sua independência e último grande território a nível mundial que continuar a ser uma colónia eficazmente. Trata-se de um problema que vem se arrastando desde 1976, quando a Espanha deixou a antiga colónia do Sahara Espanhol e, na sequência, o Reino do Marrocos anexou o território, apesar dos protestos e da disposição da Frente Polisário, movimento criado em 1973 e que representa os interesses do povo saharaui, de continuar a luta contra o que entendem ser o novo opressor. Realçar ainda, que na época da retirada da Espanha a Mauritânia também ocupou o território, disputando-o com o Marrocos, mas retirando-se poucos anos depois (1979). Decerto, estes dois Estados invadiram o território invocando direitos históricos, o que constitui uma clara violação aos princípios da então Organização da Unidade Africana, que defende o respeito pelas fronteiras traçadas na conferência de Berlim de 1884/1885.
Quando a Espanha se retirou do território não procedeu à transferência do poder para o movimento autonomista aceito como representativo do povo saharáui, no caso, a Frente Polisário. A atitude dos espanhóis permitiu a invasão do Marrocos (Norte) e a Mauritânia (Sul), o que fez com que a Frente Polisário abrisse duas frentes de combate e derrotasse, por força das armas, a invasão mauritana. Isso foi possível, em parte, pela ajuda que o governo da Argélia concedeu à Frente e pela fragilidade do regime mauritano.
A ocupação marroquino-mauritana suscitou numerosas declarações de protesto. Alguns países africanos e partidos progressistas europeus declaram-se a favor da autodeterminação. A Organização das Nações Unidas, no entanto, em pleno decurso da sua 30ª sessão da Assembleia Geral (em 1976), não foi além de votar duas resoluções contraditórias. A primeira, reclamava a organização de um referendo e solicitava às partes interessadas que se abstenhassem de toda e qualquer acção unilateral. A segunda, pedia a consagração do direito de autodeterminação, mas deixou a iniciativa à administração interina tripartida.
A 27 de Fevereiro de 1976, em Bir Lahlou, o secretário-geral da Frente Polisário proclamou a independência da República Árabe Saharaui Democrática. O primeiro Governo presidido por Mohammed Lamine foi formado a 4 de Março de 1976.
Em 1987 uma missão das Nações Unidas visitou a região para averiguar a possibilidade da realização de um referendo sobre o futuro do território. Os dois lados se comprometeram a participar de um referendo para que a população decidisse o futuro do Sahara Ocidental. O problema é que, desde então, não há acordo sobre quem tem direito a voto. O Marrocos defende que todos os moradores podem votar - o que inclui todos os marroquinos que imigraram para o Sahara nos últimos 30 anos (o Governo não divulga quantos são). A Frente Polisário afirma, por seu lado, que quem tem o direito de decidir o futuro do Sahara Ocidental são os habitantes originais, que participaram do censo de 1974.
Por onde anda a União Africana?
A República Árabe Saharaui Democrática tornou-se oficialmente membro da Organização da Unidade Africana a 22 de Fevereiro de 1982 e face a isso o Marrocos retirou-se na organização em 1985. Contudo, outros 73 Estados de todo o mundo reconhecem a República Árabe Saharaui Democrática. Até 1990, foi longa a sucessão de resoluções aprovadas no seio das diferentes organizações internacionais, tais como: Nações Unidas e Parlamento Europeu, todas lembravam o direito do povo saharaui à autodeterminação e à independência. Mas no terreno nada mudou. Marrocos, insensível aos apelos da comunidade internacional, persiste numa indiferença completa a sua política de ocupação e de repressão.
A problemática deste País já se transformou, num tipo de conflito esquecido, no qual as esperanças de uma solução vão se esvaindo lentamente, sem que ninguém tome, de facto, uma atitude concreta que leve a uma solução do problema. Enquanto isso, o Governo marroquino é acusado de violação sistemática dos direitos humanos sem que nada aconteça, até é aliado dos Estados Unidos, da França e da Espanha.
Nos últimos anos tem se notado novas iniciativas que buscaram resgatar o espírito do referendo e o encaminhamento da questão do Sahara Ocidental, mas sem nenhum resultado concreto. A titulo de exemplo, em Agosto de 2007, Marrocos e a Frente Polisário reiniciaram conversações com o patrocínio da ONU, para debater o estatuto do território. A 10 de Fevereiro de 2010 iniciaram outras conversações para por fim a crise política que se verifica naquele país e até hoje não há resultados satisfatórios. Em grande parte isso se deve à falta de compromisso da União Africana com a questão saharaui. Alias apenas 10 Estados africanos é que mantém relações diplomáticas com este país.
É importante lembrar que durante todo este tempo a maior parte dos Chefes de Estado e de Governo africanos estão a violar a Carta da Unidade Africana, ao continuar a negar o reconhecimento da RASD. Estes preconizam seus interesses individuais ao financiarem mercenários para se apoderarem dos recursos existentes naqueles País. Contudo, se os Governos africanos reconhecerem a RASD, respeitando os direitos do seu povo nos termos do direito internacional a situação naquele ponto do bloco africano será totalmente diferente, onde os nativos são refugiados dentro do seu próprio país. Assim os Estados africanos devem se empenhar mais na resolução desse problema, impondo sanções económica e corte de relações diplomáticas com o Marrocos.
A opinião expressa pelo autor no artigo aqui publicado, não veicula necessariamente o posicionamento do Centro de Estudos Moçambicanos e Internacionais

AS RELACOES ENTRE MALAWI E MOCAMBIQUE

2011-05-19T15:08:00.002+02:00

“AINDA SOBRE AS RELAÇÓES ENTRE MOÇAMBIQUE E MALAWI”
Constâncio Nguja

1. Introdução
O debate pluralista das Relações Internacionais surgiu nos anos 70, com escritores como Robert Keohane e Joseph Nye. Estes procuravam buscar alternativas ao Realismo tradicional. Através das suas obras , estes autores explicaram que o transnacionalismo tomava conta do mundo, remetendo para uma interdependência entre os estados. Para esses autores, e o pluralismo institucional em geral, os estados precisam de cooperar para a resolução dos conflitos. Os conflitos, e principalmente a Guerra, trazem perdas económicas para os estados. A negociação e cooperação é a forma mais viável para os estados adquirirem ganhos nas relações entre si.
A cooperação entre os estados pode ser feita bilateralmente ou a nível de instituições multilaterais. Foi nesse espírito que nasceu a SADCC, que mais tarde foi transformada na SADC. Esta tem como objectivo central promover a cooperação regional entre os estados da África Austral. Mas os objectivos reais estão consagrados na sua Declaração , sendo eles:
• Promover o crescimento e desenvolvimento económico, aliviar a pobreza, aumentar a qualidade de vida do povo africano, e prover auxílio aos mais desfavorecidos por meio de integração regional;
• Evoluir valores políticos, sistemas e instituições comuns;
• Promover e desenvolver a paz e a segurança;
• Promover o desenvolvimento auto-sustentável por meio da interdependência colectiva dos Estados membros e da auto-confiabilidade;
• Atingir a complementaridade entre as estratégias e programas nacionais e regionais;
• Promover e maximizar a utilização efetiva de recursos da região;
• Atingir utilização sustentável de recursos naturais e a protecção do meio-ambiente;
• Reforçar e consolidar as afinidades culturais, históricas e sociais de longa data da região.
2. Problema
Em 7 de Agosto do ano corrente, o pesquisador do Centro de Estudos Moçambicanos e Internacionais (CEMO), Saite Júnior, escreveu neste mesmo espaço sobre “As Relações entre Moçambique e Malawi” em que abordou o historial até à queda. Este enfatizou o “incidente de Ngaúma”, a questão da “navegabilidade do Shire”, a “questão de Nsanje”, a “condenação dos moçambicanos no Malawi à pena perpétua” e a “recusa de Malawi em importar a energia eléctrica de Cahora Bassa”.
Se bem que Saite Júnior abriu o debate sobre a “amargura” das relações entre o Malawi e Moçambique, o presente artigo visa dar continuidade a esse debate face aos recentes acontecimentos.
A 28 de Setembro circulava uma notícia segundo a qual “O Governo do Malawi voltara a apontar as obras em curso, de reabilitação da Ponte Samora Machel, em Tete, como estando na origem da escassez de combustíveis naquele país” e que tal acto constituía uma “sabotagem à sua economia”.
Em menos de duas semanas depois, a 6 de Outubro circulava a notícia segundo a qual uma embarcação daquele país vizinho invadira as águas territoriais de Moçambique, sem a devida autorização das autoridades de controlo fronteiriço, facto que fora oficialmente considerado infracção às regras de navegação vigentes entre os dois Estados da região.

3. Hipótese
Não seriam, tais factos, evidências suficientes para a tomada de consciência sobre o iminente conflito, tendente a evolução para se partir para as negociações? Tratando-se de países vizinhos, pertencentes à mesma região e partes do mesmo tratado de integração regional (nesse caso, a SADC de que se falou na introdução), acredita-se na existência de canais para o diálogo diplomático bilateral. Esgotando-se esse recurso, partir-se-ia para o diálogo multilateral ao nível regional. Se atentarmos para os objectivos 1 e 2 da declaração da SADC, os valores políticos e a promoção da paz figuram como itens prioritários. Os estados devem se comprometer na concretização desses objectivos através da busca contínua do diálogo para a resolução dos conflitos. A integração económica regional somente será possível através do diálogo pacífico e a manutenção do ambiente de paz. Aliás, a SADC é o melhor exemplo de integração em África por causa de ter pautado sempre pelo diálogo. Moçambique tem sua quota parte nesse feito. Seria degradante que os desaires partissem dos estados mais exemplares (como é o caso de Moçambique e Malawi).
4. Conclusão
O presente artigo trouxe para a reflexão o alerta sobre as tensões entre o Malawi e Moçambique, bem como a necessidade do diálogo bilateral e multilateral (ao nível da SADC) para a sua mitigação. Em tom de conclusão, há que consciencializar aos dois governos que as missões diplomáticas e as instituições multilaterais não são para “inglês ver”. Elas devem ser efectivamente usadas na promoção do diálogo como forma de entendimento para a consecução dos interesses dos povos que perfazem os estados.

A CRISE DO ZIMBABWE NA VISAO DA DELFINA DANCA

2011-05-19T15:07:00.003+02:00

O IMPACTO DA CRISE ZIMBABWEANA NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL: OS CASOS DE MOÇAMBIQUE E ÁFRICA DO SUL

Delfina Dança

Este artigo pretende fazer uma análise do impacto da crise zimbabweana na África Austral, com enfoque para SADC, bloco regional do qual o Zimbabwe é parte, e, particularmente, para Moçambique e África do Sul, pelo reflexo que a crise teve nos dois países e pelo contributo que ambos podem prestar para superar a crise.

A crise económica Zimbabweana teve seu início no ano 2000, altura em que o Presidente Robert Mugabe introduziu a reforma agrária. A Agência Lusa (Janeiro de 2009) dava conta da taxa de inflação ter ultrapassado os 231 milhões por cento ao ano, sendo considerada a maior inflação do mundo, e o desemprego atingido mais de 85 por cento da população activa. A esta crise associou-se a crise política, sobretudo após as eleições gerais de 2008, as quais foram consideradas nao transparentes por parte significativa dos actores envolvidos no processo.

Em decorrencia destes acontecimentos, a opinião pública africana e a comunidade internacional apelaram para o engajamento efectivo dos lideres africanos na solucao da crise, incluindo a aplicação de sanções. Entretanto, as lideranças africanas mostraram dificuldades em se posicionar contra seus homólogos, para impor sanções, limitado-se quase sempre a condenar verbalmente suas atitudes. Mesmo com a denúncia de violação de direitos humanos feita pela Human Rights Watch, e outras instituicoes, não houve accoes concretas para além da condenação verbal e apelo ao bom senso.

A crise mostrou igualmente a fraqueza da SADC na resolução de conflitos nos países membros. Esta percepção de fraqueza da SADC em lidar com as crises políticas na organização é reforçada pela forma como a mesma tem estado a abordar a crise política Malgaxe, a qual perdura até hoje. Por outro lado, este desempenho da SADC pode encorajar o aparecimento de novos casos de desrespeito pelos princípios democráticos nos países da região, propiciando inclusive, a longo prazo, o retorno dos regimes monopartidários em África.

Os Casos de Moçambique e África do Sul
Na África do Sul, a crise reflectiu-se no aumento da imigração de zimbabweanos a procura de oportunidades de sobrevivência. Com a crise financeira mundial, muitos sul-africanos perderam seus empregos. Em contrapartida, os empregadores admitiam os zimbabweanos por aceitarem trabalhar longas horas com salários baixos. De acordo com o jornal da BBC, de Maio 2008, esta situação desencadeou uma onda de ataques xenófobos, com os sul-africanos a alegarem que os zimbabweanos retiraram-lhes o emprego.
Em Moçambique também registou-se uma entrada crescente de imigrantes zimbabweanos, sobretudo no centro do país, nas províncias de Sofala e Manica, muitos dos quais acabaram permanecendo ilegalmente no país. Algumas mulheres acabaram se envolvendo na prostituição e os homens usados como mão de obra barata.
A Save the Children-UK (2006) alertou que um número crescente de crianças zimbabweanas entrou ilegalmente em Moçambique, acabando, algumas delas, por cair nas malhas da exploração e abuso, prostituição e trabalho infantil.
Este situação também teve impacto nos casos de contaminação pelo HIV/SIDA no país. Ainda segundo a Save the Children, a província de Sofala, apresentou uma taxa de seroprevalencia na ordem de 26.5%, por sinal, a mais alta do país.

Em ambos os países o efeito da crise na economia seria inevitável. Dados de 2008 da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) indicam que a África do Sul é o maior parceiro comercial do Zimbabwe, responsável por 32.1% das exportações e 60.1% das importações. A não resolução do conflito político pode prolongar a crise económica e, por essa via, causar uma redução dos fluxos comerciais, afectando os rendimentos sul-africanos

Com Moçambique, o Zimbabwe também tem boas relações comerciais. Entretanto, de acordo com o jornal “O País” de 5 de julho de 2009, até esse mês, este país tinha uma dívida de cerca de 50 milhões USD pelo consumo da energia da HCB, ainda não pagos, prevendo-se que o valor tenha aumentado. Sendo Moçambique um país economicamente dependente e com dívida externa por pagar, a demora no pagamento dessa dívida pode causar um impacto negativo na sua economia. Não obstante, o Ministro moçambicano da energia, Salvador Namburete, numa entrevista ao mesmo jornal, disse que o país não iria interomper o fornecimento de energia ao Zimbabwe, como forma de ajudar este país a recuperar-se da crise em que se encontra. Este e outros factores, como a localização geográfica e os laços de amizade, de longos anos, entre os dois países, deveriam ser aproveitados pelo Governo moçambicano para assumir um papel mais interventivo na resolução do conflito zimbabweano.

Se Moçambique deu provas de possuir uma diplomacia eficaz com relação à crise malgaxe, conduzindo as partes em conflito ao Acordo de Maputo de 2009, no caso do Zimbabwe, nos parece que o País não está a demonstrar o mesmo desempenho. Pensamos que, pelas relações históricas e económicas existentes entre os dois Países, Moçambique devia fazer mais para ajudar a encontrar uma solução para a crise zimbabweana. Os dois países estão ligados pela historia de libertação, tendo Moçambique inclusive sido parte importante nos acordos de Lancaster House. Mas existem também as relações económicas que estão a ser comprometidas, conforme mencionado antes.

Portanto, ha um dever político, económico e moral de Moçambique, a par da África do sul, engajar-se mais na solução da crise zimbabweana, através de uma abordagem bilateral sem, no entanto, descartar o papel da SADC. Por outro lado, os parceiros internacionais deviam centrar as suas atenções na persuasão destes dois países, parceiros estratégicos do Zimbabwe.

A CRISE DE MAGREBE NA VISAO DA DELFINA DANCA

2011-05-19T15:01:00.003+02:00

MAGREBE: PARA ENTENDER A CRISE NA DIMENSÃO DA DEMOCRATIZAÇÃO E DIREITOS HUMANOS E LIÇÕES PARA ÁFRICA SUB-SAHARIANA

Delfina Dança

INTRODUÇÃO
No anterior artigo “Governo de Unidade Nacional: Um Novo Modelo de Democracia em África” – discutia-se a tendência de criação desse tipo de Governo em África e o modelo de democracia ocidental inadequado à realidade Africana. A actual crise política que se vive na região do Magrebe parece confirmar essa hipótese. É objectivo deste artigo analisar os contornos desta crise para, através disso, reflectir em torno das hipóteses para a democratização em África.

ANTECEDENTES
A crise teve seu início na Tunísia, no dia 17 de Dezembro, quando o desempregado Sidi Bouzeid, de 26 anos e com formação superior, foi abordado por agentes da polícia enquanto vendia verduras na rua. Após ter sua mercadoria apreendida, foi impedido de prestar queixa. O jovem ateou fogo ao próprio corpo e morreu dias depois no hospital. A morte de Bouzeid deu azo a uma série de protestos que se espalharam rapidamente pelo país e região. Centenas de pessoas fazem-se às ruas para protestar contra o desemprego, corrupção e falta de liberdades e direitos.

CARACTERÍSTICAS:
• Manifestações organizadas: A União Geral dos Trabalhadores Tunisinos (UGTT), o poderoso sindicato que desempenhou um papel fundamental na organização dos protestos, reivindicou a dissolução do Executivo de transição e a formação de um governo de "salvação nacional", sem ministros do regime anterior. Milhares de habitantes da capital juntaram-se a centenas de pessoas procedentes das regiões do interior do país, em direcção à capital para pedir a ruptura definitiva com o regime anterior.

• Acontecimento atípico: trata-se do primeiro acontecimento do género no mundo árabe. O povo tunisino é visto como pacífico, tranquilo muito mais educado e diplomado que os demais Africanos, e possui um Exército menos repressivo em relação ao povo. As manifestações surpreenderam o mundo árabe e a comunidade internacional, por tratar-se de uma região onde predomina o medo e a repressão.

• Mobilização: houve uma mobilização massiva (mais de mil pessoas), sendo na sua maioria jovens. Destaque vai para o uso massivo de tecnologias de informação como a internet e as suas redes sociais (Facebook e Twitter). Participaram pessoas de diferentes classes sociais: professores, estudantes, trabalhadores, vendedores de rua, camponeses, dando a ideia de uma insatisfação generalizada.

RESULTADOS:
• A fuga do ex-presidente, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali para a Arábia Saudita pondo fim à ditadura que reinava no país havia 23 anos;
• A reposição de uma ordem política baseada na vontade do povo. Foi convocada a formação de um governo de união nacional para funcionar durante o período transitório até às próximas eleições, convocadas para dentro de 6 meses;
• Amnistia aos presos políticos;
• Promessa de legalização dos partidos políticos;
• Promessa de anulação das leis anti-democráticas (com destaque às lei eleitoral e anti-terroristas, bem como ao código de imprensa);
• Promessa de preservação do estatuto da mulher, a proibição da poligamia, assim como a gratuidade do ensino e o acesso à saúde;
• Efeito contágio e dominó na região.

O “EFEITO CONTÁGIO” REGIONAL
A crise política que derrubou o presidente da Tunísia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, tem inspirado vários países da região. Os povos das nações vizinhas têm estado a seguir o exemplo, numa versão fatídica do spill over effect (efeito contágio) e da teoria de dominós.
Protestos contra os regimes autoritários, o custo de vida e a falta de oportunidades de trabalho têm sido registados no Egipto, Iémen, Jordânia, Qatar, Oman, Emirados Árabes, Argélia, Sudão, Mauritânia e Marrocos. Manifestações do género eram inconcebíveis nesses países, até então. No Egipto, por exemplo, os cidadãos saem às ruas para exigir a demissão do presidente Hosni Mubarak, para além dos direitos sociais, económicos e políticos.
O analista político libanês Rami Khouri, do Instituto Fares da Universidade Americana de Beirute, disse à BBC Brasil que governos totalitários no norte da África e no Médio Oriente enfrentam insatisfação popular cada vez maior com a falta de soluções para os problemas económicos e sociais e de liberdades individuais - "O problema que assola a região é comum a todos. A actual ordem política e económica do mundo árabe é instável e insustentável, porque traz insatisfação para a imensa maioria de seus cidadãos", afirma.
Trata-se do Renascimento do activismo árabe entre as populações mais jovens e mais conscientes, com fome de liberdades individuais, emprego e desenvolvimento.

LIÇÕES PARA OS GOVERNOS AFRICANOS
O que ocorreu em Túnis rompeu o costume do medo e mostrou que era possível - com uma velocidade surpreendente - derrubar um regime e que isso não é tão difícil quanto se se imaginava. Foi o resultado do que os regimes autocráticos fizeram da política no mundo árabe: partidos da oposição debilitados ou sistematicamente isolados.
Estamos perante um contexto em que os cidadãos se mobilizam para fazerem valer os seus direitos. Um contexto em que os dirigentes não têm opções, senão ceder às exigências do povo. Afinal, democracia é isso mesmo: PODER DO POVO!
Os dirigentes dos países do Médio Oriente temem agora o efeito contagiante dos acontecimentos da Tunísia. O medo é inevitável e suas consequências, imprevisíveis.
Caso o fenómeno tunisiano se estenda pelo continente negro, há possibilidade de alguns dirigentes que se querem “vitalícios” e “déspotas” enfrentarem situações similares. Afinal, a paciência do povo tem também limite. Basta lembrar os acontecimentos vividos em Moçambique a 1 e 2 de Setembro de 2010, quando dezenas de pessoas se fizeram às ruas de Maputo para protestarem contra a subida dos preços dos produtos alimentares, combustível, ou no geral, do custo de vida. Espera-se que o cenário vivido na África do Magrebe sirva de exemplo aos governantes da África Sub-Sahariana.

CONCLUSÃO
O levante tunisino está a encorajar os grupos de oposição na região. Resta saber como a onda de motins vai terminar. A verdade é que o Mundo está atento aos acontecimentos do Magrebe e Médio Oriente, com ênfase nos desfechos. Na Tunísia, o povo demonstrou que é capaz de transformar a revolta em uma verdadeira revolução. Assim vai o Egipto, a marcar a primeira audiência nas manchetes dos jornais mundiais. Estamos perante um jogo de “soma zero”: ou o povo ganha, ou os tiranos ganham! Não há meio termo. A Tunísia abriu as portas para a liberdade e reposição dos direitos humanos, há muito negligenciados, no mundo árabe, e deu lição às más lideranças da África Sub Sahariana.

SOBRE A CRISE NA COSTA DO MARFIM

2011-05-19T14:59:00.002+02:00

COSTA DO MARFIM: PARA ENTENDER A CRISE POLÍTICA!

Constâncio Nguja

Introdução
Em 2002, um conflito armado levou a divisão da Costa do Marfim em duas partes. Desde então, a instabilidade tem reinado naquele Estado. Em 2010, as eleições que se entendiam como a solução para todos os conflitos, desaguaram numa crise sem precedentes.
Trata-se de um Estado localizado na Africa Ocidental, com uma área de 322,462 km.2
Tem como vizinhos a Libéria, a Guiné, o Mali, a Burkina Faso e o Ghana. Tem uma população de aproximadamente 21 milhões de habitantes.

Antecedentes
A Costa do Marfim ascendeu a independência da colonização Francesa, em 1960. Seu primeiro presidente foi Félix Houphouet Boigny. Em três décadas, este líder levou a Costa do Marfim a prosperidade económica e a harmonia étnica.
A fase próspera termina quando Houphouet perde a vida, em 1993, vítima de doença. À frente do Estado estava o então Primeiro Ministro Alassane Ouattara. Entretanto, Houphouet nunca deixara clara a questão da sua sucessão, entre o seu Primeiro Ministro e o Presidente da Assembleia Nacional, Henry Konan Bedié. Após a morte daquele líder, houve o primeiro cenário de dupla Presidência interina na Costa do Marfim, entre Alassane Ouattara e Henry Konan Bedié, pelo menos por dois dias (entre os dias 7 e 9 de Dezembro de 1993).
O cenario dúbio termina com a resignação de Ouattara, a 9 de Dezembro de 1993, cedendo para Bedié. Em 1995, Bedié engendra eleições perante uma oposição fraca e desorganizada, o que lhe garantiu uma vitória folgada. Se bem que Houphouet fizera de tudo para acomodar as tensões étnicas, Bedié reavivou-as com um único objectivo de sufocar o seu rival directo, Alassane Ouattara. Dado que o norte do país tem por maioria uma população com raízes estrangeiras (inclusive Ouattara), quase metade da população sentiu-se excluída dos processos políticos do país de que eram nacionais. Era o início do deflagrar das tensões étnicas, ora adormecidas.
Em 1999, Henry Konan Bedié sofre um golpe de Estado militar que levou o General Robert Guei a assumir a Presidência. Henry Konan Bedié exilou-se na França. Robert Guei dirigiu o país até as eleições de 2000, quando perdeu a favor de Laurent Gbagbo. Alassane Ouattara foi impedido de concorrer por alegadas razões de nacionalidade estrangeira. Este facto gerou uma onda de violência naquele território entre o Norte e o Sul. O culminar das tensões deu-se em 2002, aquando da viagem do Presidente à Itália. Um grupo de militares prestes a serem desmobilizados retaliou-se contra o governo, deflagrando numa Guerra civil. O grupo de rebeldes teve apoio da população do Norte.
Em 2003, os rebeldes e Laurent Gbagbo assinaram um armistício e acordo para a formação de um Governo de Unidade Nacional. Nem com o armistício os rebeldes desarmaram. Gbagbo continuou a perseguir a oposição. O seu mandato terminou em 2005, mas nem com isso quis convocar eleições. A crise foi se estendendo até à assinatura de um segundo acordo de paz entre os rebeldes, convertidos em Novas Forças, lideradas por Guillaume Soro, e Laurent Gbagbo, em 2007. Guillaume Soro foi nomeado para cargo de Primeiro Ministro, e novas eleições foram anunciadas para 2010.

O cenário actual
As eleições de 2010 realizadas em duas voltas, deram vitória a Alassane Ouattara (com 54% dos votos), em detrimento de Laurent Gbagbo (com 46%), segundo a Comissão Eleitoral Independente (CEI). O conflito começa quando o Presidente do Conselho Constitucional declarou inválidos os resultados divulgados pela CEI, tendo declarado Gbagbo o vencedor.
Questões: Até que ponto o Conselho Constitucional (CC) declara o vencedor de uma eleição em modelos democrático-liberais? O CC pode invalidar ou não os resultados das eleições, mas cabe às Comissões Eleitorais a reparação dos erros das eleições a fim de que se apurem novos vencedores e derrotados. Ademais, esta é mais uma oportunidade de se reflectir sobre a independência do poder judicial em África. Até que ponto um Presidente do CC é indepedente se é nomeado pelo Presidente da República?
Entretanto, há que louvar a unanimidade do sistema internacional, e principalmente da União Africana, em reconhecer Alassane Ouattara, como legítimo vencedor das eleiçoes, e condenar a teimosia de Gbagbo em se manter no poder. É um momento ímpar de consenso por parte das lideranças Africanas.
Cenários futuros desejáveis
• Que Laurent Gbagbo se afaste voluntariamente do palácio presidencial;
• Que Laurent Gbagbo se afaste do poder por pressao da comunidade internacional;
• Que a comunidade internacional intervenha militarmente para depor Laurent Gbagbo.
Cenários futuros indesejáveis
• Que Laurent Gbagbo se mantenha no poder a todo custo;
• Que deflagre uma guerra civil;
• Que se forme um Governo de Unidade Nacional;
• Que a comunidade internacional tolere o status quo.

Conclusão
A pesquisadora do Centro de Estudos Moçambicanos e Internacionais (CEMO), Delfina Dança, publicou recentemente um artigo sobre a ineficácia dos Governos de Unidade Nacional (GUN) em África, o que leva a crer que não pode servir de solução para a crise na Costa de Marfim. Aliás, este é o desejo de todos os candidatos perdedores, como Laurent Gbagbo. A continuar a se resolver diferendos eleitorais com a formação de GUN, nenhum candidato derrotado aceitará ceder o poder nos Estados Africanos. Os Estadistas Africanos comprometeram-se em rejeitar a tomada de poder por Golpes de Estado, mas eis que quando muitos presidentes cessantes perdem nas eleições, tendem a querer manter-se no poder por via de fraudes, uso da força com retaguarda de militares, entre outras vias. Foi o caso de Robert Mugabe, no Zimbabwe, Mwai Kibaki no Quénia, e agora com Laurent Gbagbo, na Costa do Marfim. Madagáscar é outro caso, mas na vertente de flagrante golpe de Estado. África deve unir-se na reposição da vontade dos povos manifesta nas urnas! Até quando vai-se tolerar injustiças contra os povos por causa de interesses individuais?

AS RECLUSAS MOCAMBICANAS NO BRASIL

2011-05-19T14:55:00.002+02:00

O DILEMA DAS RECLUSAS MOÇAMBICANAS NO BRASIL E O REPENSAR DAS RESPONSABILIDADES DO ESTADO NA PROTECÇÃO DOS CIDADÃOS

Delfina Dança

Com este artigo pretende-se compartilhar o testemunho sobre o dilema das reclusas Moçambicanas nas penitenciárias Brasileiras, bem como apelar ao Estado e Parlamento Moçambicanos para que façam algo para reverter o triste cenário a que estas estão sujeitas.
Numa das visitas feitas á uma das Penitenciárias Femininas no Brasil, foi possível ver o desespero no olhar das reclusas, a ponto de se abrirem para qualquer um que aparecesse para visitar, como se da solução dos seus problemas se tratasse.
No bloco das presas estrangeiras observava-se um verdadeiro cenário de globalização, com reclusas de quase todos os cantos do mundo. O que havia de comum entre elas era o motivo que as levou a prisão: o tráfico de drogas. Entretanto, é sobre as Moçambicanas, que o presente artigo se vai cingir.
Dentre os dilemas que as reclusas Moçambicanas têm passado, destacam-se:
1. A falta de implementação do acordo de extradição entre Moçambique e o Brasil. Aliás, tudo indica que, apesar de assinado, o acordo sobre a extradição de prisioneiros, entre o Brasil e Moçambique carece de ratificação nos respectivos parlamentos. Tal facto faz com que a lei brasileira se dê ao direito de julgar e condenar os criminosos Moçambicanos detidos em seu território. Pela efectividade do acordo de extradição, as reclusas Moçambicanas seriam condenadas e cumpririam suas penas no seu país de origem;
2. A falta de endereço para localização fora da prisão, para apresentar ao Juíz, como condição para beneficiarem do regime semi-aberto e da liberdade condicional. A Lei de Execução Penal (LEP) Brasileira estabelece que “ao conceder a saída temporária, o Juiz imporá ao beneficiário as seguintes condições, entre outras que entender compatíveis com as circunstâncias do caso e a situação pessoal do condenado: fornecimento do endereço onde reside a família a ser visitada ou onde poderá ser encontrado durante o gozo do benefício” (n o 1, § 1o do Art. 124)
A falta desse endereço, de acordo com as reclusas, faz com que algumas delas permaneçam nas penitenciárias, quando poderiam gozar da liberdade condicional; outras há que conseguem um endereço fictício, de alguém que com boa vontade lhes concede, só para poderem sair da cadeia, mas depois de saírem e não terem para onde ir, acabam se entregando à prostituição para poderem sobreviver e; outras ainda há que voltam ao tráfico, mesmo sabendo das consequências desse acto;
3. Às mulheres presas em estado de gravidez, seis meses após o parto, seus filhos são entregues ao abrigo (espécie de acolhimento institucional). O mesmo acontece às crianças menores de dois anos. De acordo com a Lei de Adopção Brasileira, a permanência das crianças nesses abrigos não se prolongará por mais de dois anos, salvo exceções (Lei nº 12.010, de 29 de Julho de 2009, § 2o art.19).
As reclusas ficam desesperadas quando percebem que o prazo está quase chegando ao fim, pois, findo esse período, caso não haja uma justificação plausível, as crianças podem ser entregues à adopção. Segundo elas, o ideal seria que alguém levasse seus filhos de volta para Moçambique. Mas o juizado da infância (Tribunal de Infância) diz que as crianças só podem ser entregues à familiares de primeiro grau.
4. Relacionado ao anterior, o outro dilema tem a ver com a dificuldade (senão mesmo inexistência) de comunicação com seus familiares em Moçambique, que nalguns casos nem sabem que elas estão presas neste país latino-americano. A maioria delas vem de famílias pobres - uma das possíveis razões de sua entrada no mundo do tráfico e, uma vez presas, não vêem a menor possibilidade de algum familiar seu se deslocar para visitá-las ou mesmo para evitar que seus filhos sejam entregues à adopção;
5. Por outro lado, pesa o facto de elas só poderem contar com a “boa vontade” da Defensoria Pública Brasileira, que mal consegue responder à demanda das reclusas do seu próprio país (para não falar das estrangeiras, das quais as Moçambicanas fazem parte). As reclusas acreditam que se pudessem cumprir pena no país, essa situação poderia ser amenizada;
6. Por último, mas não o menor dos dilemas, está o descaso que as reclusas enfrentam por parte do Consulado Moçambicano naquele país. De acordo com as estas, as únicas vezes em que receberam uma visita dos diplomatas moçambicanos foi quando o Presidente da República de Moçambique, Armando Guebuza, visitou o Brasil. Fora disso, não há nenhum tipo de contacto com estas entidades que se dizem estar a representar o seu país e os interesses dos seus concidadãos.
Não se pretende aqui vitimizar as reclusas, pois se elas estão presas, até prova em contrário, é porque cometeram algum crime e devem pagar por ele. Porém, é necessário lembrar que, mesmo na sua condição, elas têm direitos que deviam ser protegidos e ressalvados por aqueles a quem confiaram o seu contrato social. Parte-se do princípio que, após cumprirem sua pena, elas voltarão ao convívio social, com o diferencial de que teriam, em algum momento de suas vidas, passado por uma situação de total indiferença de quem poderia ter feito algo por elas.
Nesse contexto, o Centro de Estudos Moçambicanos e Internacionais lança o apelo às entidades de direito em Moçambique para que tomem medidas visando aliviar o dilema e sofrimento que as reclusas Moçambicanas vivem no Brasil.
Acredita-se que Moçambique e Brasil possuem boas relações político-diplomáticas bilaterais e ao nível da Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP). Se estas relações forem bem exploradas, por parte da diplomacia Moçambicana, até os cidadãos Moçambicanos residentes naquele país (inclusive as reclusas em questão), serão beneficiadas. Mais uma vez, o Estado Moçambicano é convidado a repensar no seu contrato com os seus cidadãos!

The Death of Osama Bin Laden and its Impact on Africa

2011-05-11T11:03:00.000+02:00

The Death of Osama Bin Laden and its Impact on Africa

by the International Crime in Africa Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

During the early hours of Sunday, 1 May 2011, United States forces killed Osama bin Laden, the world number one fugitive, the leader of al Qa’eda and the mastermind of the several terrorist attacks around the world, including the phenomenal attacks against Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and in the US in 2001 (9/11). This was in what seemed to have been a top secret and surgical intelligence operation. The death of bin Laden at a fortified compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad in north-west Pakistan is celebrated around the world as a momentous achievement of long awaited justice for the thousands of victims of terrorism.

Africa has always been an important region for bin Laden and for the survival of al Qa’eda. Sudan became his second home after his expulsion from his home country, Saudi Arabia in 1991, where he set up training camps for al Qa’eda operatives. The conflict in Somalia provided the first theater for bin Laden to launch his jihad against the US in 1993, by sending mujahideens to fight American forces in Somalia. In addition, two Africans are at the helms of the al Qa’eda leadership-- the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy commander and the most obvious successor to bin Laden, and Abu Yahya al-Libi – now one of al-Qaeda’s leading propagandists and strategists, gaining prominence since the Libyan uprising. Al Qa’eda also boasts strong support in Africa with groups such as the, the Nigerian Boko Haram, the Somali al Shabaab and the Algerian Al Qa’eda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the last two having openly pledged their allegiance to bin Laden. The continent has also served as al Qa’eda’s breadbasket with cells in Sierra Leone raising funds through illegal deals in diamonds. The significance of the continent became even more obvious when bin Laden carried out his first successful major attacks in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring 5000 others. The success of these attacks in terms of the magnitude of the carnage would later embolden bin Laden to plan and execute 9/11 only three years later.

There has been a cautious reaction to bin Laden’s death in Africa. The most salient reaction so far has come from Kenya, which sustained 200 deaths and over 1000 people injured in the devastation in August 1998, as well as subsequent al Qa’eda masterminded attacks in 2002. In a press briefing, President Mwai Kibaki welcomed the killing as an act of justice. As he averred, "The killing of Osama has taken place nearly thirteen years after the terrorist bombings in Nairobi that led to the death of over two hundred people, in an act believed to have been masterminded by Osama. … His killing is an act of justice to those Kenyans who lost their lives and the many more who suffered injuries." The President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete added that the death is a relief, while the Foreign Minister of Mali, Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga also hailed it. Albeit these reactions and sentiments that justice has been done, there has also been a major concern that the death of bin Laden would trigger more terrorist attacks on the continent. The mood on the streets has been mixed. While victims of al Shabaab celebrate it in Somalia, al Shabaab spokesman Mohamed Osman told AP News Agency that the group would take revenge for bin Laden`s death with "destructive explosions."

The impact of bin Laden’s death on terrorism in Africa will be felt over time and this will largely depend on the new al Qa’eda leadership and its ability to inspire and unite the various al Qa’eda cells around the world, which operate almost autonomously from the central al Qa’eda command. There are three main levels on which bin Laden’s death will have ramifications. First is at the level of organizational survival. The connection between bin Laden and most groups was mainly ideological rather than organizational and resource dependence. It is therefore unlikely that the death of bin Laden will cause the collapse of the major terrorist groups in Africa such as AQIM, al Shabaab and Boko Haram, at least not in the short term. These groups have survived various internal leadership shocks and it could be expected that they would remain resilient to the death of their hero and ideological leader.

Secondly, bin Laden’s death will impact on the frequency of terrorist acts. Here the fear is that he would be canonised as a martyr and become even more inspirational to his followers, who will seek to avenge his death. For example, jihadist internet forums have eulogised bin Laden as a figurehead and insisted that his death will not diminish their determination to continue the jihadist cause. The death of bin Laden could also backfire, if it is discovered that certain conventions were not respected in the US covert operation that led to the killing. In light of the aforementioned, the death of bin Laden does not signal the end of terrorism but could represent a new era of ferocious attacks and terrorists groups would seek to demonstrate that it is business as usual. He made jihad truly universal, whereby a threat to Muslims anywhere is considered a threat to Muslims everywhere. Thus, an American Muslim has an equal responsibility to fight in Somalia, a Moroccan in Iraq, an Algerian in Afghanistan, etc. It is this ability to bond and inspire young Muslims to fight everywhere that makes the death of bin Laden a costly affair for al Qa’eda, one that could see its disintegration.

The third area of impact will be the global war on terror. The current war on terror has been overly focused on the elusive quest for bin Laden and al Qa’eda operatives, which led the US to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, where billions upon billions of dollars have been wasted. With the al Qa’eda leader now gone, the international community would now have to reevaluate the war on terror and to redirect resources and focus on practical matters of the prevention and disrupting terrorist operations globally, particularly in Africa where the threat remains visible. It will also strengthen international cooperation that has been strained by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Areas such as intelligence and law enforcement will take on a new dimension of cooperation between African states and the US government.

With the post-bin Laden attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the prospect of ‘revenge’ terrorist attacks by al-Qa’eda and its affiliates could be expected in the coming days, weeks, months and years, as terrorist will seek to demonstrate their resilience. The death of bin Laden however, represents an opportunity to beef up security and strengthen the fight against terrorism in order to win back previous al Qa’eda operatives who may now find themselves on the fence, caught between continuing or abandoning terrorism. Coming just months before the tenth anniversary of 9/11, the death of bin Laden may equally represents a positive signal that the war on terrorism is winnable, but such a victory shall come with time, serious planning, cooperation and steadfast commitment to the anti-terrorism cause. Given the trends in Africa, its vulnerabilities and its links to al Qa’eda, it is likely that the next bin Laden will emerge from the continent, a development, which, will not augur well for its peace and security.

2011-04-08T08:37:00.002+02:00

Implications of the Financial War on Libya

Charles Goredema, Programme Head, Organised Crime and Money Laundering Programme, ISS Cape Town Office

In the last two months, the world has witnessed the rapid escalation of a campaign to unseat the regime led by Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Despite several denials, it is clear that the primary objective of the military maneuvers currently underway in that country is regime change. Apart from direct aerial bombardment being co-ordinated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Gaddafi’s army also faces an assault from the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, his government is slowly but surely being deprived of the resources on which it would be expected to rely to sustain itself. The multi-dimensional aggression ostensibly draws its legitimacy and authority from two successive directives from the United Nations Security Council, namely Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011). The resolutions purport to authorize measures that impose restrictions on arms purchases, on the flight of aircraft, and on the movement of certain officials. Finally, they direct the freezing of assets connected to named officials and institutions.

This article does not discuss the overall merits of the anti-Gaddafi war in Libya. It confines itself to the implications of its financial aspects, specifically for African countries but also in general. Paragraph 17 of Resolution 1970 directs all member states to:

‘freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in annex II of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and ………. (to) ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or individuals designated by the Committee;’

The Resolution created a Sanctions Committee to oversee its administration and implementation. Resolution 1970 was followed three weeks later by Resolution 1973 (2011), paragraph 19 of which broadened its reach to assets owned or controlled by ‘……..the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee’. The Committee is authorized to regularly extend the list of designated Libyan authorities, individuals or entities against whom sanctions will be applied. The Security Council initiated the process by naming certain individuals, including Colonel Gaddafi himself, his immediate family and his military commanders. Resolution 1973 also created a special Panel of Experts to assist the Committee. The list of individuals and entities also includes the Libyan Central Bank, the Libya African Investment Portfolio (LAIP) and the Libya National Oil Corporation (LNOC). All three are major investors within Libya and beyond, with collective investments in Africa worth an estimated $10 billion. LAIP includes the Libya Arab African Investment Corporation (LAAICO), a business company with interests that span all parts of Africa.

LAAICO has a presence in at least 25 African countries, in diverse sectors from hotels & real estate, industry, agriculture, trade to mining and telecommunications. It conducts business in Benin, Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. Certain countries, such as Uganda, are home to almost $1 billion worth of Libyan owned or controlled assets. The Libya Central Bank is reported to be among the Africa Development Bank’s largest investors. It stands to reason that the most significant assets that will be affected by the two Resolutions comprise investments of Libya’s sovereign wealth fund. The justification for classifying them as ‘poisoned assets’ is cryptically given as ‘Under control of Muammar Gaddafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.’

The impact of temporary confiscation will be loss of revenue to shareholders, whether or not they are connected to the Gaddafi regime. In terms of paragraph 27 of Resolution 1973, none of them has recourse to law to be compensated. Some of the Libyan investment has been undertaken in partnership with local entrepreneurs. Any local investment in enterprises dominated by Libyan assets can be expected to be frightened off by the wave of directives from the Security Council. On the other hand, these enterprises are unlikely to receive further capital from Libya under current circumstances, even if that is somehow permissible. For instance, it is feared that Uganda Telecom Limited, 69% of which is Libyan owned, will not get badly needed capital. (DW – WORLD.DE Deutsche Welle, 24 March 2011 accessible at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14940564,00.html)

In addition to the contagion effect to be precipitated by the Resolutions are the procedural complications that will arise in their implementation. Many countries have no experience of running an asset tracking and confiscation system outside the criminal justice process. The latter is relatively simple, as it is conditional on conviction. The confiscated article is identifiable by reference to the crime, and its disposal is determined by the court at the instance of the prosecution or the victim. There is usually no intention of maintaining or managing the article – if it is to be sold, the price is not of much consequence. The assets envisaged by the UN Resolutions present an entirely different set of challenges, especially where no single institution carries the mandate to determine their fate. In some countries, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, asset forfeiture is usually handled by the Attorney General. In others, the central Bank has an influential say, especially regarding seizures in the financial sector. One wonders what model of asset seizure the Security Council has in mind, and what it would recommend regarding the management of seized assets, such as hotels. Where, for instance should they conduct their banking operations after their usual bank accounts have been frozen?

Furthermore, with a few exceptions, the larger assets belong to the Libyan state, which holds them in trust for the Libyan people. They cannot simply be disposed of with impunity without jeopardizing future relations with Libya. The Sanctions Committee, and its Panel of Experts, is consequently likely to encounter a great deal of confusion and lethargy in many parts of Africa. Many will want to see a speedy termination of the conflagration in Libya. In the wake of the speedy seizure of assets connected to Libya in western countries, questions will again be raised as to the double standards that still hold up the recovery of proceeds of corruption and large scale plunder by delinquent political leaders in Africa.

2011-04-08T08:32:00.000+02:00

Cote d’Ivoire: The War is on, Let’s Give it a Chance?

Paul-Simon Handy, Director Research, ISS Head Office

There is no such a thing as a neat, painless and clean violent conflict. War is clearly a bad thing and inevitably causes massive casualties and substantial loss of human life, as well as loss of material wealth. There are good reasons to avoid war and it is probably one of the biggest achievements of our civilization to have sanctified the human right of preserving each and every life. But there are sometimes better reasons to opt for a war in order to preserve peace and, paradoxically, save civilian lives, which would have otherwise been sacrificed if nothing were done.

Côte d’Ivoire today has reached this point and there is little doubt that only the legitimate use of controlled violence will bring an end to a conflict whose multifaceted consequences would affect the whole West African region.

Despite numerous mediation attempts by ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and other interested parties to find a peaceful solution to the Ivorian post-electoral crisis, President Laurent Gbagbo who lost the November 2010 elections by a considerable margin, has repeatedly refused to relinquish power to his opponent, Alassane Ouattara. Having been defeated at the polls he has resorted to fierce anti-Western propaganda to mobilise his supporters in the economic capital, Abidjan, at a time when his diplomatic support seems to be vanishing both inside and outside Africa. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation on the ground has massively deteriorated, causing hundreds of civilian losses.

According to a recent report by Human Rights Watch, fighting between armed elements loyal to Gbagbo and Ouattara has led to gross human rights violations that could amount to war crimes. Targeted assassinations of civilians and prisoners, massive destruction of property and the use of heavy weapons in urban areas have led to massive population movements within the country and into neighbouring countries.

Against the background of this deterioration of the situation and given the fact that diplomatic avenues seem to have been exhausted, there are at least three good reasons to give the ongoing war a chance in Côte d’Ivoire:

Firstly because the frenetic attempts of the AU to solve this crisis by peaceful means of negotiation are based on the wrong assumption that President Gbagbo will eventually resign. Observers of the Ivorian conflict know well that both the pressure of his entourage (particularly his politically powerful and very influential wife, Simone) as well as his own conception of politics won’t allow President Gbagbo to resign. Throughout his political life, Gbagbo has had to fight to acquire almost everything and he considers those now fighting to keep him in power as his ‘liberation movement’. Despite the unprecedented diplomatic isolation that he faces, he has succeeded in brainwashing his followers and convincing them of the biblical dimension of their fight. Particularly the youth militia “young patriots” led by the now youth minister Charles Ble Goude will be ready to serve as human shields to protect their champion, should he be forced to resign.

Apart from the radicalized young patriots, Gbagbo’s support base cuts across a wide range of the Ivorian population and is well represented in urban centers where most of his supporters will however not take up arms for him. In fact, the electoral sociology of Cote d’Ivoire suggests that Ouattara also has strong support in the South, thus nullifying the simplistic dichotomic view of an ethnically divided country along North-South lines.

Secondly, war should be given a chance in Côte d’Ivoire because the current balance of power on the ground is growing unfavourable to the spoiler, Gbagbo and his troops, whose only visible strategy now consists of protecting Abidjan, the most important city and the headquarter of the country’s political institutions. Although necessary and laudable, mediation has not borne the expected fruits and the search for a peaceful resolution to the crisis is at best naïve at this stage. The forces loyal to Ouattara have understood this and have launched an offensive on many fronts that reveals the weakness of Gbagbo’s army on the ground. In a sense, the decisive victory of Ouattara’s forces, though highly undesirable in a democratic setting, might have the merit of laying the groundwork for a long-term peaceful resolution of the Ivorian conflict.

Demobilisation Disarmement and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) that blatantly failed during the transition period would be much easier to realize and there would be a unique opportunity for national reconciliation. In reality, full-blown war has never happened in Côte d’Ivoire and the de facto partition of the country imposed by French troops after the coup attempt in 2002 has prevented the only chance that war has ever had in that country. As a consequence, real and would-be war-professionals have constantly continued to re-arm with the view of increasing their stakes in peace negotiations. Weakened by a growing diplomatic isolation and an expected military defeat, Gbagbo and his allies will have to face charges of war crimes currently investigated by the International Criminal Court.

Finally, war should be given a chance in Côte d’Ivoire because the reputation of the AU, ECOWAS and even the UN would be at stake if a jurisprudence concerning Gbagbo was created at a time when the African continent is going through a high number of crucial elections this year 2011. In fact, both the AU and ECOWAS have established a governance doctrine comprised of norms and principles that form the basis of their firm stance against President Gbagbo. Informed by the UN certification of the electoral process ECOWAS and the AU have taken sides for Ouattara, the president-elect, in order to send a strong signal to potential spoilers on the continent who would be tempted by blatant electoral manipulation á la Gbagbo. In a sense, it is the capacity of African regional organisations as well as the UN to enforce their own decisions and position themselves as powerful and respected political actors that is at stake.

If war remains the only viable option in Cote d’Ivoire today, it however remains a complex and difficult enterprise that will cost civilian lives. There is no need to deploy an additional international force in Côte d’Ivoire that no country would be ready to fund in the current international context and that will only serve as a new mobilization tool for Gbagbo’s supporters. The presence of the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) with its 10 000 troops and a mandate resorting to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter is more than sufficient to back up the southwards march of forces loyal to Ouattara. Gbagbo’s army is in disarray as evidenced by the recent defection of General Philippe Mangou, his Chief of Staff. But in spite of this, the battle for Abidjan might prove difficult as radical elements loyal to Gbagbo could be tempted by suicide operations. On the other side, forces loyal to Ouattara might also engage in retaliation acts that could jeopardise the fragile peace needed to reconcile a fragmented society.

When he finally access power, Ouattara will be faced with enormous reconstruction tasks. The economy has been seriously damaged by 4 months of embargo and international isolation. But his most important task will probably be to reconcile Ivorians by reaching out to those radicalized by Gbagbo’s inflammatory and divisive rhetoric - those who have not voted for him. With a northener as President, as Côte d’Ivoire celebrates 50 years of independence, the country will have an historic chance to address the long lasting problems of identity that all successors of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the architect of the country’s independence, have tried to manipulate to their advantage.

The ‘dogmatic pacifism’ of large parts of the African political elite who advocates for peaceful means even when there is no willingness to do so by the belligerents, is at times an excuse for inaction. Conflict resolution that ignores the use of force as a matter of principle is idealistic and certainly inappropriate at this stage of the Ivorian conflict. The country is today in the logic of civil war and it is a blessing in disguise that the legitimate winner of the November elections is gaining military ground in a confrontation that the incumbent president was hoping to win by attrition. The spirit of the UN resolution 1975 that was unanimously adopted on the 30 March 2011 is probably in line with the imperative of saving civilian lives by all means, including the legitimate use of force.

2011-04-08T08:13:00.000+02:00

Is SADC Growing Impatient with Zimbabwe?

Cheryl Hendricks, Senior Research Fellow, Security Sector Reform, ISS Pretoria Office

Over the past decade Zimbabwe has been a constant feature on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation’s agenda. In September 2008, SADC was finally able to mediate a Global Political Agreement (GPA) that sought to chart a way forward for peaceful reconciliation in this country. More than two years later, Zimbabwe still preoccupies the Organ’s peace and security agenda as the main protagonists in Zimbabwe’s political saga continue to battle it out. The SADC Organ’s growing impatience with the lack of implementation of the GPA and their concern about renewed violence, was evident at a recent Summit of the Troika, held in Livingstone, Zambia on the 3rd of April 2011. But President Mugabe remains defiant. Does SADC have the necessary willingness, resources and mechanisms to enforce its decisions?

The Summit was attended by Presidents Rupiah Bwenzani Banda of Zambia, current chairperson of the Organ, Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia, chairperson of SADC, Jacob Zuma of South Africa, incoming chair of the Organ and SADC mediator for Zimbabwe and Armando Emillio Guebuza of Mozambique, outgoing chair. Also in attendance were Zimbabwean President. Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, Arthur Mutambara and Welshman Ncube – representatives of the main political parties in Zimbabwe.

In what can be considered as its strongest reprimand to Zimbabwe to date, Summit ‘noted with grave concern the polarization of the political environment…resurgence of violence, arrests and intimidation’ and resolved that: there must be an end to the violence and harassment; stakeholders should implement the provisions of the GPA and complete the necessary steps for holding and election including the finalisation of the constitutional amendment and the referendum; develop a roadmap for elections and last but not least, the appointment of a three-member panel to join the facilitation team and work with the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee to ensure the implementation of the GPA.

President Mugabe, as cited in The Zimbabwean, retorted with his usual vitriolic response, ‘Any organization, body or group of persons that is established by the Troika or SADC should not prescribe to us what to do’…’ we are a sovereign State and as a sovereign State we don’t accept any interference and even our neighbours should not tell us what to do.’

Zanu-PF, concerned about the continued deterioration of the economy and an ailing leader, would prefer elections to be held in 2011 under the current constitution. The MDC and other opposition groups do not believe the environment is conducive to free and fair elections and would want the provisions of the GPA to be implemented before elections. Essentially Zimbabwe’s electoral environment appears to be in pretty much the same position that it was in 2008. The Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe, in an advert in the Mail and Guardian newspaper, has urged SADC to push for a new constitution in Zimbabwe, ensure the independence of Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission, that SADC certify that Zimbabwe is ready for elections, and that SADC, the AU and the UN, deploy peace-keeping monitors

The SADC Organ’s increasingly assertive behaviour in relation to resolving Zimbabwe’s political crisis is commendable. President Zuma appears to be more determined to ensure a resolve of the current impasse. But, what will SADC do if ZANU-PF continues with stalling the necessary steps to ensure the implementation of the GPA and the creation of a more peaceful, free and fair electoral environment? They have shown their intransigence in the past with little consequence from SADC.

SADC has very few enforcement mechanisms, and even fewer it is willing to use. The suspension of a country, as was the case with Madagascar, is one such mechanism, but it yielded little result and it is unlikely that SADC will use this against one of its founding members. SADC is not in favour of sanctions against Zimbabwe and has been lobbying for the international community to lift theirs. Instead, SADC utilizes the power of persuasion – one with very little effect on this political party.

But, the space for Zanu-PF’s maneuvering seems to be closing. This political party relied on its liberation credentials to sway opinion in a SADC Organ that seemed split between the new and the old guard. If one looks carefully at the attendance of the Organ’s Summit then President Mugabe’s former allies are in short supply and those present are beginning to say enough is enough. With President Mugabe increasingly isolated, some movement towards a new dispensation that can finally catapult Zimbabwe to its former political and economic status within the region may be possible.

The Organ needs to ensure that all its members are in agreement on a way forward for Zimbabwe and that they do not renege mid-stream on the implementation thereof. If there is no adequate compliance by Zimbabwe’s parties, any elections held must not be condoned by SADC’s presence as observers and must be considered invalid. The circularity has to come to and end for the sake of Zimbabwe’s citizens who deserve so much more. SADC, as regional organization tasked with creating a more secure and enabling environment for the people of this region, has to now be firm and lead the way.

FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA

2011-04-05T13:52:00.002+02:00

Chasing food security in Niger

Six months before the start of the 2009 rainy season the government of Niger was warned the rains would fail. In the drought that followed, more than half the population - 7.8 million people - faced food shortages. It was the third food crisis in seven years.

"It is part of my duties, and I gave a list of measures to the government to prepare for the drought, such as planting faster-yielding varieties of millet and sorghum (two of the main staples), but governments do not always listen to us,” said Prof Alhousseini Bretaudeau, executive secretary of the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), a scientific arm of the African Union.

“We have spent 30 years perfecting the science of predicting droughts, and developed tools to help countries prepare but few political leaders pay attention,” Bretaudeau told IRIN at a technical and scientific conference to brainstorm ways of getting the country out of chronic food and nutrition insecurity.

The Conférence Internationale sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle au Niger (CISAN) began on 28 March, hosted by a military-backed interim government that will give way to a newly elected civilian administration, headed by Mahamadou Issoufou, on 6 April. To many observers, CISAN represents a long-awaited attempt by Niger to get to grips with the food security issues that have plagued the country for decades.

“Better late than never - the conference was long overdue,” said Jean-Pierre Guengant, director of research at the France-based Institute of Research for Development (IRD), which gave the world Plumpy’nut, a peanut-based therapeutic food, and insecticide-treated mosquito nets.

Beyond the crisis in Niger

Niger slipped into chronic food insecurity a long time ago, without any of the former governments noticing, said Guengant, who has spent a decade in the country.

Among those who singularly failed to address food issues was Mamadou Tandja, ousted by the military in February 2010. “He did not accept there was a food crisis [in 2010] because he did not trust what the NGOs were telling him - he thought they wanted to make money,” said the man behind the conference, Col Aboulkarim Goukoye, head of the Higher Authority of Food Security (HASA).

“The second reason was that he was a very proud man - he did not want to accept that there was a problem,” said Goukoye, who is also the interim military junta’s spokesperson.

“Under the previous regime words such as ‘food crisis’ and even ‘nutrition’ were taboo - we would have had to pack our bags and leave,” Simone Winneg, coordinator of Humedica, a German medical NGO, commented.

“When we came in power,” Goukoye said, “all the technical people in the agriculture department came to us and said: ’you are probably thinking of security issues, but we have a food crisis.” They turned to the international community for help. Mahamadou Danda, prime minister of the interim government, asked Goukoye to find out how the country could address the recurring food crises. In June 2010 HASA was set up and the idea of developing a food strategy was born. “It naturally led to the idea of a conference where we could consult with technicians and scientists to help develop this strategy,” Goukoye said.

Inclusiveness

Will the incoming regime follow through? Goukoye said he was trying to get at least 10 of the recently elected parliamentarians involved. “Our strategy is not going to be any particular government’s strategy but a Nigerien strategy.” Over the next few days, participants including technical experts from across the world will look at ways to ease access to food, reduce vulnerability and improve governance in food security.

Ibrahim Mayaki, head of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the African Union’s development agency, who served as prime minister of Niger from 1997 to 2000 and was asked to head the conference, said the process was as inclusive as possible, with all previous Nigerien regimes invited to participate.

Governance was a key issue in tackling food insecurity. Local authorities were in the frontline of government service delivery as “the first connection between the government and the people in the rural areas, where most of our people live” and could recognize and the first signs of food insecurity. Mayaki suggested empowering them to address the issue.

Previous regimes had not paid much heed to warnings by technical experts in the country. “This is the first time someone is paying attention,” said Prof Maxime Banoin, an agronomist and head of the scientific and technical committee organizing the conference, who noted that other experts had also presented explanations for why the country was grappling with food insecurity.

So what is wrong with Niger?

The northern two-thirds of Niger, the biggest country in West Africa, is desert, so the entire food requirement depends on the rainy season from May to September to grow crops in the south. “It is a scary thought, and often things go wrong with it [the rainy season],” said Humedica’s Winneg.

In an analysis prepared for the conference, Banoin and IRD’s Guengant identified the structural causes of the recurring food crises: food production has not kept up with population growth, and rainfall has declined considerably since the 1960s.

“Niger has the world’s highest fertility rate, with an average of seven children per family, so the population has grown at 3.5% per year, while food production, at best, has grown at about 2.5% per year,” said Guengant. Niger has struggled with a structural deficit for the past 20 years.

Declining rainfall has exacerbated the problem. The areas that grow staples like sorghum and millet, which need a minimum of 400mm of rain per year, has shrunk from 25% of the country to 12% since the 1960s.

Sorghum yields have dropped from between 600kg and 800kg per hectare in the 1960s to between 200kg and 300kg per hectare, while millet production has remained stagnant at 400kg per hectare.

Besides the shrinking amount of rain, the low production has highlighted the inadequate support given to agriculture, researchers said. “We have to have a multisectoral approach to finding solutions,” Guengant noted.

Investment in biotechnology to improve yields, adequate inputs, agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation systems, and education to empower women in a society that encourages them to have more children, are some of the policy measures the government should take, said Banoin and Guengant.

Harnessing the Niger River system could potentially give Niger 330 000 hectares of irrigated agricultural land.

The country has one of the world’s lowest scores in educating girls, the world’s highest maternal mortality rate, and one of the highest infant mortality rates, which all highlight the low status of women in Niger, and the cause of the high fertility rate.

Only four out of 10 girls are enrolled in primary school, two out of 10 attend secondary school, and only three out of 100 make it into high school, according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

The social reasons for having large families are deep-seated. “If we have only two children, what if they both die? You need to have at least seven or eight so you still have some children - it is always good to have more children,” said Hadiza Halidou, a woman participating in the conference.

“Women’s education is very important - they are also the main producers of food, which men do not acknowledge,” said NEPAD’s Mayaki.

More money needed

Traditional donors like Europe and the US have been concentrating on their internal financial woes, so African governments had to become more proactive about mobilizing resources to invest in agriculture locally and regionally, Mayaki said.

The technical and scientific conference would be followed by a leaders’ conference, where the new food security strategy would be presented, said HASA’s Goukoye. Regional heads of state, traditional donors, and local and international NGOs would be invited to attend for feedback and investment opportunities.

Mayaki said Africa should consider tapping emerging economies like South Africa, Brazil, China, India and Russia for money. Goukoye commented: “The biggest problem in Africa is implementation and follow-up.”

So what would happen if the new regime did not consider food security a priority and reneged on measures to address it - would the military junta come back?

“Just for that?” Goukoye said. “But I don’t think governments will not act - food security is everyone’s problem now.”

Source: IRIN News

ARMS TRADE IN THE WORLD

2011-03-25T09:29:00.000+02:00

Conventional Arms Control and the West

Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, ISS

Despite the challenges of balancing outreach on human rights, good governance and democracy with the pedalling of arms; the arms trade has been a huge money-spinner for the West for decades. The recent trend in the arms trade has been for the increased concentration of military expenditure, i.e. a smaller number of companies and countries manufacture and purchase arms. Generally the manufacturing is done in the West and the purchases by developing countries such as Saudi Arabia and India, reflecting their modernization efforts since the 1990s. According to SIPRI (The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) the top 100 arms-producing companies (excluding China) reported solid growth in 2009, increasing their global sales by $14.8 billion to more than $400 bn - a rise of 8% in real terms. The US behemoth Lockheed Martin is the world`s leading company in terms of arms sales, valued at $33.43bn in 2009, followed closely by Britain`s BAE Systems with sales valued at $33.25bn. BAE came ahead of four US companies – Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics and Raytheon. Companies in the USA or Europe accounted for 92% of recorded sales.

Controlling global defence equipment and sales is a source of huge influence for Western governments and companies with the US intent on ensuring continued dominance of the full spectrum of conventional and asymmetric capabilities for the foreseeable future. It is, at the same time, a corrupt industry, generally hidden from public scrutiny and hence susceptible to inefficiencies and poor value for money decisions. The irony is not lost on all, when, during February, the UK Prime Minister was responding to events in Libya whilst pedalling arms in the Middle East.

This situation is set to change dramatically in the next two decades. Global manufacturing is moving east and it is only a question of time before national companies located in China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and elsewhere challenge the dominance of the current global leading arms manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin and BAE. For several years developing countries have already been the major recipients of arms sales (purchasing some 45% of arms in 2009 compared to the mere 12% sold to developed countries). By 2030 the US would still be the largest military spender – probably responsible for around one third of global defence expenditure - down from around 46% currently. But whereas China is currently only responsible for around 7% of global defence spending and India less than half of that, by 2030 one can expect China and India to collectively balance US defence-related expenditure. Will the emerging countries still buy from the West? Or will the opportunities for diversification of supply to less fickle manufacturers; low prices and no disruption of supply during a crisis prove irresistible to those in need of protection?

The conventional arms trade is currently largely unregulated. The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) is a voluntary reporting instrument established in 1991 and covers seven major categories of conventional arms: battle tanks, large-calibre artillery, combat vehicles, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships (including submarines) and missiles (including missile launchers). The aim of the Register is to foster regional and international confidence building although, for example, only a small minority of African countries provide information on conventional arms transfers, even in cases where exporting countries (from outside of Africa) report conventional arms transfers to African countries that do participate in UNROCA.

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (1995) is the sole international instrument that specifically relates to the control of conventional arms and dual-use goods. This instrument seeks to promote more effective transparency and responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.

Two UN instruments relate to the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), namely: the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects; and the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. The latter is the only global, legally binding instrument that addresses the issue of small arms. An annual UN General Assembly SALW ‘Omnibus’ Resolution charts the way forward in terms of the UN program of action.

A UN process, the proposed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) recently started with the intent to establish a legally binding treaty to govern the international conventional arms trade. The UN will be hosting a conference of states parties to negotiate the detailed terms of an ATT in 2012. The scope and range of a future ATT remains a complicated matter among UN member states, as it will have a direct impact on national sovereignty, most especially the ability of governments to acquire arms to protect and defend themselves. An ATT will also have consequences for arms production and exports, which is a source of income for a number of states, particularly the P5. Given these dynamics, the scope and range of an ATT is likely to be severely limited (if such a treaty is successfully negotiated at all).

There can be little doubt that any debate on ‘upstream’ preventive action needs to engage on the future of arms exports. Even if China does not democratise, the inevitable shift in global arms production to the East could open up an arms bazaar. In a similar manner to which the tobacco industry is targeting the youth bulge in Asia and Africa to create a next generation of drug addicts, so too are arms merchants protecting vested interests and past markets. A prudent approach would be to work in support of a comprehensive ATT and a transparent arms trade reporting system that is mandatory, comprehensive and verifiable in all its aspects.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN SUDAN

2011-03-25T09:27:00.000+02:00

Sudan all About Natural Resources Conflicts

Debaye Tadesse, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa Office

The South Sudan Referendum Commission made the final results of the referendum public in Khartoum on February 7, 2011. It reported that more than 2 million people voted for secession from the North while 1.8 million votes were needed to split Africa`s largest country into two independent states. This referendum was conducted in fulfillment of the requirement of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Kenya in January 9, 2005. The South Sudan referendum was the most vital element of the CPA. The CPA also ended 22 years of civil war, which caused massive destruction and suffering, as well as significant displacement of the different ethnic groups of North and South Sudan. Meanwhile, the two governments of North and South Sudan have begun the process of disengaging national institutions to form two separate and independent countries as well as to look to the challenges and expectations that lie ahead.

General fears are being expressed about what the political situation of the new state will be after it gains independence. Some observers call it a failed state in waiting that will be marred by political instability and ethnic tensions. The central question is now that the referendum is over, what is next on the agenda? What are the key issues that need to be ironed out before July 9, 2011 the timetable set in CPA as official disengagement and birth of newest African state? The main protagonists in the referendum from both the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People`s Libration Movement (SPLM) have not agreed yet on several post-referendum issues. Critical components of those negotiations will cover citizenship, foreign debt succession, currency, assets including oil revenues, Nile water sharing, borders and the status of civil servants.

The complex part, according to legal experts, is that the CPA did not clearly spell out the fate of Southerners living in the North in case of separation. According to some estimates there are over 2 million Southerners living in the North. It stands to reason that NCP will predictably argue that Southerners in the North will forfeit their Sudanese citizenship; hence rights of employment, ownership, residency and entry to North Sudan could all be revoked. More so the critical challenge is with regards to the many Southern citizens who are employed by various state institutions, particularly in the military and police force. How the status of Southern citizens will be settled and what are the mechanisms that will be adopted by both the NCP and SPLM to overcome some of these and other associated issues are questions that remain unsolved.

Another important contestation is the sharing of oil revenue. The conflict between the ethnic groups, government and militias was fuelled by the significant oil reserves developed by foreign companies. This exacerbated the conflict because the huge potential profits increased the incentives for control of the land, resulting in all kinds of human rights violations. The South is rich with almost 60% of the oil wells but the pipes run through the North. The South fully depends on the North to sell oil. Experts in this field argues that that for the next five years Southern Sudan will have to rent the Northern oil pipeline, refineries and facilities at Port Sudan to sell its oil. If not handled diplomatically this could trigger a wave of unrest, raids and attacks on the South.

Moreover, there is the Abyei issue, which is considered the key point to a lasting peace between North and South Sudan. Abyei is a fertile region that has oil deposits between North and South Sudan. But Abyei`s future is very much up in the air, and observers worry the region could again erupt in civil war. Fear is pushing the Ngok Dinka, the town`s dominant ethnic group, to consider declaring Abyei part of the South, even though they know that move might provoke the North to try to take Abyei by force.

Sudan`s predominantly Muslim and Arab North and the largely Christian South fought a war that led to the deaths of many people. If Abyei`s status is left unresolved, the area will be caught between two nations, possibly triggering a return to conflict in Sudan. The 2005 peace agreement, which ended the war, promised the people of Abyei their own referendum on whether to be part of the North or South. The Abyei referendum was supposed to be held simultaneously with the main Southern referendum, but the two sides failed to agree on who was eligible to vote. As a result, the Abyei referendum has been postponed indefinitely.

Nevertheless, what are the lessons that Africa could derive from the successful referendum? As a consequence of this, South Sudan will be the second country to obtain independence after the decolonization period and will become the United Nation`s 193rd member. Indeed the necessity for the future sovereign Sudanese states to cooperate and to build and maintain two economically viable states is fundamental in order for political, economic and social development to take place.

On the other hand, many African leaders and policy makers fear that the independence of Southern Sudan could trigger some old claims of secession across the African continent and inside Sudan itself. For example, years before Sudan`s south began casting votes for secession, the woes of Africa`s largest country were defined by the ethnic bloodshed in the western Darfur region. Now, international mediators and rights groups are calling for stronger efforts to settle the eight-year Darfur conflict, fearing that the breakaway of the South may push Khartoum`s leaders to clamp down harder on dissent and place stricter limits on an international role in Darfur and other areas that remain under its direct control. This may result in the Darfur rebels being inspired by the South and perhaps even potentially finding an ally in the new Southern independent state.

Indeed, other international actors’ interests could play a leading role not to allow North and South to return to war. China has invested heavily in Khartoum by supplying them with a military arsenal in the form of long-range attack missiles and other arms. Equally so, the United States is providing aid and other humanitarian assistance to the South. South Africa is another new player, using carefully orchestrated moves to enter the arena, already occupied by China and United States.

Finally, a complex range of issues including international treaties, currency, borders, foreign debt, oil revenue, Nile water sharing, property, citizenship and other economic issues must be addressed before July 2011, when the CPA interim period ends. Nevertheless, the Southern Sudan referendum processes were largely peaceful and gave a good start to the creation of a new nation.

ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN AFRICA

2011-03-25T09:24:00.002+02:00

Benin: Contentions Around the Electoral Process

David Zounmenou, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

The moment there is suspicion about a person`s motives, everything he does become tainted - Mahatma Ghandi.

Like the wave of the Arab Revolutions that swept several countries since the beginning of this year, contested elections and presidential bicephalism – a country with two leaders claiming the presidency - are rapidly becoming the hallmarks of the continent`s political processes. It is as if incumbents and opposition leaders are increasingly discovering a third way, between coups and credible elections, to access state power. While Benin was expected to deliver once again free and fair presidential election and possibly stage another peaceful power change of government, the ongoing, widely ignored post-electoral crisis raises serious concerns about the state of the democratisation process itself.

On the 13th of March, Benin’s citizens went to the polls to cast their votes for a new president. If the voting process was seen as peaceful by local and international observers, the outcome remains highly contentious. Benin has now become a theatre of confrontation between the incumbent president Boni Yayi, declared winner of the first round, and the main opposition leader, Adrien Hougbedji, who has also proclaimed himself as the duly elected president.

But what is at stake goes beyond a mere contestation of the electoral results. Indeed, after twenty years, Benin`s democratisation process is still very much in the transition stage. It stems from the fact that the political system suffers greatly from a high degree of political immobility while pretending to be one of the most successful cases of democratisation in Africa. Here again, the fallacy of regularly held elections without profound institutional reforms appears as one of the major impediments to a democratic consolidation.

There is little doubt that the 2011 electoral process in Benin is going to be a crucial test of the country’s resolve to take a step further towards consolidating its democratisation process. It is the fifth time that Benin is holding presidential elections since its historical National Conference that paved the way for a peaceful transition from Marxist dictatorship to democratisation in the 1990s. Since then, three transitions of power have taken place peacefully from one civilian leader to another. Meanwhile, over the past few years, Benin`s democratic environment has deteriorated considerably due to the growing conflict between the government and key state institutions including the parliament, government`s attempts at undermining public liberties, allegations of rampant corruption, political assassination and numerous financial scandals.

In essence, what makes any electoral process exciting in Benin, stems not only from the pre-election environment, but also from the uncertainties surrounding the outcomes. Given the electoral map of Benin - which is split among key political forces - it is never clear who will be the winner. Past experiences have also demonstrated that a first round knock-out never occurred and guarantees were in place for the elections to be relatively free and fair. There is now a concern about this year`s exercise pointing toward a general instability and adding to the long list of fraudulent and potentially violent elections in Africa.

There are a number of reasons for that. The elections took place in a highly polarised environment between Yayi Boni and key political actors of the united opposition front named "Union Fait La Nation" (UN). There were some concerns that as the opposition was, for once, united and given the many scandals that marred Yayi Boni`s term in office, voters might decide to sanction his administration. The pre-election balance of power was not in the favour of the government. It has now become clear that the incumbent had anticipated the situation and worked on a strategy to determine the outcomes of the vote well before the election itself. That strategy rests on three pillars.

Firstly, the government successfully regained the control of key state institutions including; the Constitutional Court, the Independent National Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court, all appointed by the president and members of his presidential majority coalition. The neutrality of the constitutional court was compromised by the rejection of various laws voted by the parliament to create a conducive legislative environment for the elections. At the same time, opposition forces have remained uncompromising in their opposition to the current administration and this has forced the president to resort to presidential decrees to implement various government`s decisions and commitments.

Secondly, the voter registration process, mainly the Liste Electorale Permanente Informatisee (LEPI- Permanent Computerised Voter Register) was carefully monitored to favour Yayi`s administration and increase his chances to avoid a second round that might result in a defeat. The confusion that characterised the voter registration process - due to the opposition leaders` call for boycott because of the lack of transparency and the government`s deliberate attempts to reduce the influence of the opposition coalition - results in the exclusion of at least 1.3 million citizens from the vote. Mediation efforts from the AU/ECOWAS/UN delegates and Benin`s former presidents had a very limited impact on the government`s resolve to hold the elections in spite of the contested voter list. In the current post-electoral debacle, the situation has been worsened by allegations of "ghost" voting stations and inflated voting population in the North, Yayi Boni`s stronghold.

Thirdly, the government has tightened security measures by deploying heavily armed soldiers and police officers at strategic places in the country with firm instruction to enforce the imposed ban on any kind of protest. The militarisation of the electoral process poses a risk of violent confrontations as militants of opposition parties have lost confidence in the judiciary. If this is not carefully monitored and managed, it is likely to see Benin becoming another area of electoral tension in the already fragile and unstable West African region.

While the electoral commission declared Yayi Boni as the winner of the vote with 54 percent, ,confirmed by the constitutional court, thus dashing any hope of a run-off, the opposition leader has rejected the results and called for street mobilisation. Whether the call will be heeded remains to be seen, as the volatile situation in Cote d`Ivoire with two presidents seem to frighten the electorate in Benin.

In the history of Benin`s democratisation process, no president has ever won the election in the first round and the vote rigging allegations are serious enough to dent the legitimacy of the incumbent. No matter how the issue is resolved, Boni Yayi, is likely to emerge increasingly fragile and with disputed legitimacy. The upcoming legislative elections could also be a trigger for violence, as his supporters would need to get him a majority in the parliament for him to govern. Given the stalemate of the presidential contest, Benin is not yet out of trouble. Concerted efforts are needed to both avoid prolonged violent confrontation and preserve the reputation of Benin as democracy’s hope.

RAPE IN DRC

2011-03-25T09:23:00.000+02:00

The Rape Ordeal in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Jeniffer Muthangai Katusya, Intern, African Conflict Prevention Programme, Nairobi Office

Describing the conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Margot Wallstrom, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflicts called it ‘the Rape Capital of the world’. After her appointment, Wallstrom visited the region and described it as the epicenter of sexual violence, where rape is used as a weapon of war.

The region has been plagued by multiple regional and civil wars since 1991, which became more pronounced in 1994 against a backdrop of regional hostilities stretching from the Rwanda genocide. Fighting continued, wave after wave untill 1996 and 1998 with the outbreak of what has locally been named Africa’s two ‘World Wars’.. Even with relative peace prevailing across the country today, the region has experienced minimal stability. Violence and frequent attacks against women have grown exponentially making headlines in the recent violent conflicts.

A UN report released in November 2010 indicated that the situation of sexual violence deteriorated further in 2009 registering 8000 victims of sexual violence in North and South Kivu provinces. These figures almost doubled the number of cases, which had been reported in 2008. Coordinated attacks occurred on the 19th and 21st of January where 53 women were raped on their way home from the market in Nakatete and Kitumba villages. Since January 2011, over 200 raped women, men and children have sought medical attention in the local health centers, reports Médecins sans Frontières. These figures are the minimum, given that a great number of women fear the social humiliation and retaliation, which accompanies reporting of such cases.

Rape remains one of the most serious human rights violations committed against civilians in the Kivus, Eastern DRC. Attacks are launched by armed members of the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) which also encompasses original elements of the Interahamwe. Threats have also increased as a result of enhanced militarization of the region by former militia groups and community-based militias formed to defend their local communities and demobilized soldiers. For instance, the Mayi Mayi and the FDLR were allegedly involved in the rape of 60 women in Luvungi Village North Kivu in July 2010.

The incidence of rape in Eastern DRC takes several forms including, sexual abuse, gang rapes, and individual rapes. No one seems to be spared in this mayhem: babies the age of ten months, girls, young boys, women, and the elderly have all fallen prey. Witnesses in Bukavu reported that attackers round up villages, tie up and rape women and girls publicly whilst forcing their family members to watch.

Rape has been used to instil fear and disrupt the social fabric of victimized families by deliberately stigmatizing women and undermining family and community structures. However, worrying questions revolve around the motive and motivation sustaining this kind of crime with impunity. Armed groups use rape as a tool for punishing local communities for collaborating with their rivals,’ reports by the Human Rights Watch indicate. Deficiency of military discipline, absence of legal protectionist instruments for women and inefficient judicial recourse create an environment of impunity. Opportunists take advantage of this situation to gain control and dominate local communities.

The effects and the strain caused by rape have far reaching repercussions. Rape and fear of it, constrains the daily human activity for women in eastern DRC. Women have been raped while going to the farms and markets. Attackers strategically target the prime age of both women and girls, which forms the country’s powerful resource. Rape increases the rate of HIV infection. Managing a sick population with increasing HIV infection as result of rape and sexually transmitted diseases also brings forth a number of economic, political and social challenges. Many victims continue to experience multiple injustices of isolation, denial, shame, stigmatization and revenge for airing their cases.

Thousands of women have come out openly in streets to oppose the vice and agitate for their rights and freedom. While appreciating the presence of numerous international and regional initiatives put in place to mitigate sexual violence in DRC, the reality is that it is ineffective. The international Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has established a regional framework on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children in the Great Lakes Region. However, more political pressure is required in agitating for the ratification and domestication of the regional protocol, which would be a very strong regional approach towards achieving sustainable peace and development in Eastern DRC. Support from other regional bodies in which DRC is a signatory such as the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) and the Economic Community for Central Africa States (ECCAS) is important in developing practical actions and strategies to guarantee the rights and protection of women and integrate their efforts in the campaign for lasting peace and security.

The recent prosecution of 11 army officers’ by a local mobile gender court, accused of raping 60 women at the beginning of the year sent a strong signal that justice is achievable in prosecuting perpetrators of these brutal war crimes.

Appreciating sexual violence as a major form of gender-based violence is essential in the process of devising gendered responses in conflict resolution and management. It is also important to increase institutions and women empowerment projects in order to elevate women to a point of significance where they can contribute positively to the economic and political development of the country. Education as stated in this year’s theme for the International Women’s Day is a basic need human and a fundamental human right, which all women deserve.

Quoting from Margret Ogola, an African linguistic writer, “A homestead without a daughter is like a spring without a source”. So is a nation in which women are disempowered. Women form a powerful resource in any society and their rights must be protected and safeguarded.

AN INTERESTING DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

2011-03-25T09:19:00.002+02:00

The Future of African Leadership

African dictators have been part of the continental landscape for decades. However, the recent events in North Africa seem to be filtering down to sub-Saharan Africa, and the conditions for potential uprisings match those that sparked the North African unrest, namely, oppression, high unemployment rates, escalating costs of living and reported poor governance.

The question facing dictatorship-based African leaders now is whether to step down gracefully or fight to remain in power.

According to various media reports, the clashes across Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are a direct result of the 'African Century' paradigm shift. 'Africa Century' is a term used to express the belief that the 21st century will bring peace, prosperity and cultural revival to the continent. The term has been used by a variety of people, including South African politicians Thabo Mbeki and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chevron CEO David J. O`Reilly, US Treasury Secretary Paul O`Neill and celebrity campaigner Bono from Irish rock band U2.

The expected paradigm shift in African leadership has been likened to the decolonisation of Africa. The debate at this stage is; will this decade represent the democratisation of Africa or will it be the decade of renewed tyranny?

WHAT DOES AFRICA REALLY NEED...AID OR FAIR TRADE?

2011-03-21T10:38:00.002+02:00

Fair trade, not aid for Rwandan women

It's taken a long time for the Agaseke, the renowned Rwandan traditional basket, to secure a regular income for groups of rural women in the country. Salha L Kaitesi, a Rwandan entrepreneur based in the UK, has created a platform for her fellow country-women to sell their handcrafts on an international market.

Kaitesi's primary goal is to empower the women who are survivors of the 1994 genocide in the country. Besides surviving the brutal massacre of Tutsi natives, many women also lost their husbands and other loved ones. The genocide's legacy has been abject poverty in some rural areas.

In late 2010 Kaitesi founded the company Beauty of Rwanda in Newcastle, where she now lives. It's through the organisation's website that Kaitesi markets and sells Rwandan handcrafts. "We hope to end poverty for the thousands of Rwandese living in that situation in rural Rwanda," Kaitesi said in response to a set of emailed questions.

Baskets are not the only items you can shop for on the website, crafts like jewellery, apparels, tableware and wall art, all crafted by the women, are also available. Prices range between US$11 and $48 for different objects. A medium-sized Agaseke sells for $24, while a pair of beaded earrings goes for $11. Sales are growing, the founder said. The techno-savvy Kaitesi has resorted to social sites and other marketing strategies to attract new buyers.

"The response is picking up, thanks to Twitter, Facebook, word of mouth and the interviews I am doing," she said. The scale of production is high enough to ensure that the women are able to make significant returns from their work, Kaitesi said. The weavers are paid beforehand, even before their artworks are exported to the UK. "When they get here we have to sell as many and as quickly as possible so that we can put in another order for the women."

‘Only one basket can'
Beauty of Rwanda recently launched Only One Basket, a promotion campaign that's tipped to boost sales even further. The much publicised Only One Basket kicked off in London on 11 March 2011. Only One Basket is an event-based trade fair, where crafts will be marketed and sold.

The idea behind Only One Basket is that buying a single item would help advance trade and better lives of the producers. "It wouldn't financially strain the buyer, but would make a huge difference in the end," Kaitesi said. "I thought to myself: how can we get people to support us without them having to commit to something they can't afford? Then I thought of asking people to buy at least one piece of our craft."

The trade fair will be taken to Kigali, the Rwandan capital, in May. After Kigali, the aim is to take the crafts to various trade channels. "We plan on having as many "only one basket" events as possible. You never know, we could be in your city soon," Kaitesi said.

The artefacts are Rwandan culture
The crafts have been part of the Rwandan traditions since time immemorial. More like Ndebele and Zulu women in rural South Africa who dedicate time to beading, the Rwandan counterparts are renowned for weaving baskets and other artworks with their own bare hands.

Kaitesi explains in one of her blogs that they use locally sourced raw materials like sisal, banana fibre, long grass and cow dung to craft baskets. The process of producing these crafts is usually filled with joy, as groups of women gather to weave. Kaitesi explains how laughter and singing is typically part of the gatherings.

"The more we sell the better it is for the weavers in rural Rwanda. Weaving is the main skill that they have so at least we can guarantee a regular income.

The artefacts are everywhere in the country. Kaitesi, who admits to have never learnt how to weave, is concerned that the tradition may be lost for next generations. She's hoping that Beauty of Rwanda will contribute to preserving the old tradition.

Fair trade, not aid
The Beauty of Rwanda is all about creating a platform for the Rwandan women to draw income from fair trade, and not aid from donors. Kaitesi speaks passionately about fair trade being a sustainable option for the African continent. "Africa is a rich continent and with the right platform the whole continent is capable of sustaining itself," she said.

"Every time you watch the news and anything about Africa comes on, nine out of ten times it will be about organisations working in Africa that need the aid. "I do appreciate that these organisations couldn't function without the aid, but on the other hand there are companies that don't require aid."

Brighter future for Rwandan women
The year 2011 marks 17 years since the Rwandan genocide. Ceremonies are held in the country throughout April, the month violence broke out in 1994. It's therefore fitting that Only One Basket won't be staged in Kigali during the month, as "the month of April in Rwanda is a sombre month", Kaitesi pointed out. "This April Rwanda will mark 17 years since the genocide against the Tutsis. Everyone is quite sensitive during this period and so it wouldn't be ideal."

Rwanda is still a nation embroiled in healing. "We can never forget what happened and I don't think we will ever forget. We say never again and move on," Kaitesi said.

Kaitesi has been named as one of 20 inspirational women of African Diaspora in Europe 2011 by the organisation African Diaspora Professional Women in Europe. So, what does this well-recognised and inspirational, yet down-to-earth African woman think the future holds for her Rwandan counterparts?

"Rwandan women believe that the sky is the limit. They are committed, hard working individuals. Their strength and contribution to the economy in Rwanda is there for all to see. I cannot help but envision a brighter future for Rwandan women."

By Bongani Nkosi
Source: www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com

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Quote of the Week
"African women are the continent's compelling leaders, both in daily life and in social and political activities. Africa stands on their feet. Female entrepreneurs, politicians, promoters of rights, health, peace and co-existence; it is impossible to imagine the future of Africa without picturing the many ordinary women who carry the weight of this land every day, taking on its tragedies and bearing its hopes"

Guido Barbera, President of Solidarieta e Cooperazione Cipsi

WILL SOUTH SUDAN SURVIVE?

2011-03-18T08:51:00.000+02:00

All Roads Lead Back to Juba

Scott Maxwell, Visiting Researcher, Arms Management Programme, ISS Pretoria Office

With democratic uprisings spreading from Tunis to Cairo to Tripoli, the world`s attention is fixed on the events in North Africa and rightly so. Tunisia prepares for elections as a fragile transition plods forward in Egypt. Meanwhile, the bloodletting in Libya continues, with the international community mulling available options. Yet, forgotten in the possibilities of the Arab Spring is the place that might hold more promise - and peril - for democratic prospects elsewhere on the continent: South Sudan. Significant obstacles remain there, including a renewal of violence, before a peaceful and stable democracy can take hold. The challenges are no less urgent and require no less attention than the events unfolding to the north.

The protests in North Africa and the secessionist movement in South Sudan are opposite sides of the same coin - that of self-determination - yet considerably different in form and function. The countries of North Africa are in many ways outliers within the African context. They tend to identify themselves as Muslim, Arab, Mediterranean – and then African. Egypt, in particular, is quite distinct, with a relatively unified and uninterrupted history and culture. In contrast, Sudan is deeply divided along racial, ethnic, and religious lines. Modern Sudan is in many ways a construct of the borders and institutions left behind by the Ottoman, Egyptian, and British colonialists. In this sense, South Sudan’s referendum for independence is more relevant and transferable to other African countries when compared with the popular uprisings in North Africa. Therefore, the international community, specifically the United States, must extend its full economic, political, and diplomatic support to the Government of South Sudan.

On 7 February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission announced that 99 per cent of Southerners voted to secede from the North and create an independent state. Shortly thereafter, Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan, made a public address accepting the results of the referendum, thereby officially supporting the separation of the South. The international community was quick to offer their congratulations and prognoses. A press statement issued by the AU expressed its conviction that ‘Sudan [had] decisively overcome its tragic history of division.’ Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, referred to the referendum results as a ‘turning point in the history of Sudan, closing a long chapter of conflict, oppression, and despair.’ The peaceful referendum and optimistic commentary only briefly assuaged fears about a renewal of violence in Sudan. Unfortunately, these hopeful assessments were premature, and the long chapter of conflict in Sudan is still being written.

Over the past couple of weeks, the Abyei region of Sudan has become a flashpoint of violence. Recently, fighting broke out in the village of Todach on 27th February between Misseriya militias and a Southern police unit alleged to be aligned with the Government of South Sudan and elements of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). According to the international medical humanitarian organisation Doctors Without Border/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), over a hundred people have been killed and tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced due to the fighting in the Abyei area.

The Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP), a collaboration between the Enough Project, Google, United Nations Satellite Application Operations Programme (UNSAOP), the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and other organisations, confirm through satellite imagery that ‘buildings consistent with civilian infrastructure appear to have been intentionally burned in Maker Abior and Todach villages.’ The 4 March 2011 SSP report states that the absence of visual scorching around housing structures indicates that the dwellings had been intentionally destroyed. This evidence of violence is a reminder that deep tensions remain unresolved in South Sudan.

The United States was quick to condemn the violent clashes in the Abyei region, urging restraint from all parties, as well as calling on local and national authorities to ensure that the UN Mission in Sudan had access to protect civilians. Additionally, the US sent two senior advisers to bolster the North-South and Dafur peace processes. These positive steps notwithstanding, President Obama has not given Sudan its deserved attention and diplomatic lethargy has set in. America’s engagement in South Sudan’s peaceful progress toward separation is by no means an antidote to the challenges they face, but it would lend the necessary momentum to the proceedings.

South Sudan recently suspended talks with the North over Khartoum’s alleged support of Southern rebels. The two sides were set to resume talks in April, so it remains to be seen if the suspension is permanent. However, in addition to the talks on unsettled post-referendum issues, such as sharing oil revenues, demarcating the border, and resolving the Abyei situation, several other key initiatives have to be undertaken. Foremost, South Sudan needs to reconcile with all militia groups to ensure a long-term peace settlement. This process must include a robust disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme aimed at integrating militia members into the SPLA. Next, the North’s meddling with Southern militias should be addressed openly and honestly. Finally, and maybe the most difficult, is for the South to start building the framework for a democratic society. As Mayank Bubna, analyst for the Enough Project, aptly points out, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) must ‘demonstrate commitment…toward inclusive governance, in the form of a democratic constitutional review process and independent political party and civil society development.’ These are all difficult measures to address and cannot be shouldered alone. As South Sudanese leaders take on the responsibilities of governing, the international community, including the UN, AU, US – and even China – needs to offer its unwavering support to the tenuous democracy emerging in Juba.

The conflicts in Sudan have aroused humanitarian concerns for a long time and it would be inexcusable for the international community to lose interest just as the North and South are on the verge of a new future. The ultimate goal of the people of South Sudan is to establish a fully functioning independent state in peace with its northern neighbour. The stakes are high in Sudan, yet the ultimate outcome will not just determine the life of future generations of Sudanese, but may also create the roadmap for other self-determination struggles on the continent.

THIS IS ABOUT CSOs IN THE PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

2011-03-18T08:47:00.000+02:00

What Role for Civil Society in the UN Anti-corruption Efforts?

Shahnaaz Parker, Programme Assistant, Corruption and Governance Programme, ISS Cape Town Office

In addressing corruption globally and domestically the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is a promising anti-corruption tool. The convention, which to date has 148 signatory states is unique in recognizing both punitive and preventative measures in combating various forms of corruption. The fight against global corruption can only be meaningful if countries voluntarily ratify and implement the convention. It was therefore encouraging when the first Conference of State Parties (CoSP), in 2006, agreed on the need to establish an appropriate and working mechanism on the implementation of the UNCAC. It was even more inspiring when the Doha deal on the UNCAC review mechanism, the first ever United Nations peer review mechanism, was concluded in 2009. Under this deal all State Parties should complete comprehensive self-assessment checklists on their implementation of UNCAC.

Unfortunately the Doha agreement has not been much cause for celebration. For starters, the review mechanism was allowed to operate in secrecy on a government-to-government basis, with no mandatory requirements for non-governmental inputs, country visits or publication of full review reports. The mechanism also grants governments permission to keep Country Review reports confidential and makes report publication discretionary. In the mechanisms’ final Terms of Reference (TOR), paragraphs about civil society participation were removed and decision-making regarding the review process was deemed exclusive to governments’ experts. In this spirit the mechanism provided only for the appointment of 15 governmental experts for the purpose of the review process. This is inconsistent with the anti-corruption ethos of transparency, public participation and accountability. Paradoxically, the UNCAC Review mechanism takes pride in having transparency, inclusiveness, and impartiality, among other things, as its guiding principles and characteristics.

On the other hand the review mechanism, albeit flawed, is a small step in a process that can improve. It does at least exhort a State party under review to endeavor to prepare its responses to the comprehensive self-assessment checklist through broad consultations at the national level with all relevant stakeholders, including the private sector individuals and groups outside the public sector. It is now up to citizens’ groups around the world to take up the challenge to ensure that governments do not only pay lip service to the principles of transparency and civil society participation. The UNCAC Coalition, consisting of 240 civil society organizations globally is one such citizens’ group, which realizes the importance of undertaking independent assessments to input into the peer review process.

The review mechanism’s TOR stipulate that each review phase shall be composed of two review cycles of five years each and one fourth of the State Parties will be reviewed in each of the first four years. Fortunately the TOR also binds the Conference of State Parties to assess the performance of the Mechanism and its terms of reference following the completion of each review cycle. This is an excellent opportunity for civil society groups to lobby the Conference of State Parties to institute amendments to the Mechanism’s rather bizarre terms of reference.

Among the group of countries that are in the second year of the first review cycle, which looks at the compliance in implementing (Chapter III, Criminalization and Law Enforcement and Chapter IV International Cooperation) UNCAC, is South Africa. This is a great opportunity for South African civil society organizations (CSOs), especially those who are part of the UNCAC Coalition, to advocate for a transparent and inclusive review process. This is not likely to be an easy task given the mechanism’s determination to maintain the confidentiality of all information obtained in the course of, or used in, the country review process. Nonetheless citizens’ groups should persuade government to announce its focal point as well as publish the results of its self-assessments. This will require constructive engagements with the review team to enable non-governmental organizations to prepare an independent version of the self-assessment report. This could potentially provide rich material for comparative purposes and is likely to facilitate dialogue between government and non-governmental organizations.

The Implementation Review Group, the structure to which State parties must submit their consolidated reports, should therefore also seriously consider taking into account civil society inputs in order to complete maintain the principles outlined by UNCAC.

The UNCAC review mechanism creates an opportunity for government and civil society to come together in creating a transparent and inclusive review process, which promotes access to information and accountability.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN SOUTH SUDAN

2011-03-11T12:33:00.000+02:00

South Sudan starts talking, thanks to Radio Miraya
Tuesday, 08 March 2011

Miraya is a 24 hour, 7 day a week radio operated by the United Nations Mission in Sudan in partnership with Fondation Hirondelle, a Swiss non-governmental organization. Launched on June 30, 2006, Miraya has grown to an organization of more than 100 national staff members (journalists, presenters, technicians and support staff) who have been recruited from all over Sudan and trained in-house.

A map of Sudan, indicating South Sudan in red"I thought a microphone was better than a gun to continue the liberation". David's explanation is simple and convincing. A former captain of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA, an ex-guerilla force that now governs South Sudan), he now conducts Face to Face, a popular radio talk-show that hosts political and civil society personalities.

We are in one of the many Eritrean restaurants in Juba and the girl sitting next to us recognises him instantly from his voice. It is especially young people who need a free and open debate about the future of their country. For a country that has become the youngest African state after the referendum held in January sanctioned the birth of independent South Sudan, it is a future that still needs to be build.

"Many of our journalists are former child soldiers and even those who managed to avoid such a fate have pasts which have been marked by war," says Zoran Culafic, news editor of Miraya, the radio which has given David and many other young South Sudanese journalists a voice. Miraya emerged from collaboration between the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and Fondation Hirondelle, a Swiss non governmental organisation (NGO) that builds and supports quality media in crisis zones and post-conflict situations.

Every morning at 8.30, Culafic directs the editorial meeting discreetly, listening to journalists rather than imposing his point of view. "If you point them in the right the direction they provide the resources," he says, speaking about the reporters, "they can do this job better than anyone else because they know the people, the places, the problems". The aim is to make Miraya a point of reference for the growth of the civil society which South Sudan is desperately in need of. That is why Miraya doesn't only host political debates but also tries to give voice to a population that wants to live again after twenty two years of war.

Lubna conducts Baytna ("Our home"), a programme in which she tries to give answers to the more concrete problems of family and domestic life. "During the last episode," she explains, "we talked about eating a balanced diet with limited resources. Listeners were given a chance to call in and have their say and many asked questions which we attempted to give concrete answers to."

South Sudan needs this as well as to re-create the fabric of its past and its culture. Martin is a tall, smiling boy. He is reviving the region's traditional music by inviting artists and groups to play in Miraya's studios. "People are enthusiastic," he tells me with pride, "they have asked us to make some CDs with the music we record and play on air".

Naturally, however, it is current events that steal the scene in South Sudan at the moment. The tumultuous political affairs of the country have an immediate impact on the life of its eight million citizens. One of the most burning issues of the moment is the return of the refugees who escaped to the North during the war. I head towards Juba's river port with Emmanuel, a large 34 year old who spent half of his life as a refugee in Arizona and working at a petrol station. In America Emmanuel studied and today shares his time between Miraya and the fields that he managed to convince his tribal leader to allocate to him and which he farms.

Once we reach the port, we see that two large boats carrying hundreds of people have just arrived, the people are now crowded on the banks of the Nile waiting to board trucks that will take them to their country of origin. Almost all of them are from Torit, the same region that Emmanuel is from. He knows many of them, some he has not seen for twenty years but the ties have not been lost. I stop to talk to a middle-aged man, Santino. "I ran away in 1986, I was only 16 years old," he says, "I lived in a camp in Khartoum for more than twenty years and am happy I can now go back. The real problem is for our children: they are not used to the environment, to malaria, it will take them a while to adapt". Shortly after, when we move away, Emmanuel smiles and says: "you know that the man you spoke to used to be a great goalkeeper? When we played as children, his nickname was ‘Magnet'‘".

It seems like a story from a long time ago. Today, ‘Magnet' doesn't have a job, a home or the hope of a stable future. He is exhausted after a gruelling, ninety day journey. The conditions at the port of Juba are not good. There is no food and drinking water only arrived yesterday. People sleep outdoors and there are mosquitoes everywhere. The presence of humanitarian organisations, which in the city are everywhere, here is relinquished to a faded UNICEF tent and a couple of staff members from the IOM, the organisation which, together with the government, is managing the repatriations.

Emmanuel speaks to young people, the elderly and women, asking them to talk about their experiences. At first it isn't easy, the situation is tense and the people look at us with expressions of expectation, nervousness and indifference. I am aware that without Emmanuel this would be an off-limits area for a foreign journalist. In a few minutes he is able to ensure that our presence is accepted, and many tell us their story. "They know that it is important to make the condition they live in known to others. For them, it is the only way to have a voice and receive help".

After all, this is what Radio Miraya is. The voice of a "newborn" state that already speaks many languages. There is, of course, the language of suffering and need, but also the language of redemption, of freedom gained through hardship and the determination to take back the many years that were stolen by war and building a different future.

By Roberto Sinovia
Source: Afronline.org

THIS IS ABOUT AFRICAN TRADE WITH CHINA

2011-03-11T12:16:00.002+02:00

Africa trading with China: A positive focus

"The evolving relationship between China and Africa could be one of the most important developments in the international relations of the post-Cold-War era," say Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu.

The past two decades have witnessed the growth of an increasingly close relationship between Africa and China. China's phenomenal economic growth has had many positive implications for the African continent, including increased trade, investment, and development. Africa has experienced significantly higher levels of foreign direct investment as a result of its engagement with China, the latter having established more than 540 companies and 1600 development projects in 47 African countries. This number rose sharply to 750 companies by 2007.

However, the Africa-China relationship has sparked much debate, as scholars and economists alike try to interpret what it means for Africa's development in the long term. Ampiah and Naidu present two competing visions of this relationship: one casts China as a coloniser, the other views China as a competitor with the West. Many see China as an imperialist that seeks to exploit Africa and perpetuate its deplorable state of underdevelopment, but others argue that China competes with the West for Africa's resources and that this situation affords Africa the opportunity to promote its growth and development in an international system largely dominated by the West. This newsletter by Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI) argues that the China-Africa relationship, questionable as it may be, should be hailed for challenging hegemonic Western power and for actively supporting development in Africa.

Increased infrastructure and trade for Africa
Despite China's phenomenal growth levels, which quickly rendered it an international economic force, it maintains and displays solidarity with developing countries. China is one of the biggest aid donors to African countries. Its infrastructure-development projects have ranged from building railway lines in Tanzania and Zambia, to erecting skyscrapers in Luanda and stadiums in Ghana. China has further invested millions of US dollars in oil-rich countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria, and has granted loans to numerous African countries.

Due to its own history of economic stagnation and poverty, China realises the importance of infrastructure development in developing countries. Unlike the West, it does not simply offer Africa humanitarian aid, but rather growth and development opportunities through increased trade and infrastructural capacity. Struggling African countries have grabbed these opportunities for growth with both hands. The China-Africa relationship can thus be considered a strategic partnership rather than simple patronage. It has not only contributed towards Africa's infrastructure, but also encouraged South-South trade. China's engagement with Africa has made other developing countries, such as India, aware of the lucrative investment opportunities the African continent has to offer. China's involvement in Africa put it on the international trading map and increased its international trade with southern-hemisphere countries.

An alternative to United States hegemony
China's own development sets an example for other developing countries that are working to find their place in the international system, yet want to remain relatively independent. China's alternative development model, the Beijing Consensus, challenges the Western Washington Consensus. The Beijing Consensus emphasises the importance of innovation, non-interference by investors in domestic affairs, and self-determination in Third World states' bid to promote their economic development. These development tenets differ significantly from the Washington Consensus approach, which suggests that poverty alleviation and development be achieved by the liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of domestic economies. The Washington Consensus has had devastating effects on African countries as their economies struggled to cope with the ‘shock therapy' of liberalising their markets and subsequently being exposed to the unfair trade practices of the West.

Apart from offering an alternative to the Washington Consensus, the Beijing Consensus affords African states the advantage of a choice between two major economic poles. They are no longer coerced to align with United States hegemony. However, the Beijing Consensus should not be seen as a development model that can simply be applied to all African countries, but rather as one that can bring about the global terms that would accommodate and encourage the development of African countries.

Non-intervention and sovereign equality for Africa
China's relationship with Africa has been based on five tenets since 1996, namely, "reliable friendship, sovereign equality, non-intervention, mutually beneficial development and international cooperation." These five points strongly contrast with the conditions attached to loans and development packages offered by the West, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Developing African states, who are reluctant to turn to the West and the IMF, now have an alternative source of funding. China's dynamic economic growth has increased its need for energy sources, in which Africa is rich. African countries that have abundant amounts of crude oil, titanium, copper, iron ore, platinum, coal, zinc and a wide range of other natural commodities such as timber and natural gasses, have experienced high levels of investment by China along with growing markets (due to China's increasing energy needs) in which they are able to sell their products at a competitive price.

China creates training and employment opportunities
These investments, as well as the infrastructural development discussed above, have led to job creation and the increase of technical training programmes in Africa. Chinese companies that establish business initiatives in Africa provide training in technical areas such as agricultural production, irrigation and telecommunications to African citizens. The maintenance and repair of the equipment used in these business initiatives and technical areas further stimulate job creation. Large numbers of previously unemployed Africans can now provide for their families.

Whilst food security has become a growing concern in China, Africa is rich in agricultural goods and able to supply China with much-needed foodstuffs. This has led to further Chinese investment in African industries like agriculture, farming machinery, fisheries, secondary production and agricultural processing facilities. China has also used military cooperation with Africa as a means to further gain access to its resources and economy. China has provided uniforms to Mozambique's army, as well as equipment, training and arms to various African countries. It has provided fighter jets and helicopters to Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Mali. China has also contributed humanitarian aid and peacekeepers to the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) missions in Africa, in an attempt to promote stability on the continent. Last but not least, China has granted many African countries complete debt cancellation.

Trade and investment with no strings attached
Chinese investment came with some political conditions, such as trading partners not being allowed to have relations with Taiwan. They must accept the ‘one-China' policy. However, investment and development aid from the West came with political conditions, too, including adherence to the practice of good governance and acceptance of a liberalised economy, in exchange for financial assistance. Many feel that the West has always regarded Africa as a backward, poverty- and disease-ridden continent. It has treated Africa as a burden to the international system, and engaged with the continent in a spirit of paternalistic and cultural superiority.

Africa's relationship with China has given the continent an opportunity to escape old stereotypes and Western conditions and to promote its development instead. China and the West have now become strategic competitors for Africa's resources. As a result of China's regarding Africa as a sovereign equal in the international system and a lucrative investment destination, it has also promoted Africa as an official approved travel destination. More Chinese citizens now travel to African countries, which generates revenue, motivation for growth, and other positives in destination countries.

Concluding remarks
It is true that China's interest in Africa is economically and politically motivated, but it has produced a magnitude of possibilities and developments. China found a lucrative market for investment, and Africa continues to gain from the infrastructural and economic developments arising from that investment. The China-Africa relationship challenges US hegemony in the global economy, which may convince the West to alter its policies in order to maintain desired levels of involvement with the African continent. Some may argue that China has dark motives, but even if this is true, China's supportive involvement in African countries is still an example that the West is not necessarily the best answer to Africa's challenges.

By Veleska Langeveldt
Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI)
Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI) is a South African-based research and strategy firm with a focus on social, health, political and economic trends and developments in Africa. CAI releases a wide range of African-focused discussion papers on a regular basis, produces various fortnightly and monthly subscription-based reports, and offers clients cutting-edge tailored research services to meet all African-related intelligence needs. For more information, see http://www.consultancyafrica.com.

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Some further perspective on China in Africa:

Between 2005 and 2008 China consistently outspent the World Bank in Africa - in 2005 China committed $8 billion in lending to Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique as opposed to the $2.3 billion lent by the World Bank to the whole continent.
In 2006 China's premier lending arm in Africa, China Exim Bank, lent approximately $12.5 billion mostly to finance infrastructure upgrades in Africa.
Between 2006 and 2007 China's President Hu Jintao visited no less than 17 African countries, the most ever by any foreign head of state in such a time frame.
Several large South African firms such as SABMiller, Naspers, Richemont and Sasol have moved into China and benefited hugely from access to the world's largest and fastest growing market.
China's foreign direct investment (FDI) into African in 2007 presented less than 3% of its global FDI outflows, and annual trade with the entire continent amounted to half the value of China's total trade with South Korea.
Source: South South cooperation: The BRICS in Africa by Simon Freemantle in Africa The Good News (2008)

ABOUT FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION

2010-11-29T11:14:00.003+02:00

Holistic approaches key to ending female genital mutilation
Monday, 22 November 2010

Narrow approaches which focus on individuals or appear to attack deep-seated customs are less successful at reducing female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) than those that aim for community-driven change that addresses the complex social dynamics associated with the practice, according to a new study by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).

The approximate prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation in Africa"Families will and are abandoning FGM/C when the right conditions are in place - conditions that include the involvement of community and religious leaders, legislative reform and [ensure] that any discussion surrounding FGM/C is framed in a way that reinforces the positive aspects of local culture and builds community trust by implementing development projects that address local needs," James Elder, spokesman for UNICEF's Innocenti Research Centre, which conducted the study, told IRIN via email.

The report looks at highly promising approaches being used to support social change around FGM/C and how these strategies are being implemented in Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal and Sudan. An estimated three million African girls and women risk FGM/C annually.

In northern Sudan, for instance, where FGM/C prevalence is about 89 percent, community, state and national efforts to end FGM/C have included human rights education, introducing development activities to communities and a national media campaign to elevate the status of being "uncut", and changing attitudes towards the practice. The country also has national and state policies to protect the rights of women and children, and efforts are under way to criminalize FGM/C.

The country's `Saleema' (Arabic for "whole" or "undamaged") Campaign has helped reinforce positive social values which favour the well-being of children by leading with discussions about parental care and family pride and gently easing into more direct messages about FGM/C.

According to Zeinab Ahmed, a child protection specialist with UNICEF Kenya based in the northeastern town of Garissa, narrow approaches to ending the practice have met with little success.

"Some of the interventions that have had limited impact are alternative rites of passage focusing on individual girls - girls belong to communities, and dealing with a girl as an individual has limitations if she then goes back into a community that still strongly believes in FGM/C. It's important to involve parents, aunts, uncles, elders - the whole community," she said.

According to the UNICEF report, a 2001 evaluation of alternative rites of passage - which involve substitute coming-of-age ceremonies that preserve local customs but eliminate FGM/C - concluded that they have limited effect unless accompanied by a process of participatory education that engages the whole community.

"Similarly, rescue centres for girls do not deal with the roots of the problem, and they are not sustainable... Can they really house all the girls who run away from FGM and early marriage? Why not approach this by changing how the community thinks about FGM," she added.

Ahmed noted that it was important to tailor responses to suit the various communities involved in FGM. "For example, the alternative rites of passage have worked well in Maasai communities, but among Somali communities, the approach needs to address both cultural and religious aspects of FGM, so community dialogue is the method used," she said.

Complex social dynamics
"Among the Somali, it has been important to gently draw out the community to discuss issues around FGM... We might start, for instance, by discussing pregnancy and labour and the reasons why childbirth is so difficult for them, which eventually comes to a discussion of FGM."

Northeastern Kenya is dominated by ethnic Somalis, who practice infibulation - the removal of the external genitalia before sealing and leaving a small opening for menstrual blood and urine - almost universally. This method makes sex and childbirth particularly difficult.

It was important, she added, for the government to take leadership of FGM/C by enforcing existing laws and funding sustainable programming. She emphasized the need to speak to communities in their own languages through well respected community members acting as "facilitators of change".

"The media has been very effective in creating debate on FGM; FM stations in local languages, featuring experts - gynaecologists, children's officers, education experts, religious leaders - on panels discussing the issue promote healthy and lively discussion of FGM," Ahmed said. "Women and girls are able to call in anonymously and say how FGM has negatively affected them. After all, it is the shoe wearer who knows where it pinches."

According to the report, while several countries have laws in place prohibiting FGM/C, legislation alone was insufficient to end the practice, which is closely tied to social identity and acceptance.

"Religion, tradition and culture are often cited by families as reasons for cutting their daughters," said UNICEF's Elder. "Many communities, for example, assume that FGM/C is mandated by religious doctrine, despite the fact that no major religion requires it."

"In some cutting communities, a woman can't be married without being cut," Ahmed said. "In Africa, marriage is the ultimate security, and in these communities, it doesn't matter if you have 10 PhDs... If you're not cut you are not recognized for your achievements and getting married is usually a huge challenge."

Ahmed said part of the approach to ending FGM/C among the Somalis in northeastern Kenya involved debunking the idea that Islam demanded the practice, as well as de-linking the practice from ideas about promiscuity and chastity.

Elder noted that ending FGM/C was a good way to eradicate other practices that lowered the value of women in their communities.

"Evidence from the report suggests that the approach used to support the abandonment of FGM/C can also promote and contribute to the abandonment of other harmful practices, such as forced and child marriage," he said.

Subtle attitude shifts
The report noted that although prevalence rates are still high in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, there has been a significant change in attitudes about FGM/C in all three countries, indicating that individuals are questioning the merits of these practices.

According to Ahmed, there has been a similar shift in attitude among Kenya's Somali population.

"We are seeing an attitude shift - for example, some Somali communities are moving from infibulation to the pricking or nicking of the clitoris," she said. "A small percentage have discreetly left the practice altogether. However, no form of FGM should be condoned."

IRIN News

ABOUT AFRICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE

2010-11-29T10:58:00.002+02:00

Becoming a global economic power: Africa's people hold the key to success
To date, the African economy has largely been overshadowed by Asia in the East and to a lesser extent, Latin America in the West. However, hidden in plain sight, Africa has begun to emerge as one of the world's fastest growing economic regions.
Many global investors still shy away from Africa, retaining the continent's outdated image of war, corruption, political instability, financial chaos and poverty and suffering. However, leading financial consulting firms McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) and Boston Consulting Group (BCG) agree that Africa is now the most profitable place to invest. Not only does Africa provide the best growth rates, but analyses also show that investments in Africa between 2000 and 2009 have yielded the highest profits world-wide.

Africa's economic growth in the last decade
In the past, it was believed that since Africa comprises 20% of the world's land and 15% of its population but only represents 4% of global gross domestic product (GDP), the continent has been under-performing for so long that it would be difficult for it ever to rebound. However, sometime in the late 1990s, Africa's GDP growth began to gather momentum, expanding increasingly rapidly through 2008.

According to Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the past decade has been remarkable for Africa even if much remains to be done. Telecoms, banking and retail are flourishing, construction is booming and foreign investment is surging. From 2000 to 2008, global GDP grew 4%, while growth in sub-Saharan Africa has averaged over 5% annually, the best performance in 40 years. During the eight-year period, only five African countries lived up to the reputation of chaos and stagnation, with the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Zimbabwe experiencing no or negative growth rates.

Despite these few poor performances, Africa's collective GDP in 2008 - US$ 1.6 trillion - was roughly equal to that of Brazil or Russia. Poverty has reduced and significant progress has been made towards other important Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

African economies also showed remarkable resilience during the recent global economic downturn, due in part to the considerable progress made by African countries from the late 1990s and in the first decade of this century, in addressing their fiscal problems and reducing their fiscal deficits. Hence, when the crisis hit, despite many economies suffering lower revenues as a result of the reduced demand for African exports, most countries were able to sustain spending on key priorities.

Foreign investors are now benefitting from the economic and social development progress made on the continent in recent years. The BCG report shows that investors that started putting their trust in Africa in 2003, made far larger profits than those investing in more conventional markets. Between 2003 and 2008, investments in Africa's leading companies yielded more than twice the profits of those made in United States, East Asian or European companies.

Since 1998 the revenues of Africa's 500 top companies, outside of the banking sector, have grown 8.3% annually. Exports have primarily been responsible for the increase, surging from 3% annual growth in the 1990s to 18% in 2000. In turn, increased revenue has allowed Africa's top companies to start investing abroad. Direct foreign investment by African companies has grown 81% annually since 2002; more than double the growth rates of Latin America and Asia.

Economic growth has also created substantial new business opportunities, though these are often overlooked by potential investors. McKinsey analysts project that at least four groups of industries in Africa - consumer-facing industries, agriculture, resources, and infrastructure - could generate as much as US$ 2.6 trillion in revenue annually by 2020, or US$ 1 trillion more than today.

There can be little doubt then that, in the words of Strauss-Kahn, "Africa is back." However, in light of rampant poverty, disease and conflict, Africa's recent economic success has been hard won. The McKinsey report shows that Africa's economic success is primarily due to the efforts of its people and the good governance of its leaders.

XENOPHOBIA

2010-11-12T07:30:00.002+02:00

"We're all migrants": Xenophobia and rebuilding trust in South Africa

"Every single time I've seen it done, I've been amazed at how, even in a matter of two hours, by simply sitting and listening to others talk about where they come from you actually come to the conclusion that we're all migrants: whether economic or otherwise. We have come to where we are because we all come from somewhere," says Mothomang Diaho, head of the Dialogue Programme at the Nelson Mandela Foundation (NMF).

In 2009 I spent a few weeks interviewing refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa for the United Nations refugee council (UNHCR). The focus of the project was those who had been seriously affected by the so called xenophobic attacks that rocked South Africa in 2008 and tarnished its image among its neighbours in Africa. The story I heard over and over again from refugees - mostly from Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia - was one of civil war or persecution in their home countries, followed by an often dramatic journey to South Africa. These stories should have ended in the asylum seekers settling into a life of relative peace and prosperity in their new country of residence. Unfortunately, for many of those we interviewed and many economic migrants from neighbouring countries it ended with being violently chased out of the communities they were living in, with their homes and shops looted by armed gangs.

"On 23 May 2008 around midnight I was asleep at home when I heard someone break through my door. I switched on the light to see who was breaking in. It was a neighbour, who told me to turn off the light and hide him and his family. I didn't want to, because I was too scared. There were about 200 people in the streets outside my house, shouting and throwing stones. Some had pangas. We managed to escape around the back and get away to where the other Somali's in the area were gathering." This account, told by a Somali refugee, echoed hundreds of similar stories.

At the time, listening to their stories, it seemed near impossible for these migrants to re-integrate into South African communities and for trust to be rebuilt.

However, a pilot project started in 2008 by the Nelson Mandela Foundation's Centre for Memory and Dialogue has shown that something as seemingly simple as getting communities to sit down and talk to one another about the issues within the community can help people of different nationalities learn to live peacefully as neighbours.

The CEO of the Nelson Mandela Foundation, Achmat Dangor, said at a recent seminar on Dialogues for Social Change hosted by the Foundation that "We don't want to oversimplify the issue of the movement of human beings, but we can't take a problem and bottle it inside".

He added that there are underlying causes of the xenophobic attacks that still need to be explored. "We need to understand the complex issue of migration of people. It is not just an African problem," said Dangor.

The NMF project used the Community Capacity Enhancement-CCE Methodology developed by the United Nations Development Programme to start a dialogue in five areas affected by xenophobia in the target provinces: Gauteng; Western Cape; KwaZulu Natal; Mpumalanga; and the Eastern Cape. The goal was to investigate the reasons for the violent attacks and equip communities with tools to prevent it from happening again.

According to the head of the Dialogue Programme at the NMF, Mothomang Diaho, the aim of the dialogue was to start a healing process. She says the methodology focused on bringing people together and helping them to listen to each other, to understand where they all come from, and that "we're all migrants: whether economic or otherwise".

During the program the NMF works through established community structures and institutions to find locals that can be trained as facilitators, with roughly halve of the facilitators being South African, and halve of them migrants. The dialogues happen at monthly sessions at local halls or churches, where six dialogues are structured to allow community members to talk about the issues within the area, and then move on to solutions.

According to a report compiled by the NMF, some of the burning issues that communities raised were language barriers, lack of proper documentation and lack of trust that provide barriers to accessing resources; poor communication and selfishness among community leadership; and an apparent lack of participation by migrants and migrant organisations in community initiatives.

Diaho says many people battle with the term xenophobia, since it's not just a South African problem and xenophobia is usually a manifestation of something much deeper.
"The victims of the violence in 2008 were from outside and inside South Africa; it's too simplistic to just call it xenophobia, because when you dig deeper, what you find is deep-seated frustration by people in poor communities. Let's be honest with ourselves, it didn't erupt in Bryanston or Sandton or Constantia. You do start getting answers when you look at areas that were affected" says Diaho.

She says the common denominator was people who were battling with meagre resources, and had to share these resources with other poor people who were also battling.

However, not every poor community that had many migrants living side by side with South Africans experienced violence. Diaho says there is a lot of power play within communities, and often corrupt elected officials or forces within the community stoked the violence and broke the stability.

Diaho says once there is an understanding of the issues that drove people to where they were, the community can start looking for solutions to work through the anger and pain. The result they were looking for was mostly cohesion, and that communities reach a certain understanding of where their problems had come from and how they could work together to improve their situation by accessing resources from institutions like churches, NGOs and the state.

"Often, amazing things have happened," says Diaho.

One example is a community in KwaZulu Natal where the dialogue took place that came up with three projects. One project focused on protecting orphans in the community. A community newspaper was also initiated to disseminate more information around issues of migration and service delivery to create greater understanding within the community, and a community radio station was started to link with local communities in a structured way.

According to Diaho, you could argue that this community moved from deep hatred and resentment to a community that is now working together to find solutions for their problems.

However, she says they did meet resistance from formal and informal structures within the communities.

"It's never easy. You have to start slowly by building trust. It's only once they trust you that you can move on to ask them certain questions, and it takes a while, you have to spend time in building trust."

CAPE VERDE - AN EXAMPLE TO BE FOLLOWED...

2010-10-21T15:35:00.000+02:00

No natural resources required: The Cape Verde success story

As a small archipelago of ten volcanic islands, a population of 530,000 people, few natural resources, little available drinking water and frequent droughts, Cape Verde is an unlikely candidate to be in the vanguard of African development progress.

Yet, despite the island nation's geographical and climatic challenges, Cape Verde is considered to be one of the best performing countries in Africa in terms of political, economic and social development. The country's poverty rates have fallen substantially over time, and it remains on track to meet most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly those related to poverty eradication, health, education and gender.

The reason Cape Verde has thus far succeeded where most African countries, although blessed with a wealth of natural resources have failed, is good governance. A stable political climate, sound economic policies, transparency and efficient management of development aid have underpinned Cape Verde's development agenda providing significant returns.

Cape Verde on track to achieve the MDGs
Over 90% of all food consumed in Cape Verde is imported as the arid Sahelian climate and little arable land has left only four of the ten main islands (Santiago, Santo Antão, Fogo, and Brava) capable of supporting significant agricultural production. However, against all odds, the country has witnessed steadily increasing living standards and is on the way to achieving most of the MDGs.

The first MDG, which rests on the accomplishment of the remaining seven goals, is to halve, by 2015, the number of people worldwide living on less than US$ 1 a day. Cape Verde's level of absolute poverty has fallen from 37% to 28% between 2001 and 2006, and the proportion of people living below the minimum level of dietary consumption has been halved.

Furthermore, Cape Verde's 2008 and 2010 MDG reports indicate that the country is rapidly approaching the achievement of the second MDG of universal primary education. Primary school net enrolment from 2003 to 2008 is estimated at 85%. This remarkable achievement was made possible primarily through a United Nations (UN) supported 31-year national school feeding programme, taken over by the Government of Cape Verde in August 2010. The programme has been a key factor in allowing poor Cape Verdean families to send their children to primary school. In addition, Cape Verde has also achieved gender parity in primary and secondary education. Indeed, the attendance rate of girls is higher than that of boys.

There is further good news for Cape Verde's children. Child mortality rates in sub-Saharan Africa remain alarmingly high despite an overall reduction worldwide. Cape Verde, however has managed to decrease the under-five mortality rate from 57 deaths per 1 000 live births in 1995 to 21 in 2010, well below the sub-Saharan average of 94. This success is largely due to doubling the number of births attended by skilled health professionals, increased vaccinations of young children and improving programmes that address overall health and nutrition for pregnant women.

Inequality in access to health care has been identified as one of the primary barriers to achieving the MGDs in Africa. Cape Verde has engaged in greater use of awareness raising campaigns aimed at sensitising families to issues related to child health. In addition, Government moved aggressively to bring primary health services closer to its citizens, so that now 76% of Cape Verdean families live within 30 minutes of a health centre.

The gains Cape Verde has made toward the MDGs represent an African development success story made all the more impressive when the context in which it has been achieved is considered. The dearth of natural resources and geographical and climatic challenges that Cape Verde faces have meant that in order to achieve any significant advances in development the country has had to turn to its most valuable asset, that of good governance.

Good governance paving the way for development
The African continent has historically had a record of poor governance. Unlike many African nations for which the wave of democratisation of the 1990s represented a false dawn, Cape Verde has made steady gains in maintaining the values of democracy and is now considered the best democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, ahead of its nearest rivals, South Africa, Mauritius and São Tomé Príncipe. Corruption on Cape Verde, though not unknown, is very low. Transparency International rated it third in Africa, behind Botswana and Mauritius, in the Corruptions Perception Index of 2008.

Since 1991, the Government has pursued market-oriented economic policies, including an open welcome to foreign investors. In the face of a lack of resources Cape Verde has made good governance its most marketable product, using it to secure investment, loans and improved security ratings. This strategy appears to be paying off as Cape Verde enjoys a high investment rate which rose to 48% of GDP in 2008.

Cape Verde's own investment in good governance has had great returns. The country's growth strategy has focused on this and on sound economic policy, including the effective use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). These best practices have seen Cape Verde's graduation from least developed country (LDC) to middle income country (MIC), thus becoming Africa's first case of policy-induced graduation, as opposed to natural resources driven graduation. Cape Verde's policy driven graduation serves as a shining example that good governance can support growth and development in the absence of natural resource based wealth. As a middle income country, Cape Verde now has greater access to various windows of funding from international organisations such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), which will further aid development in the nation.

Simply securing international funding is, however, not enough to guarantee development. Good governance is also required to ensure that the State's resources are effectively utilised to provide the education and health care without which the potential benefit of funding cannot be realised. Public administration can only be effective if there is human capacity to deliver policies. As the Prime Minister, José Maria Neves, pointed out in his address to the High Level meeting on the MDGs, "we must invest in our people so that they can be strategic resources for the development of our country."

These successes show that the natural resources with which so many of Africa's countries have been blessed are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for development on the continent. As former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated "good governance is the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development."

Defying the odds stacked against it by nature, geography, and history, Cape Verde has proven itself to be an exception to the curses of poor governance and economic under-performance that have plagued post-independence Africa.

It is true that much still remains to be done. Unemployment is high and about 10% of the population are severely malnourished. A further 25% of people do not have regular access to safe drinking water. Still, Cape Verde has made staggering progress in development and the achievement of the MDGs and must be applauded for its successes. The arid, resource- and water-scarce archipelago should serve as an inspiring example to other low-income countries in their endeavours to achieve growth and development. As the AfDB Group President, Donald Kaberuka points out, "rich natural resources endowment does of course help, but here is evidence that no matter how bad the initial conditions, with good governance, solid institutions, and a peaceful political and social climate, take off is possible."

By Claire Furphy
Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI)

MO IBRAHIM INDEX 2010

2010-10-05T09:34:00.000+02:00

Angola, Liberia and Togo improve on Mo Ibrahim index
Monday, 04 October 2010

Many Africans are enjoying greater access to economic opportunity but are seeing their political rights undermined, according to an index of governance measures published on Monday.

Sudanese-born telecoms entrepreneur Mo Ibrahim set up the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2006 to promote good governance and leadershipThe Mo Ibrahim Foundation, also known for an annual prize aimed at African leaders, warned there was a risk that citizens' rights were being neglected as Africa made economic strides.

"We have seen from evidence and experience across the world that discrepancies between political governance and economic management are unsustainable in the long term," Foundation board member Salim Ahmed Salim said.

The 2010 index is based on 88 indicators drawn from official sources and was largely unchanged overall from 2009 as economic and health gains were cancelled out by declines in political rights, personal safety and the rule of law.

Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana, Cape Verde and South Africa led the overall governance ranking as they did last year, with Somalia, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Eritrea and Sudan once again at the bottom.

Angola, Liberia and Togo each made marked improvements in their overall scores, while Eritrea and Madagascar saw declines. The full dataset is published on the Foundation website at www.moibrahimfoundation.org.

The indicators cover a broad range of categories such as violent crime, corruption, labour rights, girls' education, inflation and child mortality rates.

The mixed picture appears to reflect a continent where industry sectors such as portable telephony are booming and investors are jostling over access to raw materials even as violent conflicts deepen and democratic rights are abused.

The Foundation has chosen for the past two years not to award its African leadership prize, aimed at former heads of state deemed to have fully dedicated their term in office to helping their people.

Mo Ibrahim is a Sudanese-born telecoms entrepreneur who set up the Foundation in 2006 with the goal of promoting good governance and leadership.

Reuters

World Bank chief: Development economics need to be democratized and demystified

2010-10-05T09:32:00.000+02:00

World Bank President Robert Zoellick on Wednesday called on economists to rethink the way they look at issues affecting developing nations and said he was overhauling the way his institution approached research.

World Bank President Robert Zoellick has urged a rethink of development economicsZoellick said development economics was often too narrowly focused and not transparent to those affected by policies that emerged from the analysis.

He said the global financial crisis and the rise of developing countries had forced a rebalancing of the world economy and raised questions about policy approaches.

"Even before the crisis there was a questioning of prevailing paradigms and a sense that development economics needed rethinking," he said in a speech at Georgetown University. "The crisis has only made that more compelling."

Zoellick, who is is not an economist, said as a policymaker he looked to development economics even more for answers. He said success in tackling global poverty was uneven and countries were frustrated with the lack of progress.

He said the World Bank would apply its economic know-how to studying issues from food security to what drives growth to be more relevant to the developing countries it assists.

The Bank would make its research available online free of charge so that it can be accessed not only by other economists but also by "a health care worker or parent in a village".

"We need to democratize and demystify development economics, recognizing that we do not have a monopoly on the answers," he said. "We need to throw open the doors, recognizing that others can find and create their own solutions."

The World Bank chief said there were lessons from the experience of emerging economics like China, where rapid economic growth has reduced poverty and created new markets.

His speech followed a week after world leaders including U.S. President Barack Obama called for a new approach to development to meet goals agreed by the United Nations in 2000 to tackle global poverty, disease and hunger.

Obama said the United States would focus its development assistance more toward helping countries develop their economies. He called for results-based development - applying strategies that in practice benefit the poor.

Zoellick said experience had shown that what may work for one country does not necessarily work for others. He said development knowledge should become "multi-polar" and recognize developing countries are new poles of growth.

"I believe we need a more practical approach - one that is firmly grounded in the key knowledge gaps for development policy," he said. "One that is geared to the needs of policymakers and practitioners -- as a primary focus, not as an academic afterthought. One that throws open the doors to all those with hands-on experience."

He identified four areas that needed more research. These included a better understanding of how economic transformations occur and why some countries are able to grow and others remain trapped in dire poverty.

Research should also help countries understand how access to economic opportunities can be broadened, including by connecting education to jobs and giving the poor access to markets and finance.

Zoellick said research should look closer at risk to do with natural disasters to health pandemics, and climate changes that are affecting food production. Lastly, more study was needed to gather evidence and data to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of development efforts, including aid, he added.

Reuters

ASSESSING MDGs IN AFRICA

2010-09-24T08:06:00.000+02:00

MDGs: How far we've come and what still has to be done
Charles Abugre

A mother cradles her newborn baby girl, with joy where there might have been grief. During labour, the baby was in a dangerous breech position, putting both mother and child at risk of death. But a skilled birth attendant turned the baby, saving their lives.

Thanks to the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), standards world leaders agreed on in 2000 to lift the poor, the sick and the hungry by 2015, professionally-attended births are at an all-time high in Africa. Benin is most improved, and even war-scarred DRC and Angola have risen to the challenge, with Angola halving maternal deaths.

Thanks to the impetus of the MDGs, the expectant mother and this baby received free prenatal care, and free medical visits will continue through the breastfeeding period, strengthening the child’s body and mind - a low-cost policy Ghana, Malawi, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda all began. Thanks to the MDG challenge, she is likely to escape Africa’s child-killing diseases, because cadres of health workers have been hired and trained to distribute essentials, such as bed nets and improved malaria medicines (in the countries with free prenatal care, plus Zambia and Niger). Africa-wide, malaria deaths have fallen by half. Meanwhile, vaccinations including measles and tuberculosis have skyrocketed, saving six million lives.

The world leaders who are gathering for a MDG Review Summit at the UN this week must study these victories. They must remember, if they wonder whether the goals are realistic, that indicators on maternal and child health, hunger, poverty and disease have improved in some of sub-Saharan Africa’s poorest countries. Before the global financial crisis, hunger plummeted by 75 per cent in Ghana, and by a smaller degree in Djibouti, Mozambique, Chad, Benin, Mali, Gambia, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Togo. Populous Ethiopia, Egypt, and Angola halved their poverty rates. And although the goals were inked in 2000, change really began in 2004. So it’s all happened very, very fast.

Today, with five critical years to go, we know what works. There’s a set of solutions that are proven, and cheap. They include:

* Increasing health budgets, so maternal and prenatal care are free (And so more birth attendants can be trained).

* Publicly-funded discounts on fertiliser, to lessen hunger. In Nigeria, when some farmers got fertiliser and simple technology, credit and marketing help, their income rose 50 per cent - for just $80 a year. Help with warehousing the harvest in eight other nations led yields to rise as much as four-fold.

* Low-cost childhood preventive care, which could save six million of the 11 million children who die each year. That includes breastfeeding for six months, nutritional supplementation up to two years, vaccines, bed nets, antibiotics for respiratory infections and oral rehydration for diarrhea.

* Cash grants to the most destitute, like teenage orphans, the elderly, and families without a breadwinner, to reduce poverty. Kenya, South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, and Lesotho, among other countries, funded them with taxes. Cash transfers are quite small: $3 a month lifted the health, education and nutrition of Kenyan orphans. A $2 per month payment to Malawian families without a breadwinner decreased child labour.

But more of the same won’t be enough. World leaders in New York must re-energise their MDG efforts, with stronger action plans to accelerate through 2015, because despite the many stunning successes, progress has been uneven. Too many donors and African governments have failed to make the plans to fund the programs and to deliver on their promises.

Meanwhile, the food and financial crises have devastated the poorest, though final numbers on the impact mostly aren’t available. But even before the global economic crisis, amid progress elsewhere, poverty was up in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. While the mother and newborn above were saved, one in seven women die in childbirth in sub-Saharan Africa. (In Ireland, it’s one in 48,000.) One in three infants in Africa are undernourished, causing irreversible stunting. Rural areas are worse off than cities almost everywhere. Child mortality is among the world’s highest in Equatorial Guinea and Chad, and in the DRC, the proportion of hungry people has doubled.

Access to piped water and sanitation has seen little progress; two-thirds of those in sub-Saharan Africa lack basic sanitation. And though education is spreading, 38 million children still don’t attend school. (In North Africa, they’re mostly girls.) And the negatives go on: Sudan and Ethiopia’s immunisations are falling. Africa has three-quarters of all new HIV infections. Most medical workforces are inadequate - in some nations, a single ob-gyn serves an entire state or province of millions. And with measles vaccine funding down, measles deaths could rebound by as much as 1.7 million.

This week’s summit must refocus world leaders’ attention on the policy failures behind these tragic shortfalls, and end with a commitment to redouble efforts. To turn away now would be, as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has said, morally and practically unacceptable and would multiply the world’s dangers: instability, violence, epidemic diseases, overpopulation, and environmental degradation. And progress must happen on multiple fronts at once. Extreme poverty kills through the cumulative effects of malnutrition, poor infrastructure, gaps in health care delivery, and more.

Here’s what commitment looks like. Take the baby girl when she reaches school age. Education will be free if she’s in Burundi or Tanzania, where school fees were abolished in pursuit of the MDGs. Now enrollment is nearly universal. (Zambia is close, and in Mauritania, which doubled its budget allocation to education, girls’ enrollment surged.) Ethiopia raised its education budget, funded textbooks in local languages and built rural schools. Tanzania recruited teachers and added second shifts to meet overflowing demand. Gambia invested in teacher training.

Once she’s in a clean school, she may be immunised there, and get a nutritious free meal, kicking off a virtuous circle. Being healthier, she’ll be absent less often. Attending regularly, she’ll likely finish. Being better educated, she’ll make healthier decisions when she grows up. And so on. If her government school purchases the free meals from an area farmer or community garden, local income rises. More community children can eat. They’re healthier and miss less school. Commitment will allow these children, upon graduating, to find decent employment, thanks to fair, efficient economic and tax policies. With jobs, they’ll pay taxes. That will fund more schools and clinics. And so on.

Leaders at the summit must also be heartened because the backdrop in Africa now is in many ways better than in 2000. Economies are bouncing back. Our abundant natural resources are in demand. There is less inflation, less debt, and more scope to borrow and raise taxes (and stop tax evasion and fraud). Broad popular awareness of the goals has fostered new coalitions now working together. The public institutions responsible for social services to the poorest are in better shape. And the trend towards decentralisation, that’s shifting funds and power to provincial localities, makes citizens better able to monitor their leaders’ governing and spending.

The political landscape is more conducive, too, with fewer military conflicts and military dictatorships. And we Africans seeking justice are backed by a global movement, pressure from which helped lessen Africa’s debt burden, leaving governments more money to spend on MDGs.

Here’s what needs to happen next:

* Donor nations: Fulfill your side of the bargain and deliver on your promises. Stop tying humanitarian aid to political and macroeconomic conditions that do not favour growth and pro-poor human development. Prudent economic management fosters development. But tying aid to unfair conditions is effectively a death sentence on millions of mothers and children and the poorest. Reducing poverty must be aid’s only purpose. If you want to promote democracy, realise that elections alone, important as they are, can’t alone constitute a functioning democracy. We need jobs, the taxes they generate and a clampdown on tax havens sheltering illicit capital flight to sustain our democratic institutions. These all - and building our jobs base so we’re not dependent on commodities - are inseparable from the democratic process.

African leaders in countries falling short: You must find a stronger will to improve the condition of your poorest citizens, as you promised when you signed the MDGs in 2000. The goals make it mandatory that you provide health, clean water, sanitation and education for your citizens. Build on what we know works to carry efforts forward at this time of promise more potent than any moment ever before. Raise the revenues needed to deliver on your commitments. Fight for global trade rules and financial regulation that serve justice. Say you stand for eradicating poverty, and the correct steps you’ll take to get there, and we will support you.

Citizens: Recognise your responsibility and in your own powerful voice, demand that political leaders and public servants deliver. Africans must stop acquiescing in silence to poor governance and substandard services, whether in schools, hospitals or town halls. We deserve, we require, we demand competence and effectiveness in public spending. That means watching over those who govern to catch corruption and waste. Show your support for the MDGs by joining an event during the September 17-19 ‘Stand Up, Take Action, End Poverty’ day of action (standagainstpoverty.org). You can force those responsible to solve our societies’ problems.

Our fates, north and south, urban and rural, rich and poor, are entwined. Our common future depends on more powerful commitment to end the suffering of extreme poverty, to make sure every newborn, like the baby girl asleep in her mother’s arms, has the basic necessities we know how to provide. For now, tiny but alive with possibility, she waits for our action.

MDGs

2010-09-24T08:04:00.000+02:00

MDGs, women and peace: Towards uMunthu
Steve Sharra

Is it a mere coincidence that the 2010 summit on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) being held this week in New York overlaps with the UN International Day of Peace? Whether it is or is not, that fact alone offers an opportunity to reflect on how the MDGs relate to the promotion of global peace. The idea of ‘peace’ is absent from the MDGs. This has prompted a group of activists to declare ‘Interfaith dialogue for peace’ a missing Millennium Development Goal. However, it may not be the only missing goal, as another activist group, the Charcoal Project, has taken up ‘energy poverty alleviation’ also as a missing MDG. I am sure each one of us can come up with at least one suggestion that could be said to be another missing goal from the MDGs.

There has been a lot of discussion leading up to the UN MDGs summit, but one that caught my attention last week was the BBC programme World Have Your Say. On Thursday 16 September the programme’s discussion centred around the observation that of all the eight Millennium Development Goals, those relating to women were the furthest behind. Evidence for this for me came from a separate news item that celebrated Ghana’s progress, touting it as on target to become the first African country to achieve MDG number one, halving poverty. But the same news report also observed that Ghana would be unable to achieve the MDGs relating to children’s and women’s health, goals number 4 and 5 respectively.

Is it surprising that of the eight Millennium Development Goals, those pertaining to women are the hardest to achieve? Take MDG number 3, promoting gender equality and empowering women. The target for that goal is to achieve gender parity in primary and secondary school enrolment for boys and girls by 2005, and in all levels of tertiary education by 2015. The 2010 Millennium Development Goals report indicates that the global numbers show near parity for this goal, but when regions are looked at separately, the reality is quite different. A few days ago the news coming out of the United States was that more women were now obtaining PhD degrees than men. This was the last remaining area in the American education system where women were not in the majority. On any given day, there are more women on American university campuses than men, with some universities reporting a 45:55 men to women ratio. It is these figures that balance out the global numbers in other parts of the world such as sub-Saharan Africa, where in fact there are 67 women for every 100 men in tertiary education. In southern Asia the ratio is 76 women for every 100 men.

Going by these realities alone, why wouldn’t one conclude that the United States of America and other societies in the global North have achieved gender equity? It is only when one looks more closely at other indicators of power that the above conclusion starts to melt away. As advanced as the United States appears to both Americans and others, it has never had a female president in its entire 234-year history. The US Senate has 18 women and 82 men, according to the website ThisNation.com. In the US Congress, males make up 83 per cent (441 males) while females make up 17 per cent (92), according to 2009 Wikipedia figures. On average, an American woman earns 75 cents for every dollar a man earns. The speaker of house is a woman, for the first time in the history of the United States. More evidence of gender disparities in the United States comes from gender-based domestic violence. Some estimates put the number of American women who have experienced sexual violence or attempted sexual violence at one in six, according to figures from the activist group Safe World for Women. Every two minutes a woman is sexually assaulted in the United States, according to the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN).

Clearly American women have not only achieved gender parity in higher education, they have surpassed it. When it comes to politics and other areas of gender concern however, the US is not unlike other countries. The world leader for women’s political representation is an African country, Rwanda. There, women make up 55 per cent of their parliament, a feat no other country in the world has achieved.

Throwing around numbers such as these always raises the inevitable question of whether women in positions of political leadership promote peace better than men. This would be an easy question to answer, were it not for the misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘gender’ differences and the nature of political power implicit in that question. For women’s leadership to promote peace, there is need for change in the very process that defines ‘gender’ and entrusts political power. The misunderstanding will endure for as long as gender continues to be defined in confrontational terms as a competition between men and women, masculine versus feminine. Progress will continue to be elusive for as long as gender is seen as an argument for women to prove that they are equal to men in physical strength and endurance, academic achievement and political representation, property ownership and leadership management style.

For the empowerment of women to make a real difference in the promotion of peace, the discussion needs to shift from one of competing forces to one of cooperation and collaboration. Feminist scholars argue that both men and women possess characteristics that are considered, for lack of more refined language, masculine as well as feminine. The difference lies in the way we are socialised. We grow up being taught to behave in a particular way due to what society perceives gender differences to mean and to require. Social norms compel us to reinforce these perceptions and expectations, and then to undermine them when we use those very perceptions and expectations to blame one gender for being collaborative rather than competitive, accommodating rather than uncompromising, submissive rather than aggressive, gentle rather than violent.

One Malawian gender columnist recently captured this contradiction perfectly. In a recent article, Penelope Paliani-Kamanga wrote about being in a vehicle with male colleagues. The car in front was moving rather slowly and cautiously, and the men concluded that the driver must be a woman. In due course the vehicle Penelope and her male colleagues were in overtook the vehicle in front, and she noticed that the driver was actually a man. She went on to observe in the article that advertisers make it a selling point when a vehicle has been driven by a female, making sure to include that in a classified ad. Yet on the road, many men make disparaging remarks toward female drivers, seeing them as incompetent and inexperienced.

The contradictions and misunderstandings of what gender means are not the preserve of one section of society only; as many men and women alike hold distorted views about the inferiority of women and their unsuitability for leadership positions; as many men and women alike believe that women have no one to blame but themselves in the numerous instances that show women not measuring up to men. One example of this came up in a recent radio panel discussion commemorating International Literacy Day, whose theme was ‘literacy and women’s empowerment’. One man called into a live programme on Transworld Radio and said the reason why there were more illiterate women than men in Malawi was that women did not understand the importance of literacy, and therefore chose to drop out of school before acquiring literacy. No doubt there were women who agreed with that sentiment. Equally problematic is the stereotypical view of women as victims who need men to empower them.

It is very common to hear men and women argue that there is no reason for gender equality programmes; women only need to apply themselves the way men do. Do people who think in this way understand why two of the eight MDGs are gender equality and maternal health? Do they understand why several African governments have created entire ministries to tackle issues of gender and women’s development? Why many universities around the world have departments and programmes studying gender and women’s development? One of the startling statistics here in Malawi is that women make up 70 per cent of all small-scale subsistence farmers, yet only 4 per cent of Malawian women own land. An easy solution to this problem would be to simply call on women, in the ubiquitous manner of news headlines, to own more land. Problem solved. But were it that simple.

As world leaders gather in New York this week to review progress on the MDGs with five years to go to 2015, the list of what goals are missing will probably grow. I will take this opportunity to add one more to the list: uMunthu-peace. Target: reform school curricula around the world into peace curricula, making all education peace education. It is in peace education and peace studies that a more meaningful perspective on gender equality has been developed. Such a perspective might enable each of the eight goals to be viewed ultimately as aiming to promote uMunthu, peace and social justice at the local and global level, making them much more relevant to the majority of people around the world.

ABOUT ZIMBABWE

2010-09-24T08:01:00.000+02:00

Tsvangirai says he will boycott 'violent' elections
Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai said on Monday he will not participate in any election marred by violence, a day after supporters of rival President Robert Mugabe stoned a constitutional meeting.

"I will not commit anyone to any election if it is a declaration of war," Tsvangirai told a conference on political violence.

Five people were injured in the capital, Harare, on Sunday when pro-Mugabe militants stoned a meeting meant to gather public opinion on a new constitution.

Police stood by and watched as the violence broke out in the populous Mbare district.

Tsvangirai agreed two years ago to join Mugabe in a unity government, partly to end deadly political violence that his party says killed more than 200 of its supporters around the inconclusive presidential elections.

'Reminder of the dark past'
"Reports of violence in Mbare and elsewhere throughout the country are a negation of the new spirit we had begun to build in the country," Tsvangirai said. "This needless violence is both a reminder of the dark past and a threat to a bright future.

"Some of us have the misguided audacity to undermine our efforts by hiring thugs to disrupt the people's right to express themselves in an important national exercise."

He spoke at a conference where victims of political violence narrated how they were injured and how they lost their friends and relatives in the unrest two years ago.

The Southern African nation is creating a new constitution as part of a road map by the unity government to fresh elections.
No dates have been set yet for next year's election, but Tsvangirai said last week that a constitutional referendum could be held in mid-2011.

Several constitutional outreach meetings have been disrupted across the country after violent clashes between supporters of long-ruling Mugabe and Tsvangirai, both leaders in the strained unity government. -- AFP

REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL DAY OF PEACE

2010-09-24T07:59:00.000+02:00

BY STEVE SHARRA

Teaching uMunthu for global peace

As I was beginning a seven-month period in 2004 studying prospects for peace education in Malawian classrooms, a friend of mine seemed very surprised at the topic of my study. Why peace education? She asked. Has Malawi been at war lately?

I don’t exactly remember how I responded, but the question of peace education in the Malawian school system appears to me to be as relevant today as it was six years ago. And as it was probably since we first developed our own education system at independence in 1964. September 21 is International Day of Peace, and the theme for this year is ‘Youth for Peace and Development’. Observing this day prompts me to reflect on what I learned those six months I spent in 2004 visiting Malawian classrooms and talking with Malawian primary school teachers and pupils about how we can define and understand peace from a Malawian perspective.

A picture of how we may define ‘peace’ from a Malawian perspective started to emerge in my mind when I attended the inauguration of Reverend Bishop Thomas Msusa as Bishop of Zomba Diocese on 17 April 2004. In his homily after the inauguration, Bishop Msusa talked about his guiding principles in his life as a priest, but it was his description of the Malawian philosophy of uMunthu that has stayed with me in the intervening years. The more I thought about uMunthu and its implications for Malawian life, the more intriguing it became. The only person I knew to have given serious thought to the idea of uMunthu within a peace framework was Archbishop Desmond Tutu. In his 1999 book ‘No Future Without Forgiveness’ Tutu argued that the transition South Africa underwent from apartheid to democratic black majority rule was made possible because of what the South Africans call uBuntu. He grants that it was not the best of transitions, but he could not think of another way South Africa could have managed the transition without degenerating into a horrific civil strife. In recent times Desmond Tutu has described post-apartheid South Africa’s socio-economic tensions as a ticking time bomb, but his belief in the power of uMunthu as an African principle of being has not dissipated.

I was also aware of Malawian philosopher Harvey Sindima’s treatment of uMunthu as an important African philosophy, from his 1995 book ‘Africa’s Agenda: The legacy of liberalism and colonialism in the crisis of African values’. I decided there and then that I needed to look more deeply into this topic, and see which other Malawians had done research on the concept of uMunthu. To say I was pleasantly surprised by what I found would be an understatement. To be sure, none of what I stumbled upon talked about uMunthu as a Malawian or African peace concept, as Tutu had done. However I discovered that there was already a considerable amount of scholarly attention paid to the concept, by Malawian intellectuals such as Augustine Musopole, Gerard Chigona, Chiwoza Bandawe, Richard Tambulasi and Happy Kayuni, among others. I also recall seeing a number of articles from a column in The Nation newspaper, titled ‘uMunthu’. More articles have appeared in other newspapers and magazines as well.

It was a female primary school teacher who gave me insights that helped me make sense of what Malawian scholars have written about uMunthu, and in the process pushed my thinking in a new direction. I had been wondering how the concept could be thought of from an educator’s viewpoint, and this teacher didn’t hesitate to show me how. She began by giving examples of Malawians in high positions because of their superior rank and educational qualifications, but who did not seem to how practice uMunthu principles in their daily life. She asked, rhetorically, ‘Of what use is a university education if a graduate has no uMunthu?’ She asked similar questions of Malawian bosses in various offices in companies and in government ministries, before making a statement that captured the essence of uMunthu and education. She observed that it was one thing to have an education, and quite another to have uMunthu. We could teach Malawian children all the knowledge necessary to succeed in life, but if we didn’t teach uMunthu, that education was incomplete.

Looking at uMunthu from this educational perspective raises several questions about how to teach young Malawians, indeed young people in any part of the world. It also offers part of the answer to the question my friend asked in 2004 as to why I was studying prospects for peace education in the Malawian school system. A number of peace educators around the world have argued that all education ought to be peace education. This is important, whether teaching a Standard 1 pupil how to read, or a final year university student how to analyse quantitative research data. The question at the heart of the education system ought to be how particular subject matter content promotes the values that define our society, and promote love and understanding, friendship and interdependence, empathy and community. That is where uMunthu-peace starts.

NEWS ON ZIMBABWE

2010-09-24T07:53:00.000+02:00

Zim constitutional-reform process 'not credible'

Zimbabwean Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai on Wednesday said violence and intimidation by the military were hindering attempts to write a new constitution and that he intends to discuss the problem with the president.
A fragile unity government set up by Tsvangirai and President Robert Mugabe last year after disputed 2008 elections is drafting a new charter to replace the independence document drawn up in 1979, a process expected to lead to a fresh vote.

Public consultations on the constitution have highlighted continued tensions between Mugabe's Zanu-PF and Tsvangirai's MDC party. At the weekend clashes became so violent in Harare that officials suspended the process.

"Having carefully considered our position, I am going to meet with other principals [in the unity govt] to map the way forward," Tsvangirai said, referring to Mugabe and Arthur Mutambara, the head of a splinter MDC faction also in the government.

"This process fails to pass the test of legitimacy, credibility and people-drivenness," Tsvangirai told reporters.

"We have noted with concern the militarisation of the process, interfering with a purely civilian process. Reports from all over the country show the heavy involvement of the military in the process," said Tsvangirai.

Debate over position of prime minister
The drive to write a new constitution is being led by an inter-party parliamentary committee and civic society groups.

Tsvangirai, who beat Mugabe in a first round presidential poll in March 2008, boycotted a run-off vote citing a violent crackdown against his supporters, which the MDC says killed at least 200.

The MDC has actively sought a new constitution to guarantee free elections and entrench political and media freedoms, while strengthening Parliament's role.
The new charter is also expected to introduce two five-year presidential term limits but there is debate between Zanu-PF and MDC on whether to keep the position of prime minister.

Zimbabwe's current Constitution has no presidential term limits, a situation which has allowed Mugabe to hold on to power since independence from Britain in 1980.

Voters rejected a draft charter in 2000 in a national referendum that heralded Tsvangirai and the MDC as the most serious challenge to Mugabe's grip on power.

A referendum on the proposed new constitution is expected by July next year, officials say. -- Reuters

ABOUT SIERRA LEONE

2010-09-24T07:49:00.002+02:00

Lansana Gberie Senior Researcher ACPP Addis Ababa

Sierra Leone’s brutal 10-year civil war was partly blamed on the misuse or mismanagement of its rich mineral resources, in particular diamonds, by the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the UN-backed Special Court trying the likes of Liberia’s Charles Taylor. So it is apposite that in its post-war governance trajectory, mineral resources would once again become a controversial central concern.

Though there were immediate problems in this regard at the war’s end in 2002, anxieties were heightened in 2007 when, on his election as President, Ernest Bai Koroma declared that he would rule the country as a business entity. He has a background in the insurance business, which is hardly a model of transparency in the country. But Koroma appears energetic and progressive, and went about courting foreign investors in a manner undreamt of under his aloof predecessor, Tejan Kabbah, a former UN civil servant. The prospect of job creation for the country’s large reserves of idle youth – a palpable national security as well as socio-economic issue – at last looked very promising indeed.

It is no fault of the President that in this important effort he has only been able to attract what in the global mining industry is called Bottom Feeders: small-scale enterprises scouring the corners of the globe to locate new mineral deposits, which they then partially develop, advertise, and sell to bigger more established companies. But he has to take responsibility for violating legislation and safeguards laid down in several policies enacted by the previous government and his own to bestow sweet deals on such enterprises.

This was certainly the case with London Mining, a penny-stock company trading on the Oslo Axess and London’s AIM, which acquired rights to exploit several primary ore deposits in Northern Sierra Leone. These included tailings left by a previous British giant (which closed down in the 1960s), estimated at 50 million tonnes of iron ore, in addition to an estimated 100 million tonnes of hard rock beneath the tailings. This makes it a highly significant deposit, made more valuable by the fact that demands for iron ore – an essential ingredient in making steel – have increased astronomically in recent years, with China emerging as one of the most significant consumers.

On 31 December 2009, the government signed a 25-year agreement with London Mining which bluntly violated key provisions of the recently-passed 2009 Mines and Minerals Act. The Agreement included an 80% reduction in income taxes for 10 years for the company, as well as 80% reduction in other major revenue streams from it for 25 years. London Mining is to pay a corporation tax of only 6% - instead of 30% set by the 2009 Act - on its investment; duty on its mining materials was pegged to 1% instead of the official rate of 5% which all other companies pay, and royalties were reduced for it to 3% instead of the official 4%. Worse yet, the agreement should remain in force for 25 years, and can only be changed if London mining wishes to.

The Agreement caused an immediate uproar, both among the country’s Civil Society and media, and its international partners. The campaign group Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) condemned it in several press releases, and a group of consultants hired by the government to advise it on issues relating to mining contracts review – Louis T. Wells (Professor at Harvard Business School) and his colleagues Boris Dolgonos and Mathew Genasci – wrote a letter to the President expressing grave misgivings about the Agreement. In the 17 March 2010, the three wrote that the illegal fiscal incentives the Agreement gives to London Mining create a bad precedent for the government by violating its own law, making it difficult to apply any best practices in the future. They also noted that the negative effects of the Agreement on other subsequent mining agreements will far outstrip the benefits from any temporary employment that would be generated from London Mining’s operations.

But of far greater concern – because of the far higher stakes – has been the lack of transparency which has characterised the recent discovery of offshore oil in large commercial quantity in Pujehun, a politically problematic district in Southern Sierra Leone, and no support base of the President. It is believed that the finds are about equal to the Jubilee field in Ghana (discovered in 2007), which is set to fetch Ghana $1.2 billion annually for the next 20 years. The site of the find was immediately disputed between two international oil companies, the Nigerian-owned Oranto group, which has been persistently renewing its exploration licenses in the area without making any effort at actual exploration, and a newly-arrived and more robust American company, Anardako. Oranto Petroleum, owned by multi-millionaire Nigerian Chief Arthur Eze, had been granted the right over a 1,500 sq km 3D for seismic survey; the area is known as block SL-5. In fact the survey area was expected, once oil finds are guaranteed, to extend over nearby block SL-4, all covering an area of 4,022 sq km. The lease was granted to Oranto Petroleum on 20 August 2003, after Sierra Leone’s First Offshore Bid Round. The first exploration period, which ended on 19 August 2006, was extended by one year to 19 August 2007.

An additional extension was made by President Koroma’s government to end through 2009. In the meantime, the government granted Anadarko prospecting rights in the same area, and the American company in 2008 mobilised the Belford Dolphin drillship to explore the area. Anadarko completed drilling on their site by mid last year, which they call Venus, and found major oil deposits extending into block SL-5. The seismic data point to a 1 billion to 1.2 billion barrels prospect with as much (or more) in neighbouring channel complexes, mostly on Oranto’s block SL5 and mostly within the disputed area – the so-called SL6/7 carve-out which covers ~10% of Block 5.

Oranto promptly hired a top London law firm to prepare background papers for arbitration against the government for the illegal removal of the carve-out area and arbitrary award to another group, an act without precedent in modern oil industry history. Last year, Oranto offered a compromise with the government to negotiate with the SL6 block. It further threatened to refer the matter to the US State Dept. in Washington for Foreign and Corrupt Practices, since Anadarko achieved its current position through non-transparent means.

The issue is now largely muted – sensing the probable legal difficulties Anadarko has relaxed its interest – but the government has now guaranteed further controversy by entering into negotiation with controversial Romanian businessman Frank Timis to exploit the fields. Having already acquired vast iron ore deposits – in no less controversial circumstances as that of the London Mining Agreement – through his company African Minerals, Timis has quickly set up African Petroleum to make a bid for the offshore oil find. By end of last year, however, the London Stock Exchange took the highly unusual step of preventing the listing of African Petroleum, prompting Timis to accuse the Exchange of ‘witch-hunt.’

Diamonds were said to be central to Sierra Leone’s troubles in the past, a dramatic example of what economists call the Resource Curse. It seems that the stakes are getting higher with the discovery of even more important minerals.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN AFRICA

2010-09-23T09:03:00.002+02:00

BAOBAB: Extending Nigerian women's rights through Sharia law

Western feminists are often challenged by gendered cultural practices such as female circumcision, arranged marriage and sentences like public lashing or stoning for women. This often leads to a situation where defenders of women's rights feel like they have to choose "between colonial interference and callous indifference."

BAOBAB, a Nigerian non-governmental organisation (NGO), uses Sharia law to assist Nigerian women and is a wonderful example of how women's rights can be actualised by drawing on the local culture itself, without appealing to external Western human rights norms.

In 1993 the Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML) network began a three year research project in Nigeria, in which various aspects of Muslim law and women's rights in Nigeria were examined. In 1996 the project came to an end after it produced an abundance of research. This research indicated that many women in Northern Nigeria experience human rights restrictions and are unable to defend their rights because of a lack of resources, both in terms of knowledge about their rights and in terms of access to legal resources, such as lawyers. BAOBAB was consequently established to raise awareness about women's rights in Nigeria, to conduct research and to provide information to women about their rights.

In 2000, BAOBAB extended their activities to provide legal defense and support to women who were unfairly charged under Sharia penal codes in Nigeria, and they have since extended these services to minors of both sexes.

Most of the women's cases BAOBAB takes on are appeals against sentences of lashing or stoning for charges of 'zina' (unlawful sexual activity). The most well-known case has been that of Amina Lawal, who was charged with zina on 15 January 2002 and was sentenced to death by public stoning. BAOBAB provided the resources to appeal the case and she was acquitted in September 2003. What is significant about BAOBAB's appeal of Amina Lawal's and other similar cases, is that this NGO lodges appeals within the Sharia legal system and does not resort to external, non-Muslim, non-Sharia or outright Western human rights standards.

Laws and the human rights approach
BAOBAB's use of Sharia law in appeal cases is not the NGO's only option. They could also appeal to general Nigerian law or to the numerous international human rights agreements that Nigeria is a signatory of.

Despite having alternative legal routes by which to make appeals, BAOBAB has pursued this process through Sharia law – a route less popular with the international community, who perceive this system of law to be frozen in time and closed to debate. S.V. Barrow, for instance, wrote that: "In Islam, these punishments are the will of God as expressed in the Qur'an. As such, no human being can question this authority without risking social ostracism or a possible death sentence for heresy. Thus, violations continue unfettered."

BAOBAB chooses to work with Sharia law in order to work directly with Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria. In 2000, the case of Bariya Ibrahim Magazuu, a 13 year old girl who was sentenced to 180 lashes in public for zina and for providing false testimony received substantial support from NGOs in the global North. The local governor dismissed the international groups and their opinions because they were not Muslim and their opinions were not based in Sharia law. He however agreed to entertain appeals from BAOBAB that originated within Sharia law.

Through this approach, BAOBAB was able to convince the trial judge to drop the sentence to only 100 lashes and to postpone the sentencing until after she had finished breast feeding, which would give BAOBAB an extra year to continue the appeal process. Unfortunately, her sentence was brought forward, with only one day's notice and she received the 100 lashes. It is suspected that the sudden imposition of the sentence was a response to the pressure from international human rights groups and that the local authority was reasserting power over the community.

Although many of their cases are still pending and appeal processes remain lengthy, BAOBAB has experienced impressive success by making appeals through Sharia law and they have had charges reversed on all the appeal cases they have handled to completion. If nothing else, let this NGO's achievements inspire us and show that 'culture' is not an impenetrable static force, but rather a very fluid, dynamic asset available to utilise for the improvement of women's lives.

By Katherine Furman
Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI)
Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI) is a South African-based research and strategy firm with a focus on social, health, political and economic trends and developments in Africa. CAI releases a wide range of African-focused discussion papers on a regular basis, produces various fortnightly and monthly subscription-based reports, and offers clients cutting-edge tailored research services to meet all African-related intelligence needs. For more information, see http://www.consultancyafrica.com.

PAN AFRICAN NEWS II

2010-09-09T16:38:00.002+02:00

Brain gain: Skilled diaspora return to Africa
Published on Thursday, 09 September 2010
After Tomi Adegoke completed a Master's degree in Public Health from a university in the United States of America (USA), she decided to move to Nigeria, the country from which her parents had emigrated one generation earlier. She accepted a position as a program management officer for the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention in Abuja, Nigeria. Tomi's story echoes Michael Akindele's, who left his financially rewarding position as a consultant within a Fortune Five Hundred company in the USA to set up his own business in media and entertainment in Nigeria. He cited the readily available investment opportunities created by Nigeria's growing economy as the main incentive for the return to the continent.

These stories highlight a growing trend on the African continent which suggests that skilled African citizens, who have been living as expats, are returning to the continent in what can be termed Africa's brain gain. This can be viewed as a reversal of the brain drain phenomenon which beset many African countries in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Brain drain trends
Brain drain typically results in African countries experiencing skills shortage when citizens with necessary expertise opt to, or are forced to emigrate. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the African brain drain is particularly noticeable in the health sector. For example, in the 1980's, Kenya reportedly had 20 medical doctors leaving each month, whilst Ghana reportedly lost 60% of its medical doctors. In 1993, the UNDP's Human Development Report stated that close to 21,000 Nigerian doctors were practicing in the United States alone, despite the fact that Nigeria suffers from a chronic shortage of doctors.

Ethiopia similarly lost a third of its medical doctors to the West. Between 1978 and 1990, Zambian statistics showed that only 50 of the 600 doctors who received training remained in Zambia, whilst the rest emigrated to the West. Numerous factors drive the movement of professionals from the African continent, including socio-economic and political matters. A regularly cited reason is that 22 African nations were ruled by military juntas in 1982 and that by 1985, post independent Africa had witnessed at least 60 military coups. This period was characterised by regimes that severely repressed human rights such as academic freedom and free speech. Attempts to garner better working conditions were often met with harsh reprisals, including imprisonment and sometimes death. The Africa described here appears to be undergoing transformation, however, in which good governance, respect for human rights and growing economies are becoming more respected, sought-after principles.

Changing times
In 2001, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) which replaced the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. Barely a year after its adoption, 40 member states had ratified the treaty and their actions were heralded "an expression of the political commitment of our leaders to regional integration, and beyond this, to a united Africa."

A new era started for Africa, far removed from what had typified the continent in its recent past. Importantly, the AU treaty acknowledges aspects such as the continents' political economy, socio-cultural issues as well as human rights. The AU has fourteen objectives ultimately aimed at boosting political cooperation and economic integration and including the protection of human rights. The AU treaty represents a departure from the OAU Charter because it prioritises human rights and democracy. The central theme of the AU treaty is a continent with a unified approach to important issues like politics, human rights and economics. Arguably, the adoption of the treaty has resulted in increased respect for human rights in Africa. The AU's objectives imply that African states see the value of improved living standards for its citizens alongside the importance of promoting investment in science and technology research.

Today, the African continent is witnessing a significant drop in the number of armed conflicts. The AU and other regional actors have been active in peacekeeping missions and pacifying tense political crises. On the economic front, Africa appears to be gaining some ground, mostly due to well performing agro-industries. The overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the continent has risen steadily from 3.5% in 1997 to a 5.5% projection in 2010 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These changing circumstances are the reason why many professionals, thought to be long lost to the West in successive waves of emigration, are returning to the continent.

Kayode Akindele returned to Nigeria in order to work as an investment banker with the United Bank for Africa (UBA). Akindele is Oxford educated and lived in Britain for more than 16 years. Prior to his departure, he held an investment banking position with Lloyds TSB in London. He stated that "There was a sense of patriotism. I have always regarded myself as Nigerian and planned to return to Nigeria eventually." Kofi Ansah, a fashion designer from Ghana, studied fashion at the Chelsea School of Art in England. He lived and worked in Europe for 20 years before returning to Ghana. Ansah has since established a growing fashion empire, based in Accra. He is also creating jobs in the local fashion industry for designers, tailors and models. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) recently released a report which indicated that Ghana's relative peace and political stability had a positive impact on return migration. Emigrants now return sooner, usually after acquiring a skill or trade.

South Africa has seen its fair share of professionals leaving during the post apartheid era. Most cited factors like the high levels of crime and unfair employment equity policies in the labour market. Alana Bailey of the ‘Kom Huis Toe Veldtog' (Come Home Campaign) founded an organisation that promotes the return of migrated professionals to South Africa. As many as 6,000 people moved back to South Africa within 6 years after the campaign started.

Skilled and patriotic Africans
It seems most expats return to the continent once they regard their homelands as politically and economically stable. In order to find a lasting solution to the African brain drain, the factors that force African professionals to leave for the West need to be addressed. The development of Africa's human resources, as well as the reversal of the brain drain, are significant concerns of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). It is vital that NEPAD recognises the importance of luring African professionals back home. Although Africa still has some way to go with regard to providing a lasting fix to the brain drain phenomenon, the introduction of human rights based regimes, improved economies and relative stability are key catalysts in the brain drain reversal.

By Phephelaphi Dube,
Consultancy Africa Intelligence (CAI)

ONCE AGAIN ABOUT AFRO-PESSIMISM

2010-09-09T16:33:00.000+02:00

Mainstream U.S. media criticized for ignoring positive developments in Africa
Thursday, 02 September 2010

The president and CEO of the Africa Society of the National Summit on Africa has told VOA that important stories about Africa continue to feature less prominently in mainstream American media outlets.

According to the Africa Society of the National Summit on Africa there is a need to demand positive coverage of Africa
The Africa Society is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that strives to educate Americans about the richness and diversity of Africa, as well as the economic opportunities that the continent offers.

Bernadette Paolo said, despite the fact that the month of August featured many Africa-related events in Washington, those events did not make the mainstream American media.

She said there is a need to demand positive coverage of Africa by providing the media with information that contrasts with the usual negative stories.

"When you ask students throughout the United States, the first four images that come to mind when they hear the word "Africa" is war, disease, starving children and animals. And, I think that the reporting in the media is primarily negative," she said.

Paolo said, although there are challenges facing African countries, Americans need to know the contributions the continent is making and the potential it holds.

"When you think about it, many of the mineral resources in the entire world are from the continent of Africa, never mind the fact that the African Diaspora in the United States is the highest educated among all immigrant populations. These are facts that never come to the fore through the media," Paolo said.

She said changes in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa over the years suggest that Africa is getting the attention it warrants from the U.S. government.

But, Paolo said much more needs to be done to improve the negative coverage of the continent in the mainstream U.S. media.

"I think that, with journalists, you have to feed them with information and make them aware of these changes, of the economic development, of a country such as Botswana and others that are making great strides economically, of the number of democracies that are on the continent now, as opposed to 20 years ago," Paolo said.

Paolo said the responsibility of disseminating positive information about Africa is not solely that of the media, but also the duty of all Africanists through the use of modern technology.

"I think it's a combined effort of getting more information out there using social media, people who are Africanists, people from the African Diaspora, putting things in newspapers, writing letters to the editors. So, the responsibility isn't solely journalists. It's all of ours," she said.

Paolo said she lamented the fact that millions of Americans did not get the chance to meet and see the young people from Africa who attended President Obama's Forum with African Youth Leaders.

"We had heads of state. We had foreign ministers. In Africa, in August, we had the AGOA Forum. We had these youth leaders that President Obama had here, 115 extraordinary young people with contributions already in their lives that were just mind-boggling. All these things are missed opportunities to have a different picture of African leaders. And so, I think, we seldom have reporting on positive developments such as these," Paolo said.

VOA News

PAN AFRICAN NEWS

2010-08-27T11:50:00.002+02:00

Africa considers a continent-wide space agency

Africa is a step closer to setting up its own space agency, with the approval of a planned feasibility study by the 53 member states of the African Union earlier this month.

Africa as seen from spaceThe African Space Agency, as it would be known, would be intended to help ensure the continent becomes an important player in the global space programme.

The agreement was made at the close of the third African Union Conference for Ministers in charge of Communications and Information Technologies meeting in Abuja.

Ministers said that the feasibility study would also draft a common space policy for the continent, taking into account various existing space technology initiatives.

They added that the continent-wide policy would be developed in collaboration with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

The news follows the first successful launch of a pan-African satellite by the Regional African Satellite Communications Organization earlier this month.

Preparations for the launch began almost twenty years ago, in 1991, but various controversies held it up until 2007, when the satellite was first launched into orbit - only for it to develop technical problems.

The ITU will provide advice to Africa on technical issues involved with setting up the agency, its spokesperson, Sarah Parkes, told SciDev.Net.

Parkes also said that details of the assistance to be provided by the ITU are yet to be defined but stressed that the union would do everything it can to help launch a space agency that would aid development on the continent.

Jonathan Mahlangu, a South Africa-based policy analyst said that the plan by the African Union was long overdue. "Think of the contributions of NASA and ESA to the development of America and Europe," he said. "A well coordinated space agency for Africa will assist in solving most of the challenges before her."

According to Mahlangu the critical mass of experts to kick-start the agency already exists. "All African Union needs to do is to put up a call to her citizens in NASA and Europe to come and contribute with their knowledge."

But others are more cautious. Peter Martinez, coordinator of South Africa's National Working Group on Space Science and Technology, said the idea was premature.

"A number of African countries should first develop their own capabilities and these [countries] could then take the lead in perhaps forming a continental space agency," said Martinez, who also heads the space science and technology division at the South African Astronomical Observatory.

SciDev.Net

SADC AT THE END OF THE 30TH SUMMIT

2010-08-19T17:39:00.000+02:00

SADC summit ends with pledge for continued peace efforts
Wednesday, 18 August 2010

Regional leaders ended their 30th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) on Tuesday with a pledge to continue with its peace and security efforts in the region.

Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba is the new chairmanof SADC
The leaders, which form the SADC, used the summit to reflect on progress and challenges that continue to hammer regional integration since its formation 30 years ago.

They also dealt with various issues including the regional "hotspots", which include Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Lesotho and the DRC.

In terms of Zimbabwe, SADC put pressure on Zimbabwean leaders to agree on a roadmap leading to a free and fair election, by fully implementing the GPA.

SADC mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis President Jacob Zuma tabled his report to the summit which touched on various issues including the successes and failures of the implementation of the GPA so far.

In a nutshell, the summit of regional leaders wanted order to be restored among Zimbabwean leaders - who remained deadlock on the swearing-in of Roy Bennett and the appointment of Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and Attorney-General Johannes Tomanato.

The leaders reiterated their call on the international community to lift all forms of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe in view of the negative impact it has on the region in general.

In terms of Madagascar, according to the communique, the Heads of State and Government decided to set up a liaison office for a more closely follow-up of the situation in that country.

They agreed that sanctions in that country should continue until the country returns to constitutional normalcy.

A constitutional crisis erupted in Madagascar when army-backed Andry Rajoelina seized power from President Marc Ravalomanana.

The two leaders signed a power-sharing agreement with two other former presidents in November last year, but Rajoelina has threatened to disband the government and missed several election deadlines he set. Talks aimed at ending the crisis have failed so far.

With regards to Lesotho, which made new headlines after its Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili survived an assassination attempt by attackers who planned to seize power, the region urged leaders to work together towards the finalisation of the Bill Amending the electoral law as a matter of agency.

Generally the summit noted that other parts of the region remained peaceful.

The summit also approved a recommendation by Ministers of Justice in the region to review the SADC Tribunal's mandate and jurisdiction. The Tribunal has been receiving cases on disputes between natural and legal persons and their countries in the region.

This means that the review of its role, functions and terms of reference of the Tribunal should be undertaken and concluded within six months.

With regards to the food security situation in the region, the summit noted that the region recorded overall increased food production, but noted that the access to food and malnutrition of households' level remained a challenge.

To address this, the summit urged member states to support the African food Basket Initiative which is aimed at transforming food sufficiency.

The summit also endorsed the council's decision on the establishment of the Regional Poverty Observatory which will facilitate the implementation of the SADC Declaration on Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development.

The hunger situation, which stems from the lack of rainfall and drought, is a genuine problem in Southern Africa. UNICEF claims that almost 16 000 children die from hunger-related causes in the region.

In terms of child mortality, which was the theme of the summit, Member States were urged to support safe motherhood programmes in order to reduce maternal, infant and child mortality in line with the Millennium Development Goal commitments.

Economically, the leaders agreed that the region was still recovering from the global economic crisis and outlined policy measures to enable the region to cushion itself from any future economic crisis.

The summit noted that the region needed to apply science and technology for infrastructure development, climate change management and for energy development, adding that these were essential for sustainable growth and development.

The summit also appointed Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba as chairman of the bloc.

BuaNews

THE SUDAN'S AFFAIR

2010-08-19T17:11:00.002+02:00

Oil and transparency: New hope for Sudan?

Hopeful news on Sudan, one of Africa's 54 countries most often and strongly associated with conflict and bloodshed, is difficult to find. This week, however, new Sudanese Energy Minister Lual Deng made a pledge for transparency in the oil industry that could play a significant role in preventing future conflict over oil. The country is in the process of organising a referendum in southern Sudan on whether the semi-autonomous region - where much of the oil lies - should become an independent state. The vote on independence from the north was part of the 2005 agreement that ended the civil war.

It was a just another seminar on transparency in the oil sector. Seemingly banal.

But this was being held in Khartoum, involving live debates between northern and southern Sudanese officials, a minerals watchdog and the international media, who were allowed free access to publicly grill those who administer what has for years been an incredibly opaque oil industry.

What emerged was surprisingly positive and all walked away feeling that — at least until the January 9, 2011 referendum on southern independence — this was the first step towards finally unpicking all the stitches that have sewn the sector tightly shut to outsiders.

We are "PR stupid" said the newly appointed Minister for Energy from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, Lual Deng, who instigated the forum.

He said this to explain the discrepancies in oil production and oil prices uncovered by Global Witness, a non-governmental organisation, whose report "Fuelling Mistrust — the need for transparency in Sudan's oil sector" provoked the discussion.

These discrepancies include oil prices published by the ministry of finance website with little clarification of how they had been calculated, even citing barrels of Sudanese oil selling for as little as 15 cents each.

Global Witness also found discrepancies between China's CNPC, which dominates a Sudanese oil sector dogged by U.S. sanctions, and Sudan's energy ministry output figures. Those figures were easily explained as the difference between gross production and net of water, gas and solids on Wednesday.

But the fact that an international giant like CNPC is publishing undefined production figures in an annual report provoked concern even from Sudanese officials.

And why did it require such an elaborate showcase to provide such a simple response? "PR stupid", said Deng.

After months of chasing and waiting in vain for an explanation from the government or CNPC of the discrepancies in oil output, even having the phone hung up on them by the Chinese, Global Witness went ahead and published their work.

"Next time you should just call us to verify the figures," was CNPC's ironic response, with the presenter who had flown in from Beijing for the forum flashing on a PowerPoint screen the email and mobile number of CNPC's country manager in Sudan.

Just five minutes earlier that same manager had declined my request for a meeting or to share his contact details "in the interests of transparency." One of dozens of attempts I have made over the years to extract any information from the state-owned firm.

I wonder how long he will keep that phone number.

But if you sifted through the barbed comments by Sudanese officials directed at the Global Witness reps and the attempts by CNPC to ridicule the figures, important progress was made.

Sudan said it would commit to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, to which CNPC gave its support. It also agreed to a full audit back to 2005 and the ministry said it would publish daily production figures. French oil giant Total was also given a public guarantee that whether or not the south votes to secede in just five months, its oil concession contract on southern soil would be honoured.

If all this happens, it will be a massive step towards opening up Sudan's taboo oil sector which could convince those elusive big European companies that left Sudan during the civil war to come back and invest.

Most analysts believe the south will secede next year and investors worry because much of the oil lies along the border dividing Sudan's two halves, which is still disputed. However, most expect any secession to be amicable given both sides dependence on oil.

Reuters Africa News blog

BIOFUELS IN AFRICA

2010-08-06T11:07:00.003+02:00

Biofuels could increase food production, says report
Thursday, 29 July 2010

Planting biofuel crops in Africa need not damage capacity to grow food and could even enhance food security, according to a controversial review prepared for the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).

The report, with case studies on six countries in East, West and southern Africa, concludes that bioenergy production can expand across the continent and provide income and energy to farmers without displacing food crops.

Potential conflicts between bioenergy and food needs can be addressed with the right approaches, said Rocio Diaz-Chavez, a researcher at Imperial College, London, and lead author of 'Mapping Food and Bioenergy in Africa', launched at the 5th African Agricultural Science Week in Burkina Faso last week (23 July).

"If approached with the proper policies and processes and with the inclusion of all the various stakeholders, bioenergy is not only compatible with food production but can greatly benefit agriculture in Africa," said Diaz-Chavez, citing the benefits of investment in land, infrastructure and human resources.

The report's conclusions were drawn from a review of existing research and case studies of biofuel production and policies in Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia. It found there is enough land to allow a significant increase in the cultivation of sugar cane, sorghum and jatropha for biofuels without decreasing food production.

But the report has triggered mixed responses from farmer groups and research institutions.

Monty Jones, executive director of FARA, cautioned that Africa should not trade food security for biofuel production.

"We need to keep the land for food rather than raise crops for energy," he told SciDev.Net. "We have the big task of increasing agricultural production by six per cent. Governments need to come up with appropriate policies on such issues."

Namanga Ngongi, president of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa said the continent has a food deficit and should prioritise food ahead of biofuels.

And Philip Kiriro, president of the Eastern Africa Farmers Federation, added that international investors in biofuels do not take local food security into account, which is likely to result in food shortages.

Meanwhile, some countries are already planting biofuel crops. Senegal, for example, plans to have 321,000 hectares of land under jatropha by 2012 to help meet the country's energy needs and increase the income of farmers.

"We are going for both," Macoumba Diouf, director general of the Senegalese Agriculture Research Institute, told SciDev.Net.

"We need low-cost energy to drive our agriculture and at the same time ensure that our farmers grow food and earn income from growing jatropha on a contract basis."

Ibrahim Togola, a professor at Mali's Rural Polytechnic Institute, said politicians need to understand that Africa's agricultural revolution depends on access to modern energy services.

During discussions of the report at the science week, participants called for a broader conversation on how to meet the energy needs of African farmers.

SciDev.net

2010-08-06T08:38:00.001+02:00

How the Gulf oil spill can benefit Africa
Tragic as it is, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is good news for Africa – increasingly the new frontier for oil and gas exploration worldwide.

The demand for oil is rapidly using up the remaining global reserves as world addiction to carbon fuels comes to a necessary end. It took the world 140 years to use its first trillion barrels of oil. It will use its second, and final, trillion, in less than 30 years. And the need will just go up and up as global energy demand skyrockets.

Currently some 1.5-billion out of 7-billion people still live without electricity and with the increase in global wealth (particularly in China and India) set to continue, the demand for energy is almost endless. As many have indicated, the world has moved from an industrial to a knowledge era, and now into an energy era where the demand and availability of energy will determine global growth patterns.

Some African countries are planning ahead. Morocco, the only North African country without oil, is investing several billion dollars in wind energy and will soon provide almost half its need from wind, with the remainder planned for nuclear. While substantial reserves of coal and gas remain, the dependence on a dwindling supply of oil makes competition for this scarce resource particularly voracious and countries need to act now.

Although Africa is estimated to only have around 10% of the world's proven oil reserves (Libya and Nigeria have the largest reserves) it will, by 2025, provide around 25% of North America's oil and is also increasingly important for other countries. Already Angola is the single largest oil provider to China.

Today new sources of oil are being located more frequently in Africa than anywhere else. Hardly a week goes by without a new discovery, often in pristine environmental areas such as Lake Victoria or within the Great Rift Valley. The Niger Delta falls into a similar category. Its mangrove swamps are considered to be one of the ten most important wetlands and marine ecosystems in the world, now also some of the most heavily polluted.

As oil runs out elsewhere and stability continues to improve in Africa, exploration on the continent is lucrative business, with companies tripping over one another to obtain exploration rights.

The reasons are not hard to fathom. Much of the oil in Africa is off the coast of countries such as Angola and others to the north in the Gulf of Guinea. Transport costs are reduced and no pipelines are required. Ships can load up and sail off, unhindered by instability or indeed the need to invest onshore. Sub-Saharan African oil is also viscous and has a very low sulfur content that requires less refining.

Finally, Africa also offers a very favourable contractual environment. Without the capacity to effectively manage and oversee oil exploration and production, nor the ability to amass either the technical expertise or the billions in capital investment required to drill for oil themselves, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa operate on the basis of so-called production-sharing agreements that offer foreign oil companies tremendous down-stream profits. This is particularly advantageous as only four African countries, Algeria, Angola, Libya and Nigeria are members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and therefore not subject to limits on output.

Most important of all, virtually all the big discoveries of oil in recent years have been offshore, in deepwater reserves miles way from civil war, insurrection or strife. In fact, one-third of the world's new oil discoveries since the year 2000 were in Africa.

Writing in his 2007 book Untapped: the Scramble of Africa's Oil (Orlando, Harcourt) John Ghazvinian notes that "African oil is cheaper, safer, and more accessible than its competitors", and there seems to be more of it every day. And, though Africa may not be able to compete with the Persian Gulf at the level of proven reserves, it has just enough up its sleeve to make it a potential "swing" region – an oil province that can kick in just enough production to keep markets calm when supplies elsewhere in the world are unpredictable.'

That the BP deepwater disaster happened within the waters of the global superpower allowed the collective venting of US spleen on an ostensible non-American company. American politicians, President Barack Obama included, could gang up on hapless CEO Tony Hayward as part of a useful domestic political scapegoating exercise, comfortably ignoring their own regulatory failures.

The sad reality is that if the Deepwater Horizon happened say to Chevron off the coast of Angola, there would be no $20 billion compensation fund, little impact upon Chevron's share price, no delay in paying out handsome dividends and certainly no legislative pressure from a hapless Angolan congress.

All this has now changed. Exxon Mobil BP, Shell, Total or Chevron (the big five) will not be able to easily hide or obscure a massive spill when next it happens and the chances are best that a new spill will not be within US territorial waters, but perhaps in places such as the Mediterranean where BP will shortly start deepwater drilling in 1 700 metres of water.

The well, in the Gulf of Sirte, is the first to be drilled under a $900-million deal BP signed with Libya in 2007, which it described at the time as its largest single exploration commitment. It is also in water substantially deeper than that below the Deepwater Horizon and since it is evident that oil safety technology has not kept pace with exploration technology at these depths, the risks self-evident. One can only hope that the development of improved safety awareness and hopefully, containment and emergency measures, will be spurred by events in the US.

Certainly the Deepwater spill will help to focus attention on the need to act environmentally responsibly and to not push exploration boundaries beyond controllable safety limits. The damage that the oil spill will inflict on the sensitive habitat along the coast of Florida will raise consciousness in the largest global oil consumer about the need for responsible exploration as much along the US coast as in emerging African oil producers.

For their part African governments need to enter into an alliance with the global green movement to monitor exploration practices, as well as with countries such as Norway that has both managed its oil income and its environment in an exemplary manner. This requires a new partnership for the energy age well beyond current practices.

By Jakkie Cilliers
Jakkie Cilliers is the executive director of the Institute for Security Studies Head Office in Pretoria, South Africa. This article was originally published on the ISS website on 6 July 2010.

2010-08-06T08:27:00.001+02:00

Caros amigos,

Em menos de dois dias 32.000 brasileiros enviaram mensagens para o Lula, porém Sakineh pode ser executada a qualquer momento. Mais pressão do Brasil e da Turquia sobre o governo do Irão é a única esperança. Doe abaixo para compra de anúncios de emergência em jornais do Brasil e Turquia nas próximas 72 horas:

Sakineh Ashtiani pode ser executada por adultério no Irão dentro de alguns dias. Somente a pressão diplomática de dois países poderá salvá-la: o Brasil e a Turquia.

Nós últimos dois dias mais de 32.000 brasileiros enviaram mensagens para o Presidente Lula pedindo um esforço maior pela libertação de Sakineh. Porém, precisamos continuar a pressão para convencer ele e o Premiê Turco, Erdogan, a usar todas as suas forças diplomáticas e persuadir o Irã a libertar Sakineh e acabar com o apedrejamento para sempre.

A Avaaz está publicando anúncios de emergência em jornais influentes do Brasil e da Turquia, pedindo pressão sobre o Irão pela clemência e justiça. Os anúncios irão entregar a nossa petição de meio milhão de brasileiros e pessoas do mundo todo. O objetivo é chegar aos círculos políticos e fazer um apelo direto ao Lula e o Premiê Erdogan. Se cada um fizer uma pequena doação nas próximas 72 horas, nós poderemos dar uma última esperança a Sakineh! - Clique aqui para colaborar:

https://secure.avaaz.org/po/save_sakinehs_life/?vl

A sentença de Sakineh é algo ridículo posando de justiça. Ela foi condenada à morte por apedrejamento por supostas relações com outro homem - mesmo após a morte do marido. Detalhe que o apedrejamento foi banido no Irão e ela não entender a língua falada no julgamento. O seu caso ganhou atenção quando seus dois filhos lançaram uma campanha mundial para salvar sua vida, gerado uma comoção global, com adesão de mais de 550.000 membros da Avaaz.

Com a pressão, o governo iraniano revogou o apedrejamento, mas a sentença de execução permanece. Há um clima de tensão no Irão desde que o caso de Sakineh ganhou a atenção mundial - o regime ameaçou prender os filhos de Sakineh por falarem demais e emitiu um mandado de prisão contra seu advogado. Ele tentou fugir do país e os membros da sua família têm sido vigiados.

Mas o Lula e o Erdogan têm grande respeito no Irã e podem influenciar o regime. E eles nos ouvem. O Lula disse que não se envolveria no caso, mas depois de ver uma campanha pela Sakineh na internet, ele mudou de opinião, oferecendo asilo político a ela.

Nas últimas duas semanas, mais de 552.000 de nós assinaram a petição para salvar a Sakineh e acabar com o apedrejamento no Irão. Nos resta apenas alguns dias para convencer Lula e Erdoğan a agir - e essa pode ser nossa última chance de salvar Sakineh. Vamos cada um fazer a nossa parte e ter certeza de que nosso apelo ao governo será ouvido:

https://secure.avaaz.org/po/save_sakinehs_life/?vl

O caso Sakineh tem indignado o mundo inteiro pela magnitude da sua injustiça brutal e absurda. Mas na nossa luta por uma mulher, nós fazemos um poderoso manifesto por mulheres e pessoas em todos os lugares, e nos colocando de pé por uma pessoa, nós lutamos pelo direito à justiça de todos.

Os filhos de Sakineh enviaram um último apelo: "Não permitam que o nosso pesadelo se torne uma realiade. Hoje, quando quase todas as nossas opções chegaram a um beco sem saída, nós recorremos a vocês. Por favor, ajudem a nossa mãe!" Clique aqui para responder ao seu chamado e para que Lula e Erdogan façam o mesmo:

Com esperança e determinação,

Alice, David, Milena, Ben e toda a equipe Avaaz

TWO MOZAMBICAN CITIZENS APPOINTED FOR AU PEACE AMBASSADORS

2010-07-22T11:21:00.000+02:00

AU appoints peace ambassadors for Africa
Monday, 19 July 2010

The commission of the African Union have announced the appointment of an Advisory Council and Peace Ambassadors to support the implementation of the 2010 Year of Peace and Security.

Senegalese singer Youssou N'Dour and Angelique Kidjo from Benin have both agreed to act as AU Peace AmbassadorsThe Advisory Council and Peace Ambassadors were drawn from multiple sectors and multiple regions, with appointees declaring that they are ready to make peace happen.

For the Advisory Council, all African Nobel Laureates and other eminent Africans were approached. Twelve Council members have accepted the position to date, including Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, F.W. de Klerk, Salim A. Salim, Alpha Oumar Konaré, Graça Machel, Mo Ibrahim and Prof. Wangari Maathai.

Notable African personalities in the areas of sports, culture, music and the arts were approached to be Peace Ambassadors. They include Manu Dibango, Angelique Kidjo, Paulina Chiziane, Michael Essien, Waris Dirie, Abedi Pele, Maria Mutola, Youssou N'Dour and Salif Keita.

The announcement was made during the inaugural meeting of the Year of Peace and Security Advisory Council Members and Peace Ambassadors held at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa last week.

The 26 will support the Commission in conflict resolution and peace building efforts on the continent by advocating for the ratification and implementation of various AU instruments and commitments. This will include the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, mobilising resources, generating popular support and awareness and implementing specific activities developed by the Commission such as encouraging businesses to sign the Make Peace Happen Industry Charter and encouraging schools to use the Make Peace Happen Lesson Plan.

They will also play a key role in the implementation of various activities leading up to and on Peace Day.

Speaking during the official opening of the meeting, AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping said that it was important for Africans to take ownership and direct as well as participate in the implementation of the Year of Peace and Security programme. He commended the personalities for choosing to be part of the initiative.

"The successes and courage you have demonstrated in your own fields of endeavour will serve as inspiration to all of us, as we collectively tackle the challenge our continent faces today: The Quest for Permanent Peace and Security," said Ping.

The meeting was scheduled to discuss the programme of work of the Advisory Council and Peace Ambassadors in the implementation of the Year of Peace and Security. The group affirmed their commitment to making peace happen in Africa in 2010 and beyond and their readiness to begin to engage various groups and institutions in the context of the Year of Peace and Security.

According to a statement, the AU Commission is implementing the Year of Peace and Security through a multistakeholder approach, in line with one of the guiding principles of the implementation of the programme, that of inclusivity and partnership.

The inaugural meeting with the Advisory Council and Peace Ambassadors is to be followed by a joint meeting with humanitarian agencies to map out areas where they will be able to work together to distribute humanitarian supplies and materials on Peace Day (21 September).

Established by a UN resolution in 1982, Peace Day provides a unified rallying point for Africa to show that peace is possible.

The AU is working towards a day when all Africans can experience peace simultaneously; the cessation of hostilities in conflict zones will allow for humanitarian relief, such as vital food, water, mosquito nets and other emergency supplies, to be provided to people living in those areas.

It will help to create an unprecedented moment of collective unity that will highlight further the objectives of the Year of Peace and Security and establish a stronger platform for a conflict-free Africa.

The AU is encouraging Africans to take up several activities on Peace Day, such as community work, football games and the utilisation of the Make Peace Happen Lesson Plan.