Cote d’Ivoire: The War is on, Let’s Give it a Chance?

Paul-Simon Handy, Director Research, ISS Head Office

There is no such a thing as a neat, painless and clean violent conflict. War is clearly a bad thing and inevitably causes massive casualties and substantial loss of human life, as well as loss of material wealth. There are good reasons to avoid war and it is probably one of the biggest achievements of our civilization to have sanctified the human right of preserving each and every life. But there are sometimes better reasons to opt for a war in order to preserve peace and, paradoxically, save civilian lives, which would have otherwise been sacrificed if nothing were done.

Côte d’Ivoire today has reached this point and there is little doubt that only the legitimate use of controlled violence will bring an end to a conflict whose multifaceted consequences would affect the whole West African region.

Despite numerous mediation attempts by ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and other interested parties to find a peaceful solution to the Ivorian post-electoral crisis, President Laurent Gbagbo who lost the November 2010 elections by a considerable margin, has repeatedly refused to relinquish power to his opponent, Alassane Ouattara. Having been defeated at the polls he has resorted to fierce anti-Western propaganda to mobilise his supporters in the economic capital, Abidjan, at a time when his diplomatic support seems to be vanishing both inside and outside Africa. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation on the ground has massively deteriorated, causing hundreds of civilian losses.

According to a recent report by Human Rights Watch, fighting between armed elements loyal to Gbagbo and Ouattara has led to gross human rights violations that could amount to war crimes. Targeted assassinations of civilians and prisoners, massive destruction of property and the use of heavy weapons in urban areas have led to massive population movements within the country and into neighbouring countries.

Against the background of this deterioration of the situation and given the fact that diplomatic avenues seem to have been exhausted, there are at least three good reasons to give the ongoing war a chance in Côte d’Ivoire:

Firstly because the frenetic attempts of the AU to solve this crisis by peaceful means of negotiation are based on the wrong assumption that President Gbagbo will eventually resign. Observers of the Ivorian conflict know well that both the pressure of his entourage (particularly his politically powerful and very influential wife, Simone) as well as his own conception of politics won’t allow President Gbagbo to resign. Throughout his political life, Gbagbo has had to fight to acquire almost everything and he considers those now fighting to keep him in power as his ‘liberation movement’. Despite the unprecedented diplomatic isolation that he faces, he has succeeded in brainwashing his followers and convincing them of the biblical dimension of their fight. Particularly the youth militia “young patriots” led by the now youth minister Charles Ble Goude will be ready to serve as human shields to protect their champion, should he be forced to resign.

Apart from the radicalized young patriots, Gbagbo’s support base cuts across a wide range of the Ivorian population and is well represented in urban centers where most of his supporters will however not take up arms for him. In fact, the electoral sociology of Cote d’Ivoire suggests that Ouattara also has strong support in the South, thus nullifying the simplistic dichotomic view of an ethnically divided country along North-South lines.

Secondly, war should be given a chance in Côte d’Ivoire because the current balance of power on the ground is growing unfavourable to the spoiler, Gbagbo and his troops, whose only visible strategy now consists of protecting Abidjan, the most important city and the headquarter of the country’s political institutions. Although necessary and laudable, mediation has not borne the expected fruits and the search for a peaceful resolution to the crisis is at best naïve at this stage. The forces loyal to Ouattara have understood this and have launched an offensive on many fronts that reveals the weakness of Gbagbo’s army on the ground. In a sense, the decisive victory of Ouattara’s forces, though highly undesirable in a democratic setting, might have the merit of laying the groundwork for a long-term peaceful resolution of the Ivorian conflict.

Demobilisation Disarmement and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) that blatantly failed during the transition period would be much easier to realize and there would be a unique opportunity for national reconciliation. In reality, full-blown war has never happened in Côte d’Ivoire and the de facto partition of the country imposed by French troops after the coup attempt in 2002 has prevented the only chance that war has ever had in that country. As a consequence, real and would-be war-professionals have constantly continued to re-arm with the view of increasing their stakes in peace negotiations. Weakened by a growing diplomatic isolation and an expected military defeat, Gbagbo and his allies will have to face charges of war crimes currently investigated by the International Criminal Court.

Finally, war should be given a chance in Côte d’Ivoire because the reputation of the AU, ECOWAS and even the UN would be at stake if a jurisprudence concerning Gbagbo was created at a time when the African continent is going through a high number of crucial elections this year 2011. In fact, both the AU and ECOWAS have established a governance doctrine comprised of norms and principles that form the basis of their firm stance against President Gbagbo. Informed by the UN certification of the electoral process ECOWAS and the AU have taken sides for Ouattara, the president-elect, in order to send a strong signal to potential spoilers on the continent who would be tempted by blatant electoral manipulation á la Gbagbo. In a sense, it is the capacity of African regional organisations as well as the UN to enforce their own decisions and position themselves as powerful and respected political actors that is at stake.

If war remains the only viable option in Cote d’Ivoire today, it however remains a complex and difficult enterprise that will cost civilian lives. There is no need to deploy an additional international force in Côte d’Ivoire that no country would be ready to fund in the current international context and that will only serve as a new mobilization tool for Gbagbo’s supporters. The presence of the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) with its 10 000 troops and a mandate resorting to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter is more than sufficient to back up the southwards march of forces loyal to Ouattara. Gbagbo’s army is in disarray as evidenced by the recent defection of General Philippe Mangou, his Chief of Staff. But in spite of this, the battle for Abidjan might prove difficult as radical elements loyal to Gbagbo could be tempted by suicide operations. On the other side, forces loyal to Ouattara might also engage in retaliation acts that could jeopardise the fragile peace needed to reconcile a fragmented society.

When he finally access power, Ouattara will be faced with enormous reconstruction tasks. The economy has been seriously damaged by 4 months of embargo and international isolation. But his most important task will probably be to reconcile Ivorians by reaching out to those radicalized by Gbagbo’s inflammatory and divisive rhetoric - those who have not voted for him. With a northener as President, as Côte d’Ivoire celebrates 50 years of independence, the country will have an historic chance to address the long lasting problems of identity that all successors of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the architect of the country’s independence, have tried to manipulate to their advantage.

The ‘dogmatic pacifism’ of large parts of the African political elite who advocates for peaceful means even when there is no willingness to do so by the belligerents, is at times an excuse for inaction. Conflict resolution that ignores the use of force as a matter of principle is idealistic and certainly inappropriate at this stage of the Ivorian conflict. The country is today in the logic of civil war and it is a blessing in disguise that the legitimate winner of the November elections is gaining military ground in a confrontation that the incumbent president was hoping to win by attrition. The spirit of the UN resolution 1975 that was unanimously adopted on the 30 March 2011 is probably in line with the imperative of saving civilian lives by all means, including the legitimate use of force.